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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Moius D. FORKOSCH*
INTRODUCTION
NY ANALYSIS which involves numerous and varied details may
degenerate into a taxonomic exercise. For example, an im-
mediate and necessary classification is that of the content or
symbols transmitted and received, and the means, methods, and
agencies so transmitting and receiving. While divisions and group-
ings may be so utilized, these must remain servants and not become
masters. The reason is that the "why" is generally more important
than the "what," being projectable in time and in space, e.g., one
country's experiences may become the basis for another's approach.
For these reasons the present inquiry at first goes deeply into
what may seem too abstract a discussion of American history and
values. However, the subsequent particularization discloses that
while now and then the United States has swerved from its basic ar-
ticles of political faith, still, over the past two centuries, it has re-
mained true to its national credos' involving freedom of information.2
* DR. FoRKoscH Is Professor of Law and Chairman of the Department of Pub-
lic Law at Brooklyn Law School, Brooklyn, New York. He has seven books and
numerous articles to his credit.
t The author wishes to thank James Carroll for technical assistance in the
preparation of the manuscript for this article.
This study was undertaken for the Consiglio Nazionale della Richerche, Rome,
Italy, which has consented to its pre-publication in a slightly revised form.
1. It may be argued that these credos are really myths, or at least mass as-
sumptions, which the collectivity accepts blindly. Nevertheless, they are "facts" of
life, even though beliefs, and because so many act on them they must be taken into
account in any examination and evaluation of a nation's conduct. See, e.g.,
FORKOSCH, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARNOLD BRECHT (1954).
2. This term, "information," will be used many times, and will be somewhat
defined shortly. It will include all forms and methods of communication, e.g., the
press, broadcasting, postal mail, moving pictures, symbolic expression infra (notes
58 et seq.), and while the press, i.e., newspapers, may be discussed at greater
length, this is not to denigrate the other media. The avant garde press is also
included, on which see GLESSINO, THE UNDERGROUND PRESS IN AMERICA (1970);
minorities and their own publications, publishing companies, and broadcasting and
other media of information, are not directly touched upon, but also come within
the present analysis.
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America's future in this area thus seems fundamentally sound and se-
cure, despite the occurrence of aberrations, exceptions, and even the
commission of egregious acts of repression at times.
Such lapses as history and current events disclosed in the free
flow of information have not yet overburdened the resiliency of the
American political system. As with all others, ours is a congeries of
postulates, axioms, and even myths, including a variety of moral im-
peratives, e.g., as in the Civil War, World War I, where we fought
for "democracy." So with the economic system, e.g., one major belief
is the validity of free enterprise;' the social system, e.g., the omni-
present opportunity to move upward; or the religious sytem, e.g., a
fundamental belief in God. All of these facets combine in the total
American system, which includes not only a way of life, but also a
need for the support and continuation of certain imperatives. Some
of these latter may sustain more than one such system-facet, and thus
be interwoven as a wool in the fabric of our society.4 Two of these
are freedom of speech and of press.5 For example, the free and un-
trammeled flow of information is today as much an economic and
social necessity as it is a political one,6 and it therefore follows that
anyone seeking to prevent this stream from being dammed is, at least
to this extent, supporting the American "capitalistic" system. Those
who seek to circumscribe these two freedoms are thus not political
3. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 1, 3 (1946); RosTow, PLANNING
FOR FREEDOM 30-31 (1959).
4. See, e.g., Forkosch, American Democracy and Procedural Due Process, 24
BROOKLYN L. REV. 173 (1958), feeling that procedural due process is such a woof
and illustrating by reference to the procedures found not only in the courts, but
also in the administrative process, military justice, labor unions, the educational
system, churches and religious bodies, the political system and parties, etc.
5. It is presently not relevant to discuss other items such as the remainder of
the first amendment freedoms, or other constitutional clauses, as also being such an
indispensable and cross-cutting ingredient. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Illi-
nois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967), that "the rights to assemble peace-
ably and to petition for a redress of grievances are among the most precious of
the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. These rights, moreover, are inti-
mately connected both in origin and in purpose, with the other First Amendment
rights of free speech and free press. 'All these, though not identical, are insepar-
able.'" See also infra note 55.
6. Justice Black, in the U.M.W. Case has "intimately connected" in an "in-
separable" fashion all first amendment freedoms, and has also written that "the
First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to the extent that it
can be characterized as political. '. . . And the rights of free speech and a free
press are not confined to any field of human interest.'" Id. at 223.
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conservatives but anarchists7 who, by disavowing such mainstays,
cause decay and disintegration. s
One personal note as to bias-this writer is biased insoafr as the
almost absolute freedom of information is concerned. He starts
with the premise that man himself, his collectivities and his organiza-
tions, must be free in the absolutistic sense to gather, edit, and dis-
seminate all information, and this is because not only man but also
his governments, national or international, and his associations, pri-
vate and public, likewise benefit in the utmost. Man's creativity and
his genuis must be free from any and all attempts by any person or
government to regiment, coerce, license, censor, intimidate, or other-
wise exercise any degree of control over him. Thus man needs con-
tacts, information, and all that his past and his present can bring to
him, and it is only in such an open society that the individual fulfills
himself.' His conduct, however, may necessarily have to be circum-
7. It is somewhat difficult so to term Georges Pompidou, President of France,
but the French-controlled television system spews forth government views and
propaganda continually. Concerning the French Office of Ration and Television
(ORTF) he is quoted as saying to its personnel that "you are speaking for France,
and there is a certain level of tone and of thought that is demanded." ORTF,
"whether we like it or not, is the voice of France." INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, July 8,
1970, at 5, col. 6. Even England's state-controlled B.B.C. has its private-commer-
cial rival, and West Germany learned well its lesson under Hitler. Italy's system is
similar to France's but apparently no special classification of its network journalists
has been made.
That dangers loom internally for the information media in the West is illustrated
by the annual report of the International Press Institute which points up the
growing distrust of public opinion in public institutions, a general disenchantment
by the public, and the start of a gulf and confrontation developing between pub-
lishers and their newsrooms. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1971, at 2, col. 2.
8. One may therefore argue that solvent publishers, for example, are indispen-
sable adjuncts to society's need for a free press, and therefore support ailing ones in
some manner. This has been sought to be done for certain purposes and certain
publishers, e.g., the Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-353 (July
24, 1970), permitting an antitrust exemption for failing papers so as to be able to
operate joint or common production facilities, etc., although its coverage and effect
is questionable insofar as a small paper is concerned. These latter may conceivably
be solely involved in governmental support financially. See also infra, notes 538
et seq., and text keyed thereto. Or, in supporting ailing businesses, the nation di-
rectly subsidizes or aids and therefore supports farmers, ships, railroads, see the re-
cent Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518 (October 30, 1970), and
others, e.g., mass transportation, Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-453 (October 15, 1970), and indirectly subsidizes the oil industry
(depletion allowances), airplane and defense industries (by upping cost estimates,
loans, etc.), and even all publications (reduced postal rates). Could there not be
some form of the negative income tax (proposed for individuals) here utilized for
these small publishers?
9. A somewhat discouraging statistic from a survey conducted by Louis Harris &
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scribed in a limited measure, but only when and to the degree abso-
lutely indispensable to cope with a (temporary) emergency or evil.10
And, in this world of imperfection, man (at least in the United
States) has created his own (imperfect) mechanism whereby this
emergency is to be determined, so that, pending judicial or political
review, it is the desired expressed will of the hoped-for majority
through its representatives which has this power. Regardless, the
starting and returning point is absolute freedom, temporarily lim-
ited minimally."
PRELIMINARY
IN GENERAL-THE POLITICAL-LEGAL ASPECT TO DOMINATE
The subject matter of this analysis is sufficiently broad to en-
compass the entirety of civilization and each nation's life, of perhaps
all that differentiates man from animals and that makes his existence
Associates is that at least thirteen-percent of the adult population is afflicted with
serious literacy problems impairing their daily lives. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1970, at
12, col. 7. The official estimate of the Census Bureau is that one out of every ten
Americans over twenty-five is functionally illiterate, and a Harvard study informs
that half of our adults probably lack the literacy required to read such basic items
as newspapers, job applications, driving manuals, or the simplest exposition. See
SATURDAY REV., June 13, 1970, at 51, col. 2. In other words, is this paper, and all
such concern for the freedom of communication and information, much ado about
nothing? The obvious retort is, what of the other eighty to ninety percent? And,
even so, broadcasting does affect and color their minds, as does all other visual or
sound efforts, e.g., motion pictures, so that at least in these areas the freedoms must
be maintained. It is, of course, appalling to realize all this, but it is just as appalling
to realize some of the other features which afflict our country.
Of exceeding importance, but not discussed because of space and relevancy, is the
problem of the university in today's world of ideas, communication, and humanism.
See, in general, the several essays on the subject in ENcY. BrT., THE GREAT IDEAs
TODAY 1969 (1969). See also infra note 312a.
10. But see infra text and notes 174, 238, and 319 for the absolutistic views of
Justices Douglas and Black, given expression lately in the former's dissent to the
majority's granting of a stay in Byrne v. Karalexis, 396 U.S. 976 (1969).
11. This writer also subscribes to the (extreme?) view that if and when any
person or group seeks to continue this emergency indefinitely, and thereby circum-
scribe freedom indefinitely, conditions for resistance, rebellion, and revolution are so
created by such intransigeance, and these conditions may conceivably erupt into a
civil war. See, e.g., Forkosch, Is Violence an "American" Nightmare?, 4 GEORGIA
L. REV. 439 (1970), and also Points of Rebellion: A Dialogue. The "Rebellion"
of William 0. Douglas, Id. 830 (1970). On the ability of the judiciary to enter
into the factual bog so as to ascertain the existence of a sufficiency of data to per-
mit, or continue, the emergency-power syndrome, see Forkosch, Constitutionality of
the Vietnam Venture, and Forkosch, A Registrant's Right to Counsel Within the
Selective Service System, 22 S.C. L. REv. 287, 301 (1970).
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worthwhile. For without the indispensable freedom of, and to in-
formation, as well as its dissemination and receipt, man would re-
main ignorant, wallow in the abyss of irrationality, and stagnate ethi-
cally, scientifically, and socially. Information, facts, data, experi-
ences are necessary for man to obtain and achieve knowledge, and it
is with knowledge and its use and application that man advances in
all areas such as scientific, social, and spiritual.12 It is significant that
in 1941 Franklin Delano Roosevelt gave, as the first of his "four es-
sential human freedoms," that of "freedom of speech and expression
-- everywhere in the world."
Freedom of speech and expression, however, are not limited
to newspapers and broadcasting-there are so many and diverse gath-
erers and purveyors of information that it is not only a physical im-
possibility to locate them all, but also to comprehend and discuss them
all.' 3  For example, the federal government permits religious, charit-
able, educational or other types of organizations to be exempted under
the law from paying an income tax. All these are in the stream of in-
formation, especially the educational; 14 newspapers and others how-
12. Man's great distinction is not in communication per se, as many of the
higher forms can do this, e.g., food, sex, danger; it is, rather, his combined ability
to gather data, obtain knowledge, think and communicate thoughts, ideas, abstrac-
tions, which is his hallmark, and speech is merely a higher form of communication
as are electronic gadgets faster ones. Present-day satellite, laser, and as yet unan-
nounced methods are improvements upon, but not drastically and totally new ones;
if and when mental telepathy comes into existence and use, then a higher form of
life through a completely different form of communication will evolve. In such
new form many questions and problems raised today should disappear, e.g., some
types of censorship. See also infra note 518.
13. See, e.g., supra note 2. See also People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d
272 (1963), wherein defendants hung a clothesline, with old clothes and rags, in
their front yard and added similar lines each year, this being a form of "peaceful
protest" against the city's high taxes. The city then enacted an ordinance pro-
hibiting such lines in the front or side abutting a street except in hardship cases,
when a permit was required. The defendants were convicted of a violation which
was upheld against first amendment claims, the court assuming that the clothesline
was a "form of nonverbal expression." Symbolic free speech is a term used to cover
conduct such as tearing draft cards, etc., on which see Forkosch, Draft Card
Burning-Effectuation and Constitutionality of the 1965 Amendment, 32 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 303 (1966).
14. See DRUCKER, THE AGE OF DISCONTINUITY: GUIDELINES TO OUR CHANGING
SOCIETY (1969), for one recent discussion. On the income tax aspect see, e.g., INT.
REV. CODE Of 1954 § 501, as amended, found in 26 U.S.C. § 501 (1964), and for
certain statutory nonexemptions see Internal Security Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C.
§ 790(b) (1964), as to Communist-controlled organizations, while the 1969 Tax
Reform Act, P.L. 91-172 (December 30, 1969) sought to close various loopholes
with respect to sources of income.
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ever, even though more in such stream, nevertheless pay. The point
is, however, that thousands upon thousands of private15 and govern-
mental' 6 sources of information exist and cannot be discussed, some
for obvious reasons, e.g., private commercial advertising which, per-
haps, is the life blood of newspapers and broadcasters, and yet which
pumps uncounted millions of lines and commercials into the stream
of information and misinformation entering the American home and
factory. This analysis therefore must necessarily be limited in cov-
erage.
Separately, the topic requires various facets to be explored, e.g.,
economic-can there be a free press, or any other medium of in-
formation, in a competitive society; should there be any form of sub-
sidization, but with what consequences; does subsidization lead to any
degree of control or censorship; how does this affect the nation and
the individuals; and so forth. Obviously neither such economic nor
any sociological or other' 7 aspect can be made the focus of this essay,
although other writers may examine them elsewhere. For example,
we cannot consider how and to what degree the computer and other
15. It is impossible to call the roll of private group or agency sources of infor-
mation. For example, in Russia there is samizdat, or self-publication, as when
typed or even hand-written crumpled onion-skin sheets of paper are used to circulate
privately an author's creation, or news, or other material. One, however, is of major
interest for modem America. It is poll-taking by private persons (or their cor-
porate organizations), e.g., Elmo Roper Associates, or by newspapers, e.g., the New
York (City) Daily News, preceding and during political campaigns. Their influ-
ence has become remarkable, both upon the candidates and their strategies and
tactics, and even upon wavering or doubtful voters. In the 1970 campaign these
numerous polls practically determined the substance and issues to be stressed by
many candidates, developed slogans, and otherwise computerized elections.
16. Every governmental agency, federal or state, is involved in the information
stream, and some even have their own information divisions or offices, headed by
an individual who devotes full time to issuing news releases and other publicity,
comments on decisions, etc. See also infra note 324.
17. There is one intriguing facet which, obviously, is a present conjecture. It
utilizes Shakespeare's sound and fury, signifying nothing, as the point of departure.
Is this volume, and all that has gone into it, as well as all written in the field, of no
value because-and here is the rub-totalitarian governments may seek to control
the minds of their subjects by brain-washing, suggestions (subliminal and all like
methods), and even via the experiments presently going on whereby subjects may be
controlled (or at least influenced) by gene and other physiological changes? If
there is any break-through in this overall area of controlled birth or controlled man
then information, in any multifaceted view, may be completely free as the recipient
is rendered unable to understand, appreciate, or act upon the "knowledge" so ob-
tained. The progressive and ultimately innocuous desuetude of man's mind thus
looms. To repeat, obviously the author of this essay does not subscribe to these hor-
rendous views of the future. See also infra notes 153 and 319.
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like methods of storing, sifting, retrieving, analyzing, and making
"decisions" on information, will affect not only the individual but the
nation, as well as international relations, in the future.' I
What is attempted in this paper is some understanding of the
political-legal scene in the United States, and if and how there are any
freedoms, duties, and rights of and to information within this view of
the subject matter. Other aspects will, of course, be touched on, but
the political-legal dominates. And, it may be added, the United
States is permeated throughout by the adversary syndrome, these pat-
terns appearing, for example, in the economic area, e.g., competition;
the political, e.g., basically a two-party struggle; in education, e.g.,
the grade-test rivalry for a college place; in the information media,
e.g., the "scoop." This adversary approach is, of course, fundamental
to the legal system in this country. It is within this context that the
free information media will be found to be either overshadowing their
governments in the emission of facts, opinions, and propaganda, or
else, at the very least, paralleling them, and this means that they will
be spreading abroad the images of their respective nations, for good
or bad.
THE NECESSARY DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROTECTED INFORMATION,
EVEN THOUGH UNDER COMMERCIAL AUSPICES, AND PURELY
COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS
The concepts of free speech and press apply to many things, per-
sons, and methods, but where purely commercial information, e.g.,
mercantile advertising, is involved, the first amendment does not
apply, and this even though one side of the handbill contains a re-
ligious message." Thus, for example, a newspaper may be sued
for a libel. Yet, because it is so interwoven with the dissemination
of information, a broader defense is made available to it where pub-
lic figures are involved. 20  And a state court refused to permit an
adopted initiative measure to be applied against pay television be-
18. See, e.g., DRUCKER, supra note 14, at 24-27. The entire volume, which is a
brief for the need for knowledge and its dissemination should be read.
19. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See also Breard v. Alex-
andria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), where the majority pointed out that "no element of the
commercial entered into this" fact situation. Id. at 643.
20. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964), and
discussion keyed to infra note 381.
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cause such "sweeping suppression of home subscription television
. . . would . . . encourage and foster monopolistic domination by
existing television stations deriving their financial support from com-
mercial advertisers." 21
CONSTITUTIONAL UNCONTROLLED AND CONTROLLED
FREEDOMS AND RIGHTS
Regardless of political or philosophic theories generally sup-
porting an uncontrolled freedom of speech and press in the United
States, the Constitution and its language are of major concern. Ob-
viously language may require interpretation, but when the first
amendment states, unequivocally and without qualification, that
"[c]ongress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press ... " it would seem that no question could be raised
as to meaning; application, of course, is something else, but the plain
meaning and intention seem crystal clear.22
This conclusion is fortified when another aspect of a person's
freedoms is examined. For example, constitutional language else-
where guarantees all persons the right that "[t]he privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,"23 but immediately
qualifies this by stating "unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Inva-
sion the public Safety may require it." So, too, do the fifth and
fourteenth amendments guarantee a person the right to his life, lib-
erty, or property, but then qualify this by immediately thereafter
21. Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 49 Cal. R'ptr. 537, 411 P.2d 289
(1966); see also infra note 221. While the court apparently utilizes a balancing
(see note 208 et seq. infra) and a bad tendency approach, in so deciding the case
solely on free speech and press grounds, other questions might have entered, e.g.,
an equal protection one.
22. There are other illustrations available, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3
states that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed," and other
clauses in that section likewise state unequivocal prohibitions. So does U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1, open, "[n]o State shall enter into any . . ." of the types of con-
duct enumerated, and here the language is again negatively absolute.
23. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. See also CHAFEE, How HUMAN RIGHTS GOT
INTO THE CONSTITTrnON (1952) wherein the author believes this to be the most
important limitation on the federal government.
There are, as already seen in supra note 5, other kinds and types of rights (and
see also, e.g., infra notes 48-50, 53); and even though different terms are used, e.g.,
freedom (see infra notes 32 et seq.), they ordinarily (not always) are interchange-
able. For a recent good conceptual analysis see Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously,
N.Y. REVIEw, Dec. 17, 1970, p.23, and also infra notes 47, 61, 63, and 546-547.
[Vol. XX:I1
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stating that these may be taken by due process of law.24 In other
words, one's substantive fights are not absolute, i.e., the govern-
ment is not limited unconditionally, as these two illustrations make
clear. 25 And if the judiciary should hold otherwise still, by amend-
ment, the government's power so to qualify one's rights, e.g., to his
property qua income, may now be granted and permit incursions
upon such a freedom of ownership and disposition.
26
Thus two general types of constitutional freedoms may be men-
tioned: first, those literally with no qualifications or exceptions at-
tached to them and, on the contrary, explicating in no uncertain lan-
guage the absoluteness of the limitations placed upon the govern-
ments;27 and, second, those which are qualified, that is, those which
depend upon subsequent conditions or factors or else expressly per-
mit governmental interference.18
Obviously it is the first such freedom which is here explored;
and obviously the absoluteness of the language will not be followed in
the conduct of the governments or in the judicial appraisal of the
meaning and enforcement of the terms. Regardless of conclusion
that free speech and free press are not absolutes, despite the consti-
tutional language, the touchstone of the present inquiry is the com-
plete and absolute freedom of information in its total sense. And
this is so even though we may find that in theory and in practice ex-
ceptions and limitations sometimes may reduce this perfect inde-
pendence to zero.
In effect we will analyze these ad hoc denials of liberty, interspersed
with statutory and judicial objections to such disclaimers. In other
words, we assume the grand picture to be unimpeded freedom of in-
24. Respectively listing the federal and state governments, and being identical in
their basic language, namely, that neither government shall deprive any person "of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....... This language is in
the negative whereas in the text we use the affirmative.
25. Again questions of interpretation and application are not here discussed.
See FoRKosCH, CONSTrrIONAL LAw ch. XV-XX (2d ed. 1969), and also Forkosch,
supra note 4, at 173-253.
26. E.g., the sixteenth amendment, permitting a federal direct income tax and so
overruling the requirement of apportionment among the states found in art. I, § 2,
cl. 3 of the Constitution, which requirement was followed by the Supreme Court in
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), overturning federal
legislation; this decision was, of course, rejected by the 1913 amendment.
27. See, e.g., supra note 10, and infra note 238.
28. See also for a like conclusion, MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 8-9 (1960).
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formation, go into the restrictions thereon, and also discuss how these
restrictions are themselves narrowed by laws and decisions. Thus,
by reducing the restrictions, the freedom is broadened.
Although so limiting the overall and the particular scope of the
inquiry, the examination within these confines will nevertheless be
wide and sufficiently deep to permit a comprehensive understanding
of the situation in this country. For this purpose there will neces-
sarily be required a degree of historical and conceptual political the-
ory, and this is what will shortly be done. However, there is first
required a brief explication and definition of terms so that against this
broad backdrop the particular analyses can follow. The reason for
this is that there are several ambiguities in "freedom of information."
Of Persons, Things, Methods
Information does not begin, go, or end in a vacuum, at least not for
our society and our civilization. For example, the freedom to inform
also must have, as a corollary, persons who are to be informed. Even
if we assume information stored on tapes and other forms of memory
on retrieval systems, the assumption is that others eventually will use
it. The umbilical cord stretching between the speaker and listener
nurtures not only those so connected, but also that which supports this
reciprocal dependence, namely, the state. It is of the essence for a
government in which the people have any voice that they be in-
formed; and the more they become so enlighted, the more the gov-
ernment not only is benefited but is more responsive and stable. Re-
bellions and revolutions are less likely the greater the diffusion and
depth of knowledge, so that a government's self-interest is furthered
by upholding one's freedom of informing and of informing others.
While there must thus be persons at both ends of the line, there
must also be a thing, i.e., the matter or material, which is involved,
as well as the methods of practices in the gathering, transmitting,
and receiving2" the thing or information. In each of these areas
questions of freedom and restriction also arise.
29. PRESIDENT'S RESEARCH COMMITTEE, RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS I, ch. IV
(1933), goes into "[t]he Agencies of Communication" for that period, prepared by
Willey and Rice, where, at the outset, the authors state they will concentrate
upon "the agencies facilitating transmission" of communications. See further
BAGDIKIAN, INFORMATION, note 522, and also notes 517 and 518, infra, and quota-
tion there from page 381. We do not go into the various available, and future,
[Vol. XX: 1
1971] FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 11
As to "persons," the term may or may not be limited to human
individuals, depending on context. It will here refer to and include
all people and all bodies recognized as (legal) entitites, e.g., as used
in the fifth and fourteenth amendments' Due Process Clauses. 0
Of and To Information
The title of this paper includes the preposition "of" before the noun
"information." Our examination, however, stresses three infinitives,
each of which contains the preposition "to," namely, one's freedom
to inform, one's duty to inform, and one's right to be informed. Is
there any significance of a substantive nature to be attached to this
difference in terminology? The answer is that "of' is here used in
a combined descriptive, possessive, and denotative sense. There are
many kinds of freedom, and one may classify them as those in the ab-
stract and those in a specific phase of man's activity; for example,
freedom of thought is an abstract concept, but freedom of move-
ment,31 of competition, 32 and of work,83 are specifics which illustrate
individuality and the ability to choose.34  Thus "of" now must de-
mechanical and other methods of transmitting or of storing information. On the
first, for example, methods such as the new cathode ray tube writing and editing
machine, or the automated communications system, have not yet been fully acti-
vated and used. On the second, for example, one can, today, literally condense (as
in microfilm, microfiche, and supermicrofiche methods) millions of words onto
pages, cards, and even dots; obviously, these are of great aid in the accessibility to
and of information, so that quaere: do the manufacturers (publishers?) of these
cards, etc. enjoy constitutional rights in the areas here discussed?
30. The Preamble is not a source of power, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11 (1905). On the distinction between people and persons, with the latter some-
times referring to the former and also including corporations, etc., see FoRKoscH,
supra note 25 at 401-402; and on the word "People" in the Preamble, and its back-
ground and meaning, see Forkosch, Who Are the "People" In the Preamble to the
Constitution?, 19 CASE WESTERN REs. L. REV. 644 (1968), for a detailed analysis
and discussion. See also infra note 133.
For example, the Preamble to the Constitution opens with, "[w]e the People,"
and only once more throughout that document does the word "people" appear, al-
though "persons" is found twenty-one times; in the twenty-five amendments to the
Constitution the term "persons" appears twenty-seven times while "people" appears
but seven times. "People," of course, ordinarily and usually refers to humans, but
"persons" may or may not.
31. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); see also infra
note 273.
32. See, e.g., FoRKoscH, ANTITRUST AND THE CONSUMER chs. III, V (1956).
33. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), as well as FoRKoscH, LABOR
LAw ch. XIII (2d ed., 1965).
34. See MILL, ON LIBERTY 76 et seq. (Everyman's Lib. 1929).
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scribe the particular and active 5 freedom to be discussed,3 6 so that
'to" becomes descriptively justified. Separately, while the analysis is
thus not to include all kinds or types of freedom, the terms "freedom"
and "information" now attach one to the other so as to limit not only
the first but also the second- i.e., information in its monumentally
broad signification is being narrowed to the freedom thereof.
It is at this point that "to" further enters. For this preposition also
delimits the concept and this essay. Both "freedom" and "informa-
tion" are overly broad, but while the second need not be specifically
restricted initially, the first must; and so it is the freedom "to" inform,
and not "of" information, which gives us a narrow verb rather than
an open-ended noun. So the later discussion is of the freedom to
inform in this limited sense. The same approach also occurs there-
after, although "freedom" is altered to "duty" and to "right"-i.e.,
there is a facet of freedom which brings up these other two terms.
COVERAGE AND LIMITATIONS
The three areas of persons, things, and methods were just men-
tioned as subjects for this inquiry, but we also referred to the freedom
to inform and of information, the duty to inform, and the right to be
informed and to information. There is undobutedly a degree of over-
lapping which occurs in any discussion of them, and several other ob-
servations may also be made. The first of the latter three aspects,
i.e., freedom to inform, may generally be said to refer to, or at the
very least include, governmental impediments to these freedoms and,
as we shall see, there are private ones as well; the second and third
aspects, however, involve private and public bodies. 7
35. The historic background and common law reason for compelling "of" to be so
interpreted is given in discussion in text keyed to infra note 240.
36. Numerous other freedoms might be referred to, but obviously the gamut can-
not be listed. Merely to illustrate some others, there are freedom of association,
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); of demonstration, Hague v. C.I.O.,
307 U.S. 496 (1939); of wearing of arm-bands, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); of transferring and controlling one's
property, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929); although later
repudiated for certain types of businesses, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934). See also FoRKosCH, supra note 25, at 411-16.
37. See, e.g., discussion of the Caldwell case in in! ra note 457. See also the right
of Congress to be informed of facts which persons may be in possession of so as
to enable that body to legislate, which right permits either House to hale before it a
recusant witness, McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). Once before such a
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Another observation is that the modifying and operative nouns
"freedom," "duty," and "right" all refer to and are connected with the
infinitive "to inform;" that while this last is a verb, a" we assume that
"of information" is part of each of the three aspects to be discussed-
e.g., the freedom to inform of facts, analyses, opinions, knowledge,
etc. Further, that while the verbs, with their modifiers, are impor-
tant, it is these broad and non-limited nouns which give substance
and content to the discussion. 9
Governmental (and private) control is, however, subject to vari-
ous limitations, at least in the United States. The most important
political-governmental limitations are those found in the federal Con-
stitution's several clauses and amendments, and in national and lo-
cal statutes, all of which either restrict governments expressly or im-
pliedly, or which support the rights of persons as against those gov-
ernments and therefore restrict these latter. The legal interplay be-
tween these rights of persons (and amongst themselves) and the pow-
ers of the governments has given rise to a body of legislation and
judicial decisions which, in effect, either has molded the nation's ap-
proach in this area of information or has severely handicapped per-
sons or governments. Separately and additionally, (and sometimes
improperly acting outside this framework of law) there are adminis-
trative agencies40 which may impinge drastically upon these rights
of the individuals.
body the witness has his own jurisdictional and constitutional rights supporting,
perhaps, his refusal to testify on grounds of self-incrimination. See FoRKoscH,
supra note 25 at 174-181. See infra notes 101, 102 and 457.
38. Whether transitive or intransitive is here not material. Of course there is a
difference, as shortly discussed, infra note 62. There a definite aspect of activity
is involved.
To inform is transitive, and appears to indicate that such right or freedom gives
one the ability actively to go about it and to do something, and this without regard
to another's right or freedom, or else by accommodating any resulting conflict (on
which see infra notes 172 and 208). There is, therefore, the element of purposeful
motion, development, and progress in one's constitutional right and ability to in-
form others, so that not only the individual but all society, and the nation, benefit.
39. See supra note 30, on meaning and definition of this term, and text keyed to
it. A last observation is that the country's total educational system ought to (must)
be included within the definition of information, with a truly detailed, analytical,
in-depth examination required, but this is here an obvious physical impossibility.
40. These are, of course, part of the governments so that this may be a distinc-
tion without a difference. These agencies will here include all federal and state
bodies, whether individual (e.g., a governmental single licensor to whom an applica-
tion is made) or collective (e.g., the Federal Communications Commission con-
sisting of seven members), on all of which see generally, FoRKoscH, ADMINISTRA-
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FREEDOM AND RIGHT
Although freedom and right are discussed separately, a prelim-
inary question must here be considered, namely, are these two
terms interchangeable? As we have discussed the former, it re-
fers primarily to the absence of restraints, thereby enabling one
freely to do that which he desires, and this without the necessity of
having any (legal, moral, or other) right thereto. As also noted,
various qualifications may be imposed upon a freedom, but for this
paper we postulate a complete freedom of information. However,
a right is not necessarily one able freely to be exercised; even the nat-
ural rights theory, while proceeding on the view that these are pos-
sessed by all equally, and in a degree are inalienable, requires only
that he who interferes with these rights assume the burden of justifi-
cation-i.e., they may therefore be limited and so no absolute free-
dom to exercise them need exist.
We still have not given freedom content. A preliminary working
interpretation permits this term to be discussed affirmatively, as
well as, negatively; that is, we may give an absolutistic and crassly
positive explanation as one's ability to do or act as he pleases, i.e.,
freedom to or for; or a like negative rendering of an individualistically
liberal conception as being or characterized by the absence of or ex-
emption from restraints, restrictions, etc., i.e., a freedom from."'
Generally dictionaries,4 2  encyclopedias,4" or other reference
TIVE LAW passim (1956). For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a
part of the United States Department of Justice and is, in theory and in law, sub-ject to the direction of the Attorney General of the United States and of the Presi-
dent; in practice, however, J. Edgar Hoover, the Director of the F.B.I. since
its inception, is a law unto himself and is sufficiently and politically powerful (i.e.,
the Congress will generally accept his reasons and recommendations) to ignore his
superiors and manage somehow to obtain his desires. On the respective cross-
competition between former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and the F.B.I. Di-
rector, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1970, at 48, col. 1. See also infra notes 347, 424,
and 499b; H & B OVERSTREET, THE FBI IN OUR OPEN SOCIETY (1969).
41. The best-known expositor of this aspect of freedom is MILL, supra note 34.
See for an exposition of "The Idea of Freedom," Adler's volume (1958), who gives a
repertory of the concepts of freedom and their variants, and also his later volume
(1961). See also 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILo. 221 (1967) for an article on freedom, as
well as infra note 139. Mill, of course, also takes into consideration his concern
for others and their equal freedoms, on which see also infra notes 45, 54 and 140.
42. See, e.g., FUNK & WAGNALL'S, NEW "STANDARD" DICTIONARY 1426 (rev. ed.
1961).
43. See, e.g., 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 48 (1957).
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sources will give or emphasize a positive definition or discussion of
freedom, whereas they will give or emphasize a negative approach to
"liberty."44 One writer uses a taxonomic approach by dividing free-
dom into three main divisions, namely, circumstantial, acquired, and
natural, with two additional variants, namely, collective freedom and
political liberty.45 Regardless, freedom may or even must also in-
clude (a degree of) power, capacity, or ability; otherwise the positive
aspect is a chimera, and in its use the like capabilities and rights and
freedoms of others enter, i.e., their freedom from being affected ad-
versely by your exercise of your freedom to or for. Of the numerous
species of freedoms we here select and discuss the "to" and "for" as-
pects of to inform and to be informed.4"
The term "right" is a difficult one to describe or discuss. As any
philosopher or lawyer will attest, it is chameleon-like and partakes of
the contextual circumstances and situations within which it is found.4 7
It may be used as an adjective, adverb, verb, or noun, and it is this
last which is here applicable, one's right to be informed. When so
stated, however, another aspect of the term appears. Does this right
exist independently of persons, as if a Platonic form in the heavens
exemplified the ideal? Or is it connected and interconnected with
and to persons, so that no separately existing right can be postulated?
For this paper, there can be no right without a person, and some de-
gree of ethics enters, as well as the power and ability of effectuation.
44. Respectively, supra note 42, at 979, and 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
1029 (1968).
45. ADLER, supra note 41, defining circumstantial freedom as being free to do
what one desires to do in any given situation, i.e., the absence of restraint (see also
infra note 54) which also can be referred to as negative freedom; acquired freedom
enables one to do what he considers right and to make rational choices; natural
freedom is an essential element of man (or his will) and is self-determination (cir-
cumstantial is self-realization, and acquired is self-perfection). The variants are
freedom which can be achieved only by a common effort (collective freedom) and
that vested in a citizen having political rights (political liberty). This classification
breaks down when various dissimilar thinkers are slotted together, but it may be
of aid.
46. See also introductory observations keyed to supra notes 31-36. One of these
observations was that "freedom" might be said to be the coin-metal controlled by
the government which could therefore debase it as deemed necessary (paragraph
after note 38 in text). As later seen, this power is of exceeding importance, as the
government usually controls not only the power to apply and effectuate its controls,
but also the power to determine when and under what circumstances they should be
so applied and effectuated.
47. See, e.g., Hart's views in Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 L.Q.
REv. 37 (1954). See also supra note 23.
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But even a right-person conjunction is not in itself sufficient to
understand the substantive content and meaning of right. Some
philosophers and students of jurisprudence hold to a natural rights
theory, i.e., inalienable rights which all men have equally,4 8 and then
fill in their definition of right as they (e.g., Congress, the President,
the Supreme Court) feel is warranted. Others, for example the
positivists, stress custom and convention, 9 and some connect and
even define right in terms of a correlative duty.?° Those in the Hege-
lian stream feel that right is a developing idea 5' which becomes and
is made manifest in society, experience, and institutions;5 2 and
(though this is not an exhaustive list) there are also human rights,
e.g., as stated in the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.3 Hohfeld's four legal concepts, each matched to its
proper jural correlative, includes one situation of present interest.
It is his first concept, which is the opposite to duty, which is of value
here, that is, one has a liberty or freedom to do something and there-
fore no right attaches in anyone else to that something or to prevent
it from being done.54 The source of the substantive rights for this
48. See, e.g., LOCKE'S, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Laslett ed. 1960).
The United States Declaration of Independence and Constitution have embraced
these concepts. See also MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW (Anson
transl. 1943); RITCHIE, NATURAL RIGHTS (1894), who attaches as Appendix six
"Declarations" in English and in French from those countries' respective his-
tories. See also infra note 53, and MELDEN, HUMAN RIGHTS (1970).
49. See, e.g., AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Hart ed.
1954).
50. See AUSTIN, id., at 285, where he footnotes: "Every right rests on a relative
[and legally enforceable] duty . . . lying on a party or parties other than the party
or parties in whom the right rests." See also BENTHAM, FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT
(1776), where he utilizes the triad of right, duty, punishment.
51. This should be capitalized, i.e., Idea, for it is the pinnacle of Hegel's system
of dialectics. See, e.g., Forkosch, Reflections Upon Hegel's Concept of Property,
Contract, Punishment, and Constitutional Law, 18 VAND. L. REV. 183 (1964):
"It is through this continuing negating method that ultimately we reach, through
such an inward, and yet outward, ladder [i.e., the (negative) dialetical process],
the Idea, which is the Absolute of God, and which may be more or less abstract."
52. See, e.g., GREEN, LECTURES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION
(1882), and BOSANQUET, PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF THE STATE (4th ed. 1923),
although see the devastating criticism of Hegel's philosophy by HOBHOUSE, THE
METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF THE STATE (1918).
53. These include various kinds of rights, e.g., social and economic (articles
22, 25).
54. See HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (Cook, ed. 1964), and
for critical literature see DIAS, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF JURISPRUDENCE (1964). For
views similar to Hohfeld's, see (his general disciple?) KOUCOUREK, JUmRA RELA-
TIONS (2d ed. 1928). This view of Hohfeld's may be compared with the text keyed
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paper is, of course the first amendment's Free Speech and Free Press
Clauses, though it is really the method(s), procedure(s), and via-
bility(ies) used to enforce and effectuate them which are primary.
INFORMATION-SYMBOLIC COMMUNICATION AND FREE SPEECH
While the First Amendment speaks of speech and press, and their
informational aspects include facts, analyses, opinions, and knowl-
edge, these latter do not necessarily exhaust the scope or coverage
of information. There is a changing content which each decade, let
alone each generation, interprets to produce additional facets, e.g.,
tapes, all communications and communication vehicles and methods,
as well as computer banks, general and selective retrieval, and the
like. So, too, are comments and views concerning all such informa-
tion to be included within the term. In addition, since speech and
press are ordinarily connected, perhaps, even, for practical purposes,
inseparable,55 what is found within the former term is generally pro-
tected as is the latter term, e.g., the right to privacy,5" and motion
pictures.5 7
In effect, therefore, the noun information is so broad that it can
include the physical and the nonphysical, the descriptions of facts,
as well as the inferences drawn and opinions thereon, and whatever
else may be utilized in the entire field of the preparation and obtain-
ing of material and data for communication, the ways and methods
of communicating, its reception, interpretation, distribution, uses,
etc. While this means that practically all of a country's life can be
subsumed under information, such an obvious reductio ad absurdum
must be rejected, and a narrower view adopted.
There is another facet of information which stems from the speech-
press connection. Speech includes many forms of expression, just as
does press, and so conduct, action, demonstrations, etc., may be pro-
to, and references in, supra notes 41, 45, and 48, especially the first, giving the
views of J.S. Mill. It can be remarked that Hohfeld's view is based upon his own
definition, so that he can say quite logically that liberty or freedom is not that when
it cannot be exercised independently of another; the modifying term that now must
be used is, therefore, "quasi," i.e., it is a quasi-liberty.
55. See supra note 5, quoting from Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
This may be too broad a statement.
56. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
57. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); and Teitel
Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968).
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tected forms of speech.58 Criticism of governmental policies may be
expressed symbolically, e.g., by burning the flag or a draft card, by
wearing a black armband.59 What is involved is communication,
with speech or conduct or action 5 a being the medium; so with publish-
ing, broadcasting, or communicating by laser, which are all only dif-
ferent forms or media of communication.
Thus it is not merely symbolic free speech. The intention of the
symbolism is communication, i.e., to say something to others, to have
them understand something, to have the act convey something-and
this something is information. The symbolism itself is tied in with
58. Illustrative cases are: Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza,
391 U.S. 308 (1968), labor picketing upheld; Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39
(1966), a city jail, convictions upheld; and Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131
(1966), a library conviction reversed. See also Forkosch, Picketing in Shopping
Centers, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 250 (1969), as well as infra notes 187 and 548.
See also Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970), holding (8-0, but with
concurrences) the exception to the prohibition upon the wearing of the uniform by
anyone not in the armed forces, that is, except in a theatrical production if the por-
trayal does not tend to discredit the service, is an infringement on free speech
where a civilian wore parts of the uniform in a skit performed in front of an armed
forces induction center to demonstrate opposition to the war in Vietnam.
59. Respectively: Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), flag conviction
reversed because "words" aspect of conviction not authoritatively passed on, but
leaving open the application of the statute so as "to reach only the act of flag
burning, whether as a protest or otherwise" (fn. 4). Thereafter the New York
Court upheld a conviction of a flag burning "where the sole basis for the de-
fendant's conviction was his act of burning the flag." People v. Burton, 27 N.Y.2d
198, 265 N.E.2d 66 (1970); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), draft
card burning conviction upheld. See also Forkosch, supra note 13; and Tinker v.
Des Moines School Dist., supra note 36, student wearing of a black armband in
school upheld, although when a teacher did this in support of the 1969 Vietnam
moratorium activities, he was dismissed. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1970, at
45, col. 1, (New York State Education Commission upholds local school board, and
teacher says he will seek relief in the federal district court). See also (different
fact situation in) Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968),
that "teachers may [not] constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amend-
ment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment [publicly] on matters
of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which
they work," and Graham, Freedom of Speech of the Public School Teacher, 19
CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 382 (1970).
59a. Conduct may, at times, transcend the permissible, and symbolism also
may go too far-at least in certain cases the Supreme Court has so held, e.g.,
the O'Brien case, supra note 59, and Radich v. New York, - U.S. -, (1971),
a 4-4 affirmance (Douglas not participating) of a conviction for violation of a
state's flag desecration statute where a gallery proprietor publicly displayed and
exposed for sale sculptures fashioned to express protest against Vietnam and uti-
lized an American flag to depict the male sexual organ.
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conduct for a purposeful end, although this latter itself may, one
hopes, trigger thought, reaction, or something in or on the part of an-
other. Symbolic free speech is thus really communication of infor-
mation, just as a front yard clothesline of dirty wash tells the viewer
that the homeowner is protesting." ° The Free Speech and Press
Clauses can thus enter and support these methods of communicating
information, just as with all of the allegedly obscene magazines,
books, films, etc., which are also so protected, and therefore permit
the blanketing of speech and press by a single concept of symbolism.
Symbolic communication, as with symbolic free speech, covers a mul-
titude of forms, methods, actions, and conduct, so that there may be
interchangeability on the practical level as well as on the legal.
A PERSON'S AND THE PUBLIC'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT ACTIVELY
TO REQUIRE THE TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION
AND TO BE INFORMED
Merely to be able to inform, i.e., to cast one's thoughts into the air,
does not necessarily connote its transmission to and receipt by others.
Without a second and corresponding right in the initiator (and the
recipient) to have the information also transmitted"' the personal
60. Even though held not to come under the protection of the free speech clause
aesthetic sensibilities, said the court, overbalanced the right to this method of
communicating, even though it was the homeowner's final effort to get something
accomplished, i.e., all other methods of social communication had failed. Supra
note 13. See also Adderley and O'Brien cases, supra notes 58 and 59. See also
infra note 175. and references, for illustrations where other aspects of free speech
prevent this constitutional right from being exercised.
61. See, e.g., Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967), who urges that such a right be constitutionalized and
enforced. This suggestion has been adopted by several groups and legal suits to
date have concentrated on advertising, that is, chiefly of "editorial advertising."
This conveys a noncommercial message and supports or attacks, or seeks to influence
or change, an item or institution or agency. To illustrate, in 1969 the Chicago
Joint Board of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers sought to explain their campaign
against the sale of imported clothing and its picketing of Marshall Field & Co.; the
four Chicago dailies refused the advertisement on the ground that while the text was
general, it was nevertheless directed solely at that store and was therefore unfair
and misleading (note: the store is a major advertiser in all four papers and its
parent corporation owns two of them). The suit by the union to compel publication
is pending. See generally SATuRDAY REV., Aug. 8, 1970, at 48; and infra notes
518 et seq.
There is a separate aspect which deserves consideration. In Russia's Constitu-
tion, art. 125 sets forth various freedoms of the citizens which "are guaranteed by
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and public right actively to inform is ineffective. The informer thus
must have two rights, namely, the initial right to inform, and also the
second right to have this transmitted. But of course this latter, in-
sofar as receipt is concerned, assumes nonrejection by the recipient,
no invasion of corresponding rights, e.g., of privacy, no forcible in-
jection of information, etc. These two personal and public rights, of
informing and of transmitting, are thus constitutional coin-faces (with
both, however, seen to be subject to a degree of control). 6 2  There is
also a third constitutional right, primarily in the recipient as a per-
sonal and yet public combined right, regardless of whether it should
be deemed to be a corollary of the first two or a separate one. In
television, for example, "[lt is the right of the public to receive suit-
able access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally
be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC."'
This third right to be informed need not necessarily be exercised
actively in any physical sense as with the earlier right to inform or
law," e.g., "(b) freedom of the press," and then "ensure(s) [these rights] by placing
at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks
of paper, public buildings, the streets [for holding demonstrations], communications
facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights." China's
art. 87 apes this, e.g., "the state provides the necessary material facilities" (1954
Constitution, which apparently has been superseded).
In the United States the Constitution's first amendment also speaks of the free-
dom of the press, etc., but no specific material provision to effectuate it is given.
However, by analogy to the right of an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding
to counsel under the sixth amendment, now to be provided without charge by the
government concerned, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), can the Su.
preme Court not insist upon an analogous required governmental consideration (at
least for indigents) in the exercise of these other rights? Of course the bill comes
high, and some accommodation (balancing?) must occur, but, at least in theory,
there is no reason to reject this approach offhand. And this conclusion is sup-
ported by the governmental aid or largesse given (only?) failing newspapers
(see supra note 8 on the 1970 Act), publications in general (see infra note 282, on
mail rates), railroads (see infra note 270), broadcasters (see infra notes 286 el
seq., wherein original issue and renewal licenses are granted practically free,
although the air "space" is worth millions), farmers, and others. Why not a sub-
sidy for this basic purpose?
62. The words "seems" and in the next clause "apparently" indicate that such a
superficial conclusion need not control, as indeed it does not shortly. See also supra
note 38.
63. See infra note 457, quoting the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Caldwell regarding,
"the public's First Amendment right to be informed . . ." by the press. There is
also a "right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of broadcasters, which is
paramount." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). The
text quotation is also at 390. See also, infra notes 81, 287, 323, 424, 450, 451,
455, 471, 487, 499, and 556.
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to transmit. One may, as a recipient, merely sit passively and wait
for the information to be given or made available to him. But of
course this does not exclude or preclude one's right actively to seek
out the information made availabe, as where a governmental depart-
ment has its records open for public inspection and the seeker must
now do something to obtain such information, or even when records
are sought to be kept from the public and a person, e.g., a newspaper-
man, delves into the bog of administrative tape to obtain the infor-
mation.
THE DUTY TO INFORM-ITS PRACTICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS
One may have a right to inform and not exercise it; there is, for
this item, no information transmitted or received. A duty to in-
form, however, mandates one so to act so that, as has been seen, duty
and right may almost be said to be coin-faces; there are, however,
differences and distinctions. The term duty contains a basic differ-
ence between its practical and the philosophic (ethical) concepts.
The dictionary gives both aspects, i.e., "[tihat which is required
by one's station or occupation; any assigned service or business ...
That which a person is bound by moral obligation to do, or refrain
from doing; that which one ought to do."64
Society, for example, has required man to assume certain duties,
as in a parent-child relationship, or an official-job one; these rela-
tionships, it will be noted, are usually of a voluntary nature (of course
a draftee's duties are imposed). The duties one bears enter into and
affect and sometimes determine, a person's conduct and life, e.g., a
physician's Hippocratic oath prevents him from shirking his duty to
heal regardless of consequences."5 Duty, therefore, in its practical
manifestations, is a factor to be considered by a person before under-
taking a course of conduct, relationship, or other commitment.
The philosophic (ethical) concept of duty may, with some philos-
64. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 802 (2d ed. 1934). As a
synonym, it states: "Duty, Obligation, in ordinary usage, differ chiefly in that
Obligation commonly implies a more immediate constraint or more specific refer-
ence than Duty ......
65. But see the "good samaritan" statutes, safeguarding him from ordinary cir-
cumstances; over thirty states have enacted these, the first being the 1959 amend-
ment to the CALIFoRNIA BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE § 2144.
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ophers,66 relate to, and with, the practical ones of everyday life,67
but the term is usually tied in with matters of conscience. The most
important of such approaches if, of course, the Kantian one.68 Duty
(die Pflicht) is, to Kant, the central and motivating factor in his
concept of morals. A person may want to do something (as he con-
ceives it to be his practical or desirable "duty"), and yet not do it;
but when he feels morally obligated to do something there is not only
merit, but a higher sense of "duty" attached. Thus one recognizes
and submits to the moral law, i.e., the supreme moral principle, even
though it be against one's inclination, i.e., the law is now expressed
as an imperative which, being "unconditioned" now is described as
a "categorical imperative." 69 In this paper both aspects of duty, i.e.,
the practical and the Kantian categorical imperative, are utilized, and
at times one or the other dominates, e.g., governmental misinforma-
tion may be a practical duty in times of exigent emergencies, whereas
in consumer aspects full and true information emerges as the goal.
THE DUTY TO INFORM-PERSONS
There is, in law7 0 and in morals, 71 a duty sometimes to inform.
Here, however, the question is narrowed to whether there is a duty on
the possessor of information to make this fact of possession known, or
to make available; offer, or actively to give the information itself to
66. E.g., BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES (2d ed. 1927), greatly influenced by Hegel.
67. For the Stoic conception see, e.g., CICERO, ON DUTIES (Poeteat, transl.
1950).
68. It is impossible to go into details; but see KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL
REASON, and also his FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, both in
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
(Beck, transl. 1949).
69. See further text keyed to infra notes 155 et seq.
70. E.g., in order to abate a nuisance notice (information) must ordinarily be
given the wrongdoer of its existence and a demand made to remove the condition.
Maryland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ruth, 106 Md. 644, 68 A. 358 (1907); Hickey v.
Michigan Central R. Co., 96 Mich. 498, 55 N.W. 989 (1893); and Verder v. Ells-
worth, 59 Vt. 354, 10 A. 89 (1887).
There are other illustrations which may be given: For example, there are duties
to inform concerning which constitutional questions have never been raised, as in
the duty to report the commission of a crime; a drug firm must make disclosure of
ingredients and the like on its package or label; cigarette companies must announce
on packages that smoking may be hazardous; an agent must make disclosure of
possible conflict of interest to his principal.
71. Even though no legal duty may ordinarily be predicated upon one's non-
informing (or warning) of danger where no private or public relationship, con-
tractual obligation, or statutory admonition requires, still, from the viewpoint of the
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another or others, and this within not only a context of constitutional
freedoms but also statutory requirements. For example, information
of an impending catastrophe comes to a television or radio station;
aside from any public service obligation or license feature which may
compel the broadcasting of this information, is there any separate
moral, legal, or other duty so to do? Or, if it is a private newspaper
which has and requires no license as such to carry on its business
generally, although elements of a public service do enter even if only
on an economically competitive and therefore voluntary basis, is there
likewise any such duty at all?
While a broadcasting station, licensed in the United States on be-
half of the people, 72 has some duty as a licensee to do and perform a
variety of things, this is not necessarily so for a non-licensee. A li-
censee is subject to direct or indirect pressures, or even duties, to in-
form, whereas a strictly private business or person ordinarily has no
such corresponding duty affirmatively to give information where nei-
ther requested nor required; and if the facts now recede to the ordi-
nary and usual scope and type of information, 7 then there would ap-
pear to be even less of a questionable obligation to infrom. 7 1 Ordi-
narily, therefore, private information may be withheld from public
scrutiny, and there is also no duty affirmatively to make it known.
There is another facet involving agreement or contract which en-
ters. For example, gatherers of information may group, by agree-
ment, and select one or a few to "represent" them in meetings with
heads of state, or at restricted events, and here there is an obvious
ethical and indirectly imposed duty to inform the others. Or, by ex-
human relationship one's conscience may impose the moral obligation or duty; see,
e.g., paragraph keyed to supra note 68. Furthermore, as Dr. Edward H. Teller, the
nuclear physicist has warned, a policy of open scientific research and work is
necessary so as to make clear what is involved in the growing debate over the im-
pact of science and technology on society, because otherwise the deepening senti-
ment (fear?) against technology may erupt. "Secrecy in science should be abolished
so that the democratic process can be better able to work in making decisions on
how science is applied." N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1970, at 1, col. 4.
72. The air is owned by the people of the nation and it is the furtherance of the
public interest which is the criterion, on which see, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio,
Inc. v. F.C.C., 316 U.S. 4 (1942); and F.C.C. v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470 (1940).
73. See, e.g., the question of secret trade and business information in text keyed
to infra note 512.
74. As in the impending catastrophe situation, an ethical duty is, of course,
assumed not able here to be translated into a legal one.
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press agreement (restricting the news to the contractees although
keeping membership open), publishers may organize as in the As-
sociated Press, the United Press, or even a smaller grouping (e.g.,
as with the New York Times, Chicago News, et al.), and thereby be
under a contractual duty to inofrm.
THE DUTY TO INFORM-BY GOVERNMENTS
In dangerous situations: As postulated above, if it is now the gov-
ernment or one of its agencies which has information of an impending
catastrophe, does any duty to inform attach? In an imminently dan-
gerous situation such a requirement does exist, and this duty has even
been recognized by all nations as, e.g., in the erection of lighthouses,
buoys and other warning stations or methods. In nondangerous situ-
ations, and in the absence of policy needs for secrecy, it would ap-
pear that ordinarily an active duty to make available, make known,
and inform does exist in some degree. Whether this duty is a con-
stitutionally or statutorily required one, 75 or even a political one,
need not be explored. But that there is such a general and positive
duty is conceded by all (subject to necessary qualifications and ex-
ceptions).
Wartime and analogous situations bring to the fore the need of the
people to know (at least in a democracy), with the correlative duty of
the government not only to inform (and even to misinform, at times)
but also to permit reporters to visit, see, question, and write; the
problem created always involves the extent to which the enemy is
thereby aided. The only solution, besides the extremes of unhind-
ered openness and absolute secrecy, requires a shifting mean de-
pended upon the factors present at each place and during a particu-
lar time. Where, as in the Laotian campaign in early 1971, the gov-
ernment's initial salutary restrictions then became ridiculous and un-
necessary, not only did the credibility gap between the government
and armed forces on the one hand, and the press and the people on
the other hand, widen to a point of rebellion, but the information
later released by the government and its field commanders was sus-
pect and even rejected.76
75. On secrecy see text keyed to note 490 et seq., infra, and on the duty, see,
e.g., note 85, in!ra, on the Freedom of Information Act.
76. See, e.g., the strong criticism by the Freedom of Information Committee of
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Contract requirements: These also may be found present where
the government acts as a proprietor. Here the other party may insist,
as in any contract, that disclosure occur in any degree or kind; of
course the government may refuse, but this is now a consensual give-
and-take bargaining, with a consensual duty flowing therefrom.77
Criminal areas: The government also may have a duty to disclose,
and thereby inform, in another area, namely, criminal prosecutions
instituted by it. For example, it may have obtained information
through its legislative or executive branch, whether legally or illegally,
and while it may superficially retain the information without divulg-
ing it, there may be either a statutory requirement compelling the in-
formation to be made known to a court,7s or else a court may direct
its release to it, a grand jury, or even another party. 79
Civil areas: What has just been remarked concerning criminal
areas is, generally, applicable in this one, e.g., if the government sues
for damages it may be compelled to give information to the defendant
through various procedural methods as in a bill of particulars.
Departments and agencies: During war the federal government
engages openly in the dissemination of information,80 and at all times
engages in various forms of public relations and issues much informa-
Sigma Delta Chi, the national professional society in journalism, in April, 1971,
which contained, inter alia, the following: "Although the embargo on reporting of
the Laos operation may have been initially necessary in the interest of protecting
our forces and those of our allies, extending the blackout well past the point when
the operation had been reported by foreign news agencies, including those of North
Vietnam and Communist China, rendered it ridiculous. .... "
77. See on the coin-face, where the government is able to obtain information,
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
78. See, e.g., the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 212, § 802 of which amends Title 18 of the U.S.C. by adding
a new chapter 119 authorizing wiretapping and bugging and, in its § 2518, requires
court orders with reports to the judge as he may require (except that in "an
emergency situation . . . with respect to conspiratorial activities threatening the
national security, interest or . . . of organized crime . . ." no order need be
initially required.) See also infra notes 499c and 558 on the preceding Act, and
on another aspect of disclosure see infra note 503.
79. See, e.g., FoRxoscn, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 465 n.79, 481-82 (2d ed. 1969),
referring to Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969), and to Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), where the fourth amendment's Search & Seiz-
ure Clause was utilized. In the 1968 Act, supra note 78, a separate subsection
permits the judge "in his discretion" to make available to a party or his counsel for
inspection any portion or all of the intercepts.
80. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 9182, 3 C.F.R. 1169 (Comp. 1942), abolished
Ex. Order No. 9608, 3 C.F.R. 423 (Comp. 1945). See also infra note 323.
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tion through reports, statistical information and analyses, etc., as in
census reports. Many of its departments even have an office of in-
formation, e.g., the Department of Labor, the Department of -De-
fense."s Its large agencies, regulatory or otherwise, also generally
have an office devoted to this, e.g., the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity; 2 and there exists, in the international area, a United States
81. U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL-1970/71, respectively at 300
and 120 (1970); FULBRIGHT, THE PENTAGON PROPAGANDA MACHINE (1970) excori-
ates that body's internal propaganda, pointing out that the USIA is statutorily re-
stricted to foreign propaganda. See also note 499, infra. The Pentagon's activities
in this area were first authorized by the 1947 law creating a new Department of
Defense. By the Pentagon's own estimates, its publicity budget rose ten-fold be-
tween 1959 and 1971, to $30 million this year, although the Twentieth Century
Fund estimated the true current expenditure may be $190 million.
These Pentagon activities were made the subject of a C.B.S. "Report" on "The
Selling of the Pentagon" on Feb. 23, 1971, which the N.Y. Times critic termed a
"brilliant documentary" which "struck a whale of a constructive blow for unfettered
TV journalism free from Washington manipulation." Feb. 24, 1971, at 83, col. 1.
The criticism evoked from Vice-President Agnew, among others, resulted in a re-
peat showing March 23rd, but this time adding interviews with the Vice-President,
Defense Secretary Laird and Congressman H~bert, head of the House Armed Serv-
ices Committee, and followed by the C.B.S. News President who defended the
report (on April 18th C.B.S. also presented a one-hour discussion among four pro
and con participants). Although the same N.Y. Times critic had called the report
"impeccable in its integrity, absorbing in its revelations and a priceless guideline
for electronic journalism" (March 7, 1971, at 17, col. 1), the Vice-President felt the
documentary to be unfair and biased, and of "deliberately publishing untruths," and
that his so-called rebuttal, as aired March 23rd, was distorted, out of context, and a
sloppy piece of editing (March 25, 1971, at 79, col. 2). See also TIME, April 5,
1971, at 46, for some of the pros and cons. The broadcast won a special Peabody
Prize as "electronic journalism at its finest." N.Y. Times, April 13, 1971, at 78,
col. 1.
Regardless of the question of, or lack of, credibility on both sides, a N.Y. Times
editorial put it well: "The heart of the matter is the flagrant violation of traditional
rules-unmistakably spelled out in Defense Department regulations-which prohibit
the military from engaging in political propaganda activities." March 25, 1971, at
38, col. 2. Another and most important and obvious question relates to the news
and repertorial independence of a news medium which operates and can operate
only under a governmental license, renewable triennially; a second question involves
the power of a Congressional (sub)committee to subpoena from C.B.S. all of its
notes and unused film and details of its disbursements of money on the program,
with C.B.S. willing to produce only what was aired and nothing else (on which
see also infra notes 451 and 455); on all of which see also notes 63, 100, 287, 323,
424, 450, 451, 479, 499, and 556.
82. Id., at 66. See also Kilpatrick, Government Information-Or Propaganda-
Officers?, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 10, 1969, II, at 7, col. 1, which records the 1913
enactment of general legislation prohibiting agency employment of public informa-
tion personnel. In 1947 a House subcommittee found constant violations of a law
forbidding any "agency to use public funds to promote or influence legislation, or
to mold public opinion." In 1951 Senator Byrd identified 4,200 federal employees
engaged in public information, but he suspected double or triple were actually so
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Information Agency whose purpose "is to help achieve U.S. foreign
policy objectives by influencing public attitudes in other na-tions
"83
All elected, and even appointed officials, engage in their own in-
dividual and personal form of public relations, dissemination of in-
formation, and efforts to influence others, project their "image," etc.,
and the media have even felt that, for example, the President was not
having a sufficient number of press and other conferences, or that
even in those held there was an insufficiency of news or direct an-
swers, i.e., the President was not being fully responsive (and, some-
times, evasive) ,,3a
Freedom of Information Act: In 1946 a federal Administrative
Procedure Act became law and its section 3(c) required generally
that a limited number and type of public records be made available
to the public, except for confidential information.84 There was gen-
eral dissatisfaction with this provision because it was not a general
public information law and did not provide for public access to offi-
cial records generally. Then, in 1967, the Freedom of Information
Act was enacted, being a replacement for the entirety of former
section 3, and now, in effect, intended to have information main-
tained by the executive branch become more available to the public,
involved. In 1949 the Hoover Task Forces estimated federal outlays for pub-
licity and information at over 100 million annually. Finally in 1963 and 1967 a
House subcommittee investigated but its findings were never published. See also
infra note 1000.
83. Supra note 81, at 517. "The Agency's mission is accomplished by the use
of various techniques of communication-personal contact, radio broadcasting, li-
braries, book publication and distribution, press, motion pictures, television, exhibits,
English-language instruction, and others." Id. at 518.
83a. See, e.g., language of former Pres. Johnson's press secretary, George Reedy:
"The reality, it seems to me, is that times of adversity are precisely the times when
a President most needs press conferences. The explanations he gives to the public
are much more convincing when presented under questioning than when offered by
formal, staged appearances. Credibility is enhanced by direct responses to tough
presentations." N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1971, at 37, col. 1. For a "defense" of the
Nixon type of press conference by the President's director of communications,
Herbert G. Klein, see id. at Dec. 29, 1970, at 29, col. 4.
The value of press conferences is illustrated by the suggestion of the head of the
party organization in Estonia to the 24th Communist Party Congress that high-level
news conferences could get important news and propaganda messages to the public,
and that "At these conferences, party, government and economic leaders speak and
answer journalists' questions." Id. at April 5, 1971, at 16, col. 1.
84. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1011 (1964) on which see, e.g., Attorney General's
MANUAL ON THE A.P.A. (1947), a slim volume of interest for the original statute.
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i.e., "freedom of information is now, by statute, the rule, and secrecy
is the exception;"8 5 however, records unable to be disclosed without
impairing rights of privacy or important governmental operations are
protected. This new law has not yet been sufficiently interpreted and
applied to warrant overmuch hope that it will bomb information
from the agencies, but some beginning has been made. 6
Internal information: Governmental departments, officials, agen-
cies, and employees may have duties to maintain external secrecy
but internally have duties to inform, say, their superiors or others. 87
For example, Congress may create the Atomic Energy Commission
and authorize secrecy in great degree subject, however, to require-
ments that its own Joint Committee on Atomic Energy be kept in-
formed of various details; 8 or the Departments of State or Defense or
85. Welford v. Hardin, 315 F. Supp. 768, 770 (D.D.C. 1970), the statute being
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1964). See also 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1964) so as to prevent with-
holding, etc. because the executive department, or the military, may prescribe in-
ternal regulations, etc. In Welford plaintiffs were "members of the public" and
sued, successfully, to enjoin the Secretary of Agriculture and officials there from
withholding information. For a good analysis of the Act, see LADD, CRISIS IN
CREDIBILITY (1968), especially ch. 9, "The Moss Subcommittee."
86. E.g., the Act does not apply to the President (and his aides), whose execu-
tive privilege requires dismissal of a suit to compel him to release a top-secret
report by a consultant allegedly critical of the projected SST airplane. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 22, 1970. Generally any person requesting the information has standing to
sue and compel release of an otherwise-publishable report, Skolnick v. Parsons,
397 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1968); compare infra note 354. On standing see also infra
notes 571 et seq.; however, a top secret classification was upheld, and information
denied an historian, where forced repatriation of Soviet citizens was involved.
Epstein v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. den. 90 S. Ct. 2176 (1970). The internal management of an agency
ordinarily is not covered by the Act. Hicks v. Freeman, 397 F.2d 193 (4th Cir.
1968). See also text keyed to infra notes 490 et seq. and 509. See also infra
note 121 on the Federal Register Act. States, of course, may have their own
statutes and procedures, but there are not any of sufficient power nationally to
discuss. On a private venture in this area, see SAT. REV. March 13, 1971, at 93,
giving details of the Freedom of Information Center at the University of Missouri's
School of Journalism, functioning since 1959.
87. On external secrecy see discussion in text keyed to infra notes 491 et seq.
On informing others, see, e.g., the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-190 (January 1, 1970), especially § 102(c) which requires that all
federal agencies must prepare reports on the expected environmental impact of new
proposals and make these "available to the President, the Council on Environ-
mental Quality and to the public . . . and shall accompany the proposal through the
existing agency review processes." Whether or not the public enters the decision-
making process is presently a question which will have to be judicially resolved.
The loopholes in the Act, e.g., the questions of "clearly," "timely," are being
interpreted loosely by the agencies, may require amendments, and the actions of
the agency administrators indicate blatant noncompliance.
88. E.g., Pub. L. No. 91-273 (June 2, 1970), § 106(b) requiring the agency to
1971] FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 29
both may obtain legislative appropriations under requirements that
information be given; and yet it may not be until years later that
this duty yields information, misinformation, or a flat refusal to dis-
close.8 9
THE DUTY TO INFORM-ENFORCEMENT
Where licenses or other governmental authorizations exist then
obviously there is a negative type of enforcement available, e.g., re-
fusing to renew, seeking revocation. Within its general powers and
acting as a sovereign, government may also utilize other methods,
e.g., criminal enforcement, fines, punishments in contempt situa-
tions,90 subpoenaing information to enforce laws. 9 Or where the
government acts in a proprietary capacity, it may refuse further per-
formance or payment, and itself sue for damages or seek other means
of redress, e.g., enforcement of a subpoena to compel information to
be made available to it.92
THE DUTY TO MISINFORM-BY GOVERNMENTS
This is a touchy and tricky area, embracing the no-truth, the lit-
tle truth, and the untruth. This cynical perversion of facts is some-
times also termed propaganda. No definitive law or judicial opinion
is available as justification. 93 One seeks reasons based on security
and necessity. And, throughout, questions of credibility enter which
may impair a government's effectiveness vis-a-vis its own citizens and
submit to the Joint Committee details of any proposed cooperative arrangement with
a reactor manufacturer, etc. before entering into the agreement.
89. See, e.g., infra note 499. Presidential information is not touched upon
here, for it is too broad and even today ambiguously known, e.g., letter by a special
assistant to the President to N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1971, at 30, col. 3, giving some
details concerning Nixon's receipt of capsuled press and broadcast news. For exam-
ple, the President has the resources of his F.B.I., C.I.A., Army and other intelli-
gence, agencies, officials, and even state and local agencies.
90. On these aspects see previous discussion and also text keyed to infra
note 418 et seq.
91. See, e.g., Oklahoma Press Publ. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946);
Overnite Transportation Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n., 397 F.2d
368 (5th Cir. 1968).
92. See, e.g., Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, supra note 77.
93. See also censorship, infra notes 324 et seq. The courts insist upon truth
and punish lies by perjury indictments and otherwise, e.g., Jones v. State Bd. of Ed.,
397 U.S. 31, 32 (1970), where the Court first granted certiorari (396 U.S. 817),
heard argument, and then dismissed the writ because it appeared "that Jones
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foreign nations. For example, was President Eisenhower justified
in disclaiming any U-2 overflight of Russian territory by Francis
Gary Powers on May 1, 1960 for the purposes of photography? Was
President Johnson justified in playing his Vietnam cards so close to
the vest that his press conference information was ambiguous, i.e.,
slanted, incomplete, and even downright incorrect? Does any gov-
ernment, in war, emergencies, or in peace, have any justification for
creating a credibility gap by misinforming its own citizens in any
fashion or degree?94
The Machiavellian bifurcation between morals and politics has
never been surmounted in practical government. The gap may nar-
row, perhaps at times even be closed as Burke would have closed it,
but it never remains so. The ethical postulates of openness and truth
find acceptance on the religious level, e.g., the truth shall make ye
free, an echoing on the individual level, a mouthing on the business
level, and a combination of all on the political level. For example,
truth in advertising is still a consumer-government slogan; the Wil-
sonian open covenants plea was an international one; and the contin-
uing efforts of all persons and governments to have an open society
live up to its name insofar as information is concerned seems to indi-
cate that morals and politics have finally bedded. However, govern-
mental secrecy remains, is judicially supported, and on the interna-
tional plane is openly advocated in order to get things done. It is
indefinite suspension was based in part on a finding that he lied at the hear-
ing on the charges against him." See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1970, at 15,
col. 1, where a cadet at West Point Military Academy was asked to resign because
he lied about a shoe-shine.
Non-governmental commercial and non-commercial advertising is, of course, in-
cluded within the information field, and the misinformation indulged in has become
part of American folklore, although the F.T.C. (and local bodies in other instances)
has recently sought to move vigorously in this area under its basic statute, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1964). The courts seem to protect them sometimes, e.g., Jacob Siegel Co. v.
F.T.C., 327 U.S. 608 (1946), although today a more consumer-oriented approach
is found; e.g., infra notes 97 and 578 et seq.
94. Merely to illustrate one such, compare the March 4, 1969 statement by
President Nixon with that of June 8, 1969: "There are no plans to withdraw any
troops at this time or in the near future." "I have decided to order the imme-
diate redeployment from Vietnam of ... approximately 25,000 men." Whether
or not one nation (its head) can or should lie to another (its head) is not
here relevant, concerning which the assurance given by Andrei Gromyko to
John F. Kennedy, in October, 1962, that Russia had not installed and would
not install offensive missiles in Cuba, is pertinent. Vide, further, the 1970 ex-
change between these governments concerning the creation and use of a submarine
base by the former in Cuba. See also, and further, notes 99 and 504a, infra.
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but a short philosophical step to the withholding of all the truth,
and then from partial to distorted truth the distance is even shorter,
with the reasons being, as already stated, national security and neces-
sity. But the latest cynical perversion is in the field of politics, from
the national head of state down to the proverbial dog-catcher, namely,
that it is not the man or the issues but the "image" which counts,
for the voters' reactions are to the Madison Avenue creation, not ac-
tual performance.
Regardless of the stated reasons, should active and positive govern-
mental misinformation, or the withholding of portions or even all of
information, be accepted and supported? Unfortunately, there is no
constitutional, statutory, or even moral aspect which can be utilized
in this area of information to answer this or related questions. If one
seeks an ethical justification then he is driven into the conclusion that
truth is a chimera. But Everyman would rebel at this. And yet he
would admit that, as with the first amendment and other freedoms,
there is no such thing as an absolute in man's experience in nature or
in government. This does not mean that all is relative and shifting;
it is only that one hundred percent truth in government is ordinarily
unattainable. That may be the goal, but what is accomplished has al-
ways fallen short.
It is, therefore, the degree of truth obtained in a particular situation,
involving numerous factors and consequences, in an imperfect world
of pressures and choices, that permits the creation of a national cli-
mate of acceptance, i.e., the public accepts the information as the best
under the circumstances. In other words, misinformation, even ly-
ing, may sometimes be condoned by the people when an overriding
security-military compulsion appears,95 but what of politics? 0
95. See, e.g., editorial, "A Matter of Credibility," N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1970,
at El0, col. 1, concerning the secrecy-publicity reversal by the government on
the abortive P.W. Sontay camp raid near Hanoi. Or was our Vietnam escalation
the result of a mistake or a deliberate suppression of the facts? Was the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution the result of evil-minded men who engaged in misinformation?
See, e.g., Forkosch, The Constitutionality of the Vietnam Venture, and a Regis-
trant's Right to Counsel Within the Selective Service System, 22 S.C. L. REv. 287
(1970), and GOULDEN, TRUTH Is THE FIRST CASUALTY (1969).
On the My Lai (Song My) tragedy, and its court-martial aftermath, see infra
note 503. See, e.g., Forkosch, Is Violence An "American" Nightmare?, 4 GA. L.
REV. 439 (1970), and U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 30, 1970, at 28.
The point here involved is well put in the N.Y. Times, March 22, 1970, section E,
at 1, col. 7: "A highly censored report by an Army investigation panel . . . found
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The extremes are now the obvious ones of a shooting war, and a
"pure" peace situation. Whether or not this latter has ever been ex-
perienced by the United States is immaterial; we can create an
Utopia! So in war the public will condone much that it will con-
condemn in peace. When the national life is at stake there is no need
for aught but success. Translated analogously into the political
arena, the 1970 election campaign was perhaps the dirtiest, non-truth
one ever conducted, with computers and all the information media
now being utilized to play an electronic symphony on the electorate's
emotions via a cacophonous discord of lies, half-lies, and even quar-
ter-lies. Political self-preservation thus encourages cynicism and op-
portunism, with the truth lost somewhere in the mix.
Pandora's box, however, finally offers hope. The free press may
be a slogan, and even a misnomer in an age of corporate irresponsi-
bility. Yet even the profit motive in our society may be utilized to
support the quest for true information where market competition re-
mains as a spur.17  The responsible press rejects governmental quar-
ter-lies, resents governmental secrecy, and reports whatever it ferrets
out. Many scandals are so uncovered, and to an extent governmental
secrecy and misinformation are kept under some discipline."
that [a] Maj. General ... and 13 other officers 'wittingly or unwittingly' sup-
pressed information ... in some cases, by making false statements."
96. "'The ritual of lying is one of the unfortunate aspects of a Presidential cam-
paign,' said a close aide who was not, however, a member of the Mayor's [Lind-
say's] official family." N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1971, at 13, col. 4. See also infra
text and notes 514 et seq.
97. Which is not to say that the profit motive does not condone misinformation
on a massive scale, e.g., pills, laxitives, beauty aids and preparations, sex stim-
uli, arthritic cures, to mention only this field. On a quantitative scale such cor-
porate and private misinformation must exceed that of all governments, and the
governments have moved against this fraud, deception, and reprehensible conduct,
e.g., consumer legislation, F.T.C. proceedings (see supra note 93). However, the
government sometimes lacks the aid of consumers and becomes helpless in the face
of public apathy, e.g., the F.T.C. efforts to outlaw the "negative option" sales de-
vice (the consumer must notify the distributor not to ship an item) were impaired
and possibly undermined because of such lethargy. N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1970,
at 32, col. 3.
98. E.g., the paper medal created by enlisted men, under orders, who manu-
factured incidents so as to enable the Silver Star to be awarded to a Brigadier Gen-
eral. Apparently the army procedures were insufficient or ineffective, so that the
soldiers' letters to a Congressman and the press resulted in publicity which shortly
caused a reversal and withdrawal of the award. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1970, at 10,
col. 1, also detailing analogous, if not similar, incidents; and Nov. 21, 1970, at 12,
col. 5, relating the award of Bronze Star Medals in South Vietnam to two dogs, and
their revocation by the Army upon learning of the hoax.
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This is not to say that the press is blameless. Even the organs of
information feed misinformation, and some do it deliberately.99
There is no question that all information, e.g., newspaper, publishers
are biased. The publicized effort is to keep their prejudicies con-
fined to the editorial page and to keep the news columns free of slant;
unfortunately, this is not what occurs, and even the most responsible
of organs of information regularly are charged with errors of omission
and commission and, in some instances, of deliberately so doing.
Misinformation therefore seems to have become institutionalized,
e.g., advertising, and to be a way of life, from the lowest of the low
to the highest of the high, and at times is justified as a need for gov-
ernment.10 The moralist disapproves; the ritualist intones; and the
practical man accepts. Everyman may choose.
THE GOVERNMENT'S LEGISLATIVE RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
While the preceding has stressed the various rights, duties, and ob-
ligations of persons, the public, and governments to inform, trans-
mit, and to be informed, there is also a separate legislative right in
the government to be informed, and a corresponding duty on the
99. See also infra notes 504a, and references. For example, see Defense Secre-
tary Laird's explanation or, rather, half-truth misexplanation, of why he had not
told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Hanoi was included in the Nov. 21,
1970 air strikes against North Vietnam, i.e., "I only answer questions that are
asked," and Senator Fulbright's comment that the Defense Department "misrepre-
sent the facts. Obviously he did, and they do it all the time," with the N.Y.
Times calling the Secretary's explanation "disingenuous." Dec. 3, 1970, at 46, col.
2. See also the (comparative) hearings on the license renewal application of
WPIX, infra note 287.
We do not discuss the Orwellian warnings of "doublespeak" and "doublethink"
in any future society; these have become actualities. Thus the justification for not
withdrawing all troops from Vietnam immediately is couched in starry language,
e.g., so as to safeguard the lives of the American troops remaining, to protect the
civilians from retaliation, to permit democratic government to survive; the President
upholds bombings in ambiguous language, e.g., "protective reaction;" the agencies
of government issue soporifics, e.g., "senior citizens" instead of old people. But,
as Madison Avenuese infiltrates our language and our thinking more and more, so
more and more do we enter 1984.
100. See also infra notes 95 and 325. The Pentagon admits to spending $40
million annually on "public information," although its Congressional critics charge
$70 million is closer to the truth (see also supra note 82). According to Senator
Fulbright, nine-tenths of this is for propaganda. A former Pentagon information
officer stated that "our mission was identical to that of any commercial advertising
agency: to 'push' our product . . . as hard as we could-to capitalize on its suc-
cesses, and to conceal its blunders. . . . We were not concerned primarily with
truth or accuracy (except in spelling the names of officers), and we were not ad-
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part of persons to inform, e.g., if Congress desires to enact legislation
it does not do so in a vacuum. Facts are required, and these facts
are to be found outside congressional walls (even if it is another de-
partment, e.g., the executive, which has them). To legislate with-
out facts is analogous to looking in the dark room for the spook which
is not there; it is jejune legislation.
Furthermore, since without information the legislative power would
be rendered impotent, the government cannot function. There is,
therefore, a right in any government to be informed by those in pos-
session of facts, and a corresponding duty on the latter to inform.
Thus a recusant person may ordinarily be compelled to appear before
Congress and testify concerning these required facts,'' although still
retaining his constitutional rights, e.g., not to incriminate himself,
which the judiciary now may or may not uphold."0 2
JUDICIAL PRIMACY
Because of the doctrine of judicial supremacy in the United States,
that branch of the government ordinarily dominates in the solution of
all problems stemming from or involving the Constitution. The
stress in this paper placed upon court decisions, opinions, and views
is therefore understandable. Judicial primacy should not, however,
be construed as judicial exclusiveness; all other departments, agencies,
officials, and persons in or connected with the governments are
important, as is the private sphere.
There is one aspect of judicial primacy which sometimes confuses
not only persons outside but also some inside the United States. That
aspect is the Supreme Court's shifting of positions, with consequent
reversals of doctrine, which is very disturbing to the uninitiated. The
reasons are not difficult to understand. To illustrate, the Court may
feel that its past examination of the applicable history was inadequate
or inaccurate; 03 or that its interpretation of the congressional mean-
verse [sic] to releasing false information when advantageous . .. ," NEWSDAY,
Nov. 21, 1970, at 1A, col. 1.
101. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). See also supra note 37 and
infra note 457.
102. See FoRKoscH, supra note 79, at 175-81, and also supra note 37, and
infra note 457.
103. Its reversal of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 1 (1842) because, as it
said in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), later researches had dis-
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ing had been incorrect; 10 4 or that an emergency had subsided to
where the proper decision could now be given;' 05 or that its earlier
reasoning was not sufficient (and logical) and therefore not to be fol-
lowed;0 6 or that no controlling decision could be made because the
question involved "can only be decided in the concrete factual con-
text of the individual case ; '1107 or that some shifting is necessitated in
the evidentiary requirements0 8 or burden of proof,0 9 etc.
An outright rejection of Presidential" or Congressional"' ability
to act because of a constitutional prohibition is not overly rare, but
neither is it overly common." It is really in this area that basic
problems of subjective policy approaches by human beings arise.
That is, one's background, mature views, and other factors shaping
his treatment of a constitutional question emerge at this point. And
it is here that the executive and legislative "control" of the appoint-
ment process may shape the Court and thereby its decisions.
For example, the Senate's rejection in 1970 of two nominees to the
Supreme Court prevented an immediate "hard line" approach to cer-
tain problems being thereafter taken. Nevertheless, President Nix-
on's appointment of a Chief Justice and an Associate Justice (the
former in 1969 and the latter in 1970), with possibly two (or three)
closed the true meaning of the statute there involved. See also the Court's his-
torical and jurisprudential analyses in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965),
and Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
104. The Erie R.R. case, supra note 103, illustrates this.
105. See, e.g., reversal of Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940) by West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See
also its use of the method of distinguishing cases which, in practical effect, amounts
to a reversal, as in the Japanese Relocation Cases, Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943) and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), as op-
posed to Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
106. See, e.g., its views on retroactivity in civil, Norton v. Shelby County,
118 U.S. 425 (1886), as rejected in Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940), and in criminal cases, as in Shott, supra note 103, and
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
107. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968).
108. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
109. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
110. E.g., as in the Steel Seizure Case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952), discussed in Forkosch, Governments and Governed in the
United States, RECUEILS DE LA SOCIfITh JEAN BODIN, XXVI, GOUVERNI S ET Gouv-
ERNANTS 344, 389 (1965).
111. E.g., the first such decision occurred in Marbury v. Madison, I Cr. (5 U.S.)
137 (1803).
112. For a brief analysis of the type of limitations found in the Constitution
see, e.g., FoRKoscH, supra note 79 at §§ 102-105.
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more to come before the expiration of his first term in 1973, has al-
ready influenced the Court's attitude, e.g., even before the last ap-
pointment the Court had shifted to a more conservative position as
evidenced by the increase in dissents of two of the more liberal mem-
bers from the year before (Brennan from one to six, and Douglas
from nine to twenty-three) while two of the conservative members
reduced theirs (Harlan from sixteen to three, and Stewart from thir-
teen to six). Thus the Court's prior activist stance is being changed
to a restraining one,"' and so one may expect at the very least a see-
saw alternating in accepting and in rejecting (reversing) prior de-
cisions." 4
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND
APPROACH TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S
FREE SPEECH (AND PRESS) CLAUSE
The first amendment to the Constitution of the United States con-
tains the limiting prohibition that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . ... "15 Read
literally, this permits (without requiring) the conclusions first, that
the first amendment does not forbid the abridging of the speech per
se but only the abridging of the freedom of speech,"1 " and, second,
that it is one's freedom to speak or to publish which cannot be
abridged." '  Thus, one's consitutional right is only "to inform.""'
113. There are numerous references which can be made to this statement, e.g.,
Barnett, "Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Holmes Tradition," found in ESSAYS IN
LEGAL HISTORY IN HONOR OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 307-315 (FORKOScH ed. 1966).
114. See, e.g., infra note 407.
115. This refers especially to the federal Congress and seemingly is limited to
that body (but see, CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES II, 1056 et seq. [1953], but through the Due Process
Clause of the fourteenth amendment the entirety of the first amendment (as well
as other amendments in part or in whole) has been made applicable to the states,
on which see, e.g., cases beginning with dissents in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925), and discussion in FORKOSCH, supra note 79 at 435-45.
The fourteenth amendment's § 1, sentence 2, states that "No State . . . shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . .. .
116. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960), who also terms this a
paradox or self-contradiction which must be solved.
117. We have substituted the preposition "to" for that used in the first amend-
ment, i.e., "of," on which see text and supra note 41 and note 37, and infra notes
120, 152, 224, 225, and 244.
118. In other words, the first amendment's language may conceivably be read
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This strict construction would, therefore, seemingly protect only the
giving of information, so that no correlative freedom or right to be
informed, or duty to inform, literally and expressly would so exist.
Assuming this literal interpretation and these conclusions, still, for
the purpose of effectuating the admitted rights to speak and publish,
and so to inform, there logically flows a correlative series of implied
and additional rights which are absolutely necessary and indispensa-
ble, and without which the constitutional right to inform would be-
come merely a hortatory expression. These other rights include
those of being able to: 1) have information made available so as
to permit one thereafter to be able to inform, i.e., to exercise one's
constitutional right to inform; 2) have access to sources of informa-
tion for that purpose; 3) be able to travel to sources for information
and for ascertaining and checking the truth, etc.; 4) obtain materials
physically to publish and to distribute; and 5) be free of unjust and
inequitable special and punitive taxes, licenses, controls, or limita-
tions and other analogous, and "penumbral"' 9 rights.
as: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom to speak, or to publish
[or: of the press to publish] . . . ." The United States has followed a broadening
path in interpreting the amendment's language. To illustrate, the Blackstonian
declaration of the common law of this day as having the nature of a free state pre-
vent the laying of any "previous restraints" upon publication, and that this is what
that law meant by a free press, 4 COMMENTARIES 145 (1876), was stated as late as
1951 to have been the principle adopted by the first amendment's free press clause.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 521 et seq. (1951), per Frankfurter.
Similarly did the adoption of the fourteenth amendment leave the law as it was,
e.g., Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907), per Holmes, although in the
same opinion this Justice stated that "t]here is no constitutional right to have all
general propositions of law once adopted remain unchanged." Id. at 461. However,
without any express reversal of this doctrine of previous restraint as being the sole
principle found in the free press clause, and without expressly stating that the
clause was being broadened, the Supreme Court has nevertheless altered and broad-
ened it. Thus, for example, there is a "clear and present danger" test which is
today utilized (see text and infra notes 188 et seq.), and, in addition, the Supreme
Court will review findings of fact of lower courts, federal or state; Fiske v. Kansas,
274 U.S. 380 (1927), and especially Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
There are other aspects which find the free speech and press clauses utilized by
the judiciary to control governmental intrusions upon these rights, e.g., in federal
or state efforts to censor individual conduct or publication in the name of law and
order, public morals, labor relations, and other fields. See generally FORKOSCH,
supra note 79 at chs. xv-xx, and also FoRKoscH, LABOR LAW PASSIM (2d
ed. 1965).
Thus an individual's constitutional right "to" do something in the area of publi-
cation and speech has been continually extended, and greater impedimenta placed
upon governmental efforts to control.
119. See on this penumbral concept, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
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It may be strongly urged, however, that even though these addi-
tional rights be granted, there is no "duty" affirmatively to inform.
Even though a governmental agency must have its official records
open and available to persons who seek these out, 120 the agency is
not required to initiate disclosure. A passive, not active, duty exists,
i.e., to open and make available all official and relevant sources and
records, and, where statutorily required by Congress, also to promul-
gate, publish, and disseminate them, and make them available in and
through (official) publications. 121
THE BASIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE
CONSTITUTION AND AMENDMENTS
However, the very idea of government embodied in the Constitu-
tion and in the amendments negates the literal and limiting interpre-
tation just enunciated, and so also does the correlative notion of public
education. These considerations of government and of education
stem from and involve basic philosophical and political concepts.
Without some understanding of the continuing impact of these con-
cepts upon the American consciousness there can be little under-
standing of information as here discussed.
The nation's early colonial ancestors practiced what they did not
preach. They utilized human beings as slaves, and accepted or ar-
ranged for contract and indentured servants to immigrate. Their so-
484 (1965), discussed by Forkosch, Who Are the "People" in the Preamble to the
Constitution?, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 644 (1968).
120. See, e.g., text keyed to supra note 84, and also infra note 121.
121. See, e.g., the Federal Register Act of 1935, 44 U.S.C. §§ 301-314 (1940),
which provides for the publication of executive orders and rules and regulations in
the daily Federal Register; any document so required to be published is not to be
valid against any person not otherwise having actual knowledge unless and until the
order, etc. is filed for and published. But see, discussions in Hotch v. United States,
208 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1953), and 212 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1954), as well as Federal
Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947), especially the dissent by
Justice Jackson. See also supra note 85, on the Freedom of Information Act of
1967. The background of the 1935 statutory rejection of secrecy is in the argument
before the court, MASON, BRANDEIS, A FREE MAN'S LIFE 618 (1946), and the deci-
sion, Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Emergency, 59 HARv. L. REV.
645 (1946), in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), United States
v. Smith, 293 U.S. 65 (1934), although in 1872 four Justices had earlier dissented
against giving legal effect to an unpublished Presidential proclamation. Lapeyre v.
United States, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 191 (1872), although an administrative inter-
pretation of general effect, not published, is valid. Boesche v. Udall, 303 F.2d 204
(D.C. Cir. 1961), aff'd. 373 U.S. 472 (1963).
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ciety was definitely hierarchical in this sense, although the divisions
were not overly clearcut. Not only the economic but also the theo-
logical entered this class structure, e.g., the required conformity which
drove some to found other colonies. 2' The people were thus not
egalitarian in practice or in thought, and those who were in the higher
categories conducted their affairs for their own benefit, i.e., govern-
ment then was of, by, and for those who were deemed freemen and
were further able to meet certain requirements. 123
Within this group there were certain accepted and understood prin-
ciples and concepts. One of these was that man had to work and
strive to better himself so as to be welcomed into heaven; another
was that heretics could not be accepted as members of their society,
and, as a corollary, that no views involving autonomy and individual-
ism, as independent thought, new ideas, or free rpeech and press could
be tolerated. In this mind-closed society there was freedom only for
the topmost, who also conformed; that is, permissible activity was
restricted.
Yet this founding authoritarian oligarchy had been the activating
force behind the emigration from Europe because of their religious
convictions, refusing to bend the mind's knee to another's command.
It was this spark of religious freedom which flowered in Europe and
in the colonies'24 and, although it took at least a century for a liberal-
ized church, a broadened (albeit still narrow) political base, a more
just and egalitarian society, and a greater appreciation of the indi-
vidual and his liberties to develop, still, by the last quarter of the
eighteenth century, a sentiment of liberty and freedom of and for
(most of) the individuals then comprising colonial society was not
only in the air but probably was one of the major reasons for the
American Revolution. 25
122. See, e.g., Roger Williams and the founding of Rhode Island as described by
WISH, SOCIETY AND THOUGHT IN EARLY AMERICA ch. 2 (1950).
123. See, e.g., Forkosch, supra note 119 at 661-62, where some of the require-
ments include not only sex and age but also wealth, i.e., property.
124. See supra note 122.
125. See e.g., ADAMS, THE FOUNDING OF NEW ENGLAND 450-52 (1921), that
"[T]he course of development, however, which was to make Massachusetts the
leader of liberal thought among the states, was a long one, and, in part, it was but
a reaction and a protest against the theological repression of the earlier period." See
also, the criticism of Adams's general thesis by Shipton, A Plea for Puritanism, 40
AM. HiST. REv. 460-67 (1935), who also concludes that "[f]ar from being narrow
bigots, the ministers were the leaders in every field of intellectual advance in New
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In colonial America, therefore, by the time of the Revolution there
was a degree of ambivalence concerning the freedom of the individual
and of his mind and his conscience.126  There were many who
mouthed platitudes supporting these principles but hypocritically re-
jected political equality for others; and yet there were also many who
acted on conviction and espoused egalitarian views.' 27 The result
was that for each economic interpretation of and support for colonial
society' 28 there is a contrary opinion, 29 as well as a compromise
mean between the extremes, such as the opinion that "[t]he Ameri-
cans fought England because Parliament threatened the security of
property. . . . The economic motive was present . . . but it was
present as the friend of universal liberty.'1 0
By the time of the Declaration of Independence of 1776, the wave
of egalitarianism sweeping the country' found Jefferson writing that,
one of the "truths [held] to be self-evident" was that man's "un-
alienable Rights" included "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happi-
ness." Eleven years later, however, the proposed Constitution lacked
England in these years. And such difficulties as they experienced were in no small
degree due to the fact that they were too liberal, not too conservative, for the mass
of the people."
126. See, e.g., BROWN, MIDDLE-CLASS DEMOCRACY AND THE REVOLUTION IN
MASSACHUSETrS, 1691-1780 (1955) who supports the view that no internal social
struggle is to be found during the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period, and
JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, 15, 239 (1948), as well as his Dem-
ocracy and the American Revolution, 20 HUNTINGTON LIBRARY Q. 321 (1957), who
espouses the view that not only was there an external revolution (against Great
Britain), but also an internal one (to change the social order, seeking to establish
majority rule and a degree of equality). This writer has accepted the latter view,
FORKOSCH, supra note 79 at 1-2.
127. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson's thoughts and conduct concerning all these
aspects, in SCHACHNER, THOMAS JEFFERSON 153-54, 231-32, 978 (1951).
128. See, e.g., BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES (1913), followed by PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERI-
CAN THOUGHT III, 410 (1927-30).
129. See, e.g., BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION (1956), and
McDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE (1958), who reject the Beard thesis.
130. Morgan, The American Revolution: Revisions in Need of Revising, 14
WILLIAM & MARY Q., 12 (Third Series 1957), who continues: "Devotion to security
of property was not the attitude of a privileged few but the fundamental principle of
the many, inseparable from everything that went by the name of freedom and ad-
hered to the more fervently precisely because it did affect most people so intimately."
131. Was it really a sub-surface wave stirred by the deep feelings and emotions
of the many, or was it a surface wave engendered by the few to create an emotional
fervor to stir the masses to arms and to the defense of property, not freedom?
This question has been answered many times, by many scholars, in many ways, but
as yet not definitively.
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a Bill of Rights, 1 2 and when this was ratified in 1791 the fifth
amendment contained a clause providing for the security of "life,
liberty, or property," not "Happiness." As a sop, the Preamble to
the Constitution, which is not a source of power or of rights,' in-
toned majestically that that document was being ordained and estab-
lished for a new government in order, inter alia, to "secure the Bless-
ings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity. . ....
Despite what has been implied in this brief review of colonial his-
tory, there still was in the majority of the colonists a viable belief in,
and continued adherence to the ideas of human dignity, individual
free-will and conscience, and the liberties to be enjoyed by all." 4
Included in the beliefs of the early Americans, as members of a free
and independent society, was the philosophic (and political) one
that reason and the human mind, and its ideas and conjectures, were
to be free of censorship and governmental inhibitions. Such theories
espoused as these should circulate freely and without fear of re-
prisal." 5 It was to secure these rights and beliefs, as well as to
create a more stable society, that a new form of government was being
instituted.
The notions of government which the colonists and the Founding
Fathers first implied nationally 8 ' in the Constitution,8 7 and then
132. These generally refer to the first eight amendments, on which see
FoRKoscH supra note 79, at chs. xv-xx.
133. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); contra, Forkosch,
Does "Secure the Blessings of Liberty" Mandate Governmental Action?, 1970
LAw & SocIL ORDER 17. See also supra note 30.
134. See, e.g., Patrick Henry's emotional arguments in the Virginia ratifying
convention, given in Forkosch, supra note 119, at 692.
135. The coin-face is discussed later when the limitations thereon are examined.
The Age of Reason began with Descartes's famous dictum, Cogito ergo sum; I
think, therefore, I am; and the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries espoused in-
ductive science as a way of life. The present reaction to the logical culmination
of Cartesian thought and practice still exalts reason, if not the ends.
136. The Articles of Confederation, agreed to in 1777 but not ratified by Mary-
land, the last state, until 1781, was the first national document of government for
all the states (peoples). It contained very few guarantees of rights of peoples or
citizens. It was primarily, if not solely, a compact (treaty) among sovereign states
(see ART. I). It did guarantee that "the free inhabitants . . . shall be entitled to
all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people
of each state shall have free ingress and egress to and from any other state, and
shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce...." Aside from a
last item on states being required to give full faith and credit to the records, etc. of
other states, the quoted items were all that ART. IV mentioned.
137. The Constitution, as proposed in 1787 by the Philadelphia Convention and
then finally ratified and enforceable the following year, contained not only the
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expressed in the Bill of Rights, and which are still relevant today, are
that Everyman's mind is to be free; that he is to be enabled freely to
debate the political issues of the day; that an informed public is in-
dispensable for government and its strength, as well as Everyman's
own cultural betterment;1 8 that to be so informed Everyman has a
constitutional right not only to receive but also to give, debate, and
exchange information, views, ideas, and beliefs whether in agreement
with others or dissenting from them; that the very nature of the demo-
cratic process requires the deliberate and reasoned (continuing) con-
sent 3 9 of the governed; 4 ° that an unbroken national growth politi-
cally, economically, socially, and in all other respects is a necessity
else decay and decline occur;' 4 ' and that when free rein is given to
privileges & immunities clause and the full faith & credit clause (in ART. IV §§ 2
and 1 respectively) of the old Articles (see supra note 136), but also few others
found expressed as negative limitations upon the federal and state governments in
§§ 9-10 of ART. I, e.g., habeas corpus not to be suspended, no bill of attainder or
ex post facto law to be passed (all against both governments), no impairment of the
obligation of contract against state governments, but see later fifth amendment's
due process clause, FORKOSCH, supra note 79 at 335-37.
138. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940): "In the
realm of . . . political beliefs . . . these liberties are, in the long view, essential to
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy."
139. The consent of the governed may be obtained in many ways, e.g., the
Athenian and colonial "town-hall meeting" or the balloting of today; the consent
may be of a majority, two-thirds, three-quarters, or even of a plurality (all are
found on the American constitutional and political scene). But, it must not be
forgotten, a bare majority of half-plus-one is merely one, and perhaps not overly-
satisfactory, method. Such a majority does not necessarily possess the greater or
greatest knowledge, wisdom, or vision, and the most inconsequential of minorities
must therefore be free to urge.
Implicit in the political philosophy of the contract theory of government, and
judicially made explicit in many situations, e.g., contract law, criminal law, is the
doctrine of the free will, not further discussed, although see, e.g., EDWARDS, FREE-
DOM OF THE WILL (Ramsey ed. 1957); FREEDOM AND THE WILL (D. Pears ed.
1963). See also supra note 41.
140. On the relation between governors and governed see Forkosch, supra
note 110, at 311-402. On the democratic process required see, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960): "Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are
to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or
doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result
must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It is that mutila-
tion of the thinking process of the community which the First Amendment to
the Constitution is directed. The principle of the freedom of speech springs from
the necessities of the program of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of
Reason in the abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American agreement that
public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage."
141. In this respect the Greeks knew of and adhered to this principle of growth,
for they had witnessed a cycle of changes, i.e., monarch-aristrocracy-tyranny-
democracy. See, e.g., BARKER, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE
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dissenting views and opinions' 4 2 a society's internal pressures are less
likely to erupt into violence, rebellion, and revolution than when such
opposing thoughts are kept repressed.' 4 ' "Our [American] scheme
of society is more dependent than any other form of government on
knowledge and wisdom and self-discipline for the achievement of its
aims. For our democracy implies the reign of reason on the most
extensive scale."' 44  So it was written by Thomas Jefferson, who well
knew at first hand the vituperation heaped upon him and his con-
temporaries by the press, that, nevertheless "[w]here the press is
free, and every man able to read, all is safe," and echoed by one
Justice that
• . . I view the guaranties of the First Amendment as the foundation upon which our
governmental structure rests and without which it could not continue to endure as
conceived and planned. Freedom to speak and write about public questions is as
3 (1959). See also ZIMMERN, THE GREEK COMMONWEALTH 125 et seq. (5th ed.,
1931).
142. See, e.g., infra note 172. It is not amiss to point to "[t]he most funda-
mental rights and obligations of the [Chinese] citizens are support of Chairman
Mao . . . , support of the dictatorship of the proletariat and support of the so-
cialist system," as disclosed in the draft of the new Constitution which also as-
signed life-time supremacy in national affairs to Mao. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1970, at
3, col. 1. See also infra note 153.
143. Of course the current situation in the United States (and elsewhere) may
be pointed to in refutation of this concept and conclusion, on which see Forkosch,
Is Violence An "American" Nightmare?, 4 GA. L. REV. 439 (1970). See also
Sostre v. McGinnis, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1971), 39 L.W. 2500, where a prisoner in
jail was punished solely for possessing literature, expressing political ideas, and
threatening to initiate litigation, one such punishment being to stop his corre-
spondence with his attorney-all this was denounced.
144. Per Frankfurter, concurring in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952). See also infra note 188. The Justice's language in de-
fense of these freedoms is eloquent, sometimes overly so, and this regardless of his
actual decision. To illustrate, in his concurrence in Dennis v. United States,
supra note 118, at 550 this is, inter alia, what he wrote: "We must not overlook the
value of that interchange. Freedom of expression is the well-spring of our civiliza-
tion-the civilization we seek to maintain and further by recognizing the right of
Congress to put some limitation upon expression. Such are the paradoxes of life.
For social development of trial and error, the fullest possible opportunity for the
free play of the human mind is an indispensable prerequisite. The history of
civilization is in considerable measure the displacement of error which once held
sway as official truth by beliefs which in turn have yielded to other truths. There-
fore the liberty of man to search for truth ought not to be fettered, no matter what
orthodoxies he may challenge. Liberty of thought soon shrivels without freedom of
expression. Nor can truth be pursued in an atmosphere hostile to the endeavor or
under dangers which are hazarded only by heroes."
"'The interest, which [the first amendment] guards, and which gives it its
importance, presupposes that there are no orthodoxies-religious, political, econo-
mic, or scientific-which are immune from debate and dispute. Back of that is
the assumption-itself an orthodoxy, and the one permissible exception-that truth
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important to the life of our government as is the heart to the human body. In fact,
the privilege is the heart of our government. If that heart be weakened, the result
is debilitation; if it be stilled, the result is death.14 5
And the latest majority opinion by the Supreme Court in this vale
of personal freedom upheld Everyman's constitutional right to the
privacy 4 6 of his own home, free of governmental intrusion, and used
this rather eloquent language:
It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive infor-
mation and ideas. "This freedom [of speech and press] ...necessarily protects the
right to receive .... ." This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of
their social worth . . . is fundamental to our free society. . . . For also fundamental
is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted govern-
mental intrusions into one's privacy. . . . [Appellant] is asserting the right to read
or observe what he pleases-the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs
in the privacy of his own home. He is asserting the right to be free from state inquiry
into the contents of his library. . . . Whatever may be the justifications for other
statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's
own home. If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or
what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of
giving government the power to control men's minds.
147
will be most likely to emerge, if no limitations are imposed upon utterances that can
with any plausibility be regarded as efforts to present grounds for accepting or
rejecting propositions whose truth the utterer asserts, or denies.' . . . In the last
analysis it is on the validity of this faith that our national security is staked."
It may be noted that the Justice's second sentence accepts a limitation upon
free speech and press, as opposed to the absoluteness of the Black-Douglas views,
on which see infra note 174.
145. In a letter to Colonel Yancey in 1816, THoMAs JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY
137 (S. Padover ed. 1939), a selection of Jefferson's writings, the Justice is Black,
dissenting in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287,
301-02 (1941). See also infra note 188.
146. This right to privacy is protected in whole or in part by other constitu-
tional provisions, e.g., the third amendment, the fourth amendment, the fifth amend-
ment. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350, n.5 (1967), where the Court
denounced electronic bugging of the outside of a telephone booth and refused to
permit the telephone conversation into evidence (and see also infra note 560).
147. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969). In the Katz case,
supra note 146, at 350-51, however, Justice Stewart referred to various consti-
tutional provisions protecting "individual privacy against certain kinds of gov-
ernmental intrusions," but pointed out that such provisions may "go further, and
often have nothing to do with privacy at all. . . . But the protection of a person's
general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is, like the
protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the
individual States."
Justice Stewart's opinion was also on behalf of Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Fortas (Marshall not participating), with Douglas (Brennan) in a separate con-
currence opening, "[wihile I join the opinion of the Court" (Id. at 359), as did
Harlan's concurrence (ld. at 360); White's concurrence was silent as to this point;
Black's dissenting opinion, however, refused to agree to bringing any portion of the
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And Jefferson, speaking of the first amendment's freedom of the
press, wrote that "The basis of our governments being the opinion of
the people, the very first object should be to keep that right; and were
it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without
newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesi-
tate a moment to prefer the latter." 4
Since the founding of the nation in the eighteenth century industry
and commerce have multipled enormously, there have been indi-
vidual and technological upheavals,'49 the communications revolu-
tion has changed the world, 150 and the primacy of knowledge and
education as the present and future bases for a better economic, so-
cial, and political society have come to the fore.1 ' So that while our
heritage has always included education and knowledge, these have
now assumed major importance in our future development.
These political beliefs and their corollaries necessitate the conclu-
sion that not only must there be a constitutional freedom to inform
and be informed, but also the separate positive and active duties and
rights exist repectively to inform and to be informed. 2 Thus these
rights, as constitutionally protected ones, have been accorded judicial,
fourth amendment's protections into the area of privacy (Id. at 373), and inveighed
against any distortion of its language "to 'keep the Constitution up to date' or 'to
bring it into harmony with the times.' It was never meant that this Court have
such power, which in effect would make us a continuously functioning constitu-
tional convention" (Id. at 373, and see also discussion into 374).
148. The Meadowmoor case, supra note 145, at 301, n.4, quoted by the Justice.
See also the Canadian Special Senate Committee on Mass Media's Report, excerpts
in N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1970, at 14, col. 3 (and see also infra note 304), which
states, inter alia: "Remember that freedom of the press is basic to all our freedoms,
and that the greatest danger to press freedom is public apathy. We hope the
media will not be reluctant to embarrass the powerful. If the press is not a thorn
in the side of the Establishment, it's a wart on the body politic." See also
HOHENBERG, FREE PRESS/FREE PEOPLE (1971), as well as THOMPSON, AT THE
EDGE OF HISTORY (1971).
149. Kristol, Urban Civilization and Its Discontents, COMMENTARY 29-35 (1970),
feels that such revolution transformed the urban "mob" into a bourgeois class and,
by urbanizing our civilization, has resulted in the current-day discontents.
150. See McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA (1964), where he promulgated the
theory that the medium itself is the message, rather than a conveyor or transmitter
of the information; since then a minor revolution in, e.g., political campaigning has
occurred. Thus the ad-men stress the medium and its use rather than the sub-
stance of the message, so that information qua knowledge (of issues) is seemingly
relegated to a secondary position and the image projected through, with, and as the
medium becomes the message.
151. See, e.g., DRUCKER, THE AGE OF DISCONTINUITY C. 13-15 (1969).
152. Shortly a distinction will be made as to information which is or directly or
indirectly has to do with or bears upon political matters, and those in other areas.
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and now political, recognition and effectuation,153 albeit only effec-
tively in recent decades. It has been the judicial branch of the gov-
ernment which has pried loose these conceptual duties and rights, and
it has been a somewhat recalcitrant legislative branch which has ac-
corded a modicum of cooperation. On the practical level, one may
ask whether all this is sound and fury signifying nothing.' 4
THE SOCRATIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
This positive idea of government as requiring such duties and rights
to inform and to be informed, with the reciprocal idea of public edu-
cation, is somewhat new. In one aspect it may conceivably be traced
to the dilemma confronting Socrates, as Plato's Apology and Crito
present it, wherein that savant had to determine whether he was
bound to obey his government in circumscribing the content of his
speeches, and likewise bound to submit to punishment for a refusal
so to do. The Old One answered no as to the first, 155 and yes as to the
second.'5 6
For the moment we do not press the distinction. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra
note 116 at 95 et seq.
153. Effectuation is, practically, sometimes of greater importance than recogni-
tion. See, e.g., the conversation between Revolt I. Pimenov, a prominent Lenin-
grad mathematician, and V.A. Medvedev, a party official in charge of ideology,
which occurred April 20, 1970, with the former trying to explain why scientists were
agitating for more political freedom. Inter alia, the latter said "that Soviet au-
thorities never would allow anyone to write 'anything that comes into his head.'"
"Of course, we don't have enough power to force all people to think the same, but
we still have enough power not to let people do things that will be harmful to
us. . .. ." "What do you want? If you think that we ever will allow somebody to
speak and write anything that comes into his head, then this will never be. We
will not allow this ...... N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1970, at 2, col. 4. See also
N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1970, at 1, col. 2, concerning the formation of a Committee
for Human Rights by three prominent Russian physicists, to seek ways of guaran-
teeing personal freedom in Russia (joined by the Nobel literature prize winner,
Aleksandr L. Solzhenitsyn, on December 10, 1970). Thereafter the Soviet Com-
munist Party called for a firm stand against Western ideas and its editorial in
Pravda in effect was an indirect reply to these dissenters. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24,
1970, at 3, col. 4, and see also U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 30, 1970, at 44.
See also supra notes 17 and 142, and infra note 319.
154. See infra notes 518 et seq., on the monopolies and oligopolies rampant in
the information media which make a mockery of these high-sounding precepts.
See also supra note 62.
155. See also Jackson's language in West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette,
supra note 105, at 642, that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional con-
stellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein."
156. See text keyed to supra note 68.
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In so refusing to be stilled, but then accepting the authority of the
state to punish, Socrates in effect urged that an informed public was
an essential to the well-being of society and the state; that the electo-
rate required knowledge and debate to make reasoned determina-
tions on the governance of the community, so that they had a right to
these; that such knowledge and debate could be secured only through
their accessibility to and freedom of information, e.g., through his dis-
cussions with others; and that therefore he had a duty and obliga-
tion 15 7 to the citizens to bring whatever information and knowledge
he possessed to them.' 58 Throughout, it will be noted, it is society
and the state which benefit from the extension of these rights; and,
further, that there is the implication that in the absence of these liber-
ties society will either not progress or else regress.' 59
However, this Socratic approach is individualistic, not the state's,
i.e., the positive function enunciated in the opening sentence of the
157. An excellent analysis of Socrates and the Sophists is found in GUTHRIE,
A HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY, VOL. III, THE FIFTH CENTURY ENLIGHTENMENT
(1969), which discloses the shift of philosophy from an interest in nature and the
universe to man and his problems.
In the APOLOGY Socrates concedes that "disobedience is indeed evil" but "I will
always obey God and confute ignorance." Shortly he adds, "[s]lay me-and you
hurt yourselves. For I am your better conscience...." SELECTIONS FROM PLATO
21, 23 (L. Forman ed. 1927) (in Greek, with some marginal translations in Eng-
lish, here quoted). See also GULLEY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCRATES 178 (1968),
feeling that Socrates demands for all the rights to be free and to determine their
own good, and see also review by Neumann, 8 J. HIST. PHILO. 335 (1970).
158. The charge of heresay is ancient, as here illustrated; medieval and colonial,
e.g., discussions by Mintz, Hobbes On the Law of Heresy: A New Manuscript,
29 J. HIST. OF IDEAS 409 (1968), Willman, Hobbes On the Law of Heresy, 31 J.
HIST. OF IDEAS 607 (1970) and reply by Mintz, at 614; and modem and current, as
the later discussions on censorship will indicate. They all bear upon the freedoms
of man's mind, thoughts, expressions, and cooperative endeavors to elevate himself
in the realm of ideas.
159. Socrates expressed various opinions in his role as the devil's advocate, but
this did not mean that he subscribed to these positions. See, e.g., Douglas's quota-
tion, in his dissent in Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 78-79 (1961), of
an interplay with Adeimantus ([the Justice incorrectly refers to Glaucon] whom
Socrates was using as a sounding board) to attribute to the Sage a general type of
censorship which his own conduct belied (although there is a degree of correctness
in that the quotation had to do with children's reading of false tales, requiring a
degree of protection of and so censorship for the benefit of the young, a position
rejected as to obscenity by the Justice in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968), upholding a statutory prohibition of the sale of pornographic material to
youths under 17). Furthermore, the entirety of BOOK II of Plato's REPUBLIC, from
which the quotation is taken, has to do with justice (and injustice), a concern of the
entirety of the volume, and shortly thereafter Socrates points out "that God is not
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second preceding paragraph places the onus upon the government to
act for and on behalf of the individual, whereas Plato's reporting
stresses the individual's obligations so to act that eventually the state
(also) benefits. This superficial dichotomy is resolvable when it is
recalled that the Greek city-state there was no sharp line of separa-
tion between government and citizen; they were one in practice, for
the good of each was the good of the other. This unity therefore per-
mitted a degree of cooperative coercion by the state on the individual
which today would be resented and, in the political thought underly-
ing the American Constitution and system of governments, is found
expressed in the system of built-in limitations on governments and the
rights of persons. Also, whereas the Greeks felt that their state had a
duty positively to inculcate virtue in the citizens, today's theory of a
government's mission is that it should remove and prevent hindrances
leading to "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness" (Declara-
tion of Independence).
The Greek view of cooperation is found expressed to some degree
in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations and in the subsequent literature;
the age-old view of government predominance, e.g., the divine rule
theory, whether by king or church or the rule of force or might, is still
present today, witness some countries in South America, the Far
East, or behind the "iron curtain"; but the Western nations hew
basically and primarily to the views given above, placing the indi-
vidual and his rights above the state and its duties.' 60
the author of all things, but of good only," i.e., he is not the cause of evil and
therefore "he is the cause of a few things only ... ,." an impious statement which,
if Douglas's generality is to be accepted, means that Socrates was violating his own
precept. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 57, 62-63 (Jowett trans]. 1901), revised edition
published by Colonial Press, with the quotation attributed to Glaucon shown at
page 56 to be erroneous. See also THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO III 248, 249-50
(Jowett transl. 1875), showing, at the last two lines of page 248, that Adeimantus was
interjecting himself and, at top 249, that Socrates was addressing him; DIALOGUES
OF PLATO 253-55 (Kaplan ed. 1955), Pocket Library edition II, accepting and using
the Jowett translation and FORMAN, supra note 157, at 200 (1927), in the Greek lan-
guage, with BOOK II headed by the cast, "Socrates, Adeimantus."
160. Of course we discuss and stress information, so that in time of actual war
another point of view may well require a different conclusion, on which see, e.g.,
text and infra notes 320 et seq. John Dewey's views stemmed from his rejection
of a priori natural rights and making democracy a "belief in the ability of human
experience to generate the aims and methods by which further experience will grow
in ordered richness." Dewey, Creative Democracy-The Task Before Us, in
CLASSIC AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS 393 (1951).
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THE AMERICAN COLONIAL VIEWS
The American colonial politicians, and especially many of those
gathered at Philadelphia in the spring of 1787, generally had classical
backgrounds and knew of, and were sometimes well read in the con-
temporary political literature.' 6 ' Not only did they know these politi-
cal and philosophical concepts but they also utilized them. For ex-
ample, most of the constitutions which the colonies-turned-states
adopted during and after the Revolutionary War contained provisions
guaranteeing free speech, 162 and the ratification of the Constitution
was jeopardized by the failure to include such protections within that
document. 16  The adoption of the First Amendment's free speech
clause was therefore in line with the theories, experiences, and prac-
tices during these early periods,' so that the Socratic views as to
the necessity of speech and information, despite the government's
ability to punish for their exercise, may justifiably be said to be part
of the continuing American heritage. And, in further extension of
the Old One's views, the Constitution so attempted to re-state and
set primary emphasis upon the individual in the continuing relation-
ship between government and one's conscience.16
161. See, e.g., FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION ch. II (1913).
162. And other rights, e.g., there were bills of rights expressly provided for in
eight state constitutions, and while three others had no such formal bill their con-
stitutions contained similar provisions. See, e.g., Forkosch, supra note 119, at 698,
n.229, and also for the current state constitutions and their bills of rights, CoNsTIru-
TUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL AND STATE (1969).
163. See, e.g., Forkosch, supra note 119, at 697, n.226, and pages following.
In England a Bill of Rights was presented to the House of Commons in 1969 but,
in April, 1970, rejected by that body. The proposed Bill, as of this writing, is
being modified slightly for re-presentation. It lists eight "human rights and funda-
mental freedoms," the sixth being: "freedom of expression by speech, and by writ-
ten, printed, or transmitted word or representation." Many other nations have
constitutional or statutory provisions similar to the Bill of Rights, e.g., Canada.
164. There are disagreements, of course, as to many aspects of speech so covered
and not covered, e.g., CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 18-21 (1961),
who feels that the common law as to seditious libel was now overthrown, and so
rejects Holmes's views in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), although
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 259 et seq. (1960) disproves the Chafee thesis.
165. For a late illustration of governmental (via the judicial) efforts to tip the
balance against the individual, see Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970),
the conscientious objector case, supporting the individual against the government.
See also Prof. Randall's view that "English and American tradition has long opposed
military conscription. Back of this oppostion there is a mental attitude which has
been bluntly characterized . . . as a manifestation of the Anglo-Saxon's sense of the
sanctity of the individual, [and] his repugnance to outside coercion." RANDALL,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 239-240 (rev. ed., 1951).
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The American heritage just enunciated has not been a placid or un-
broken one. For example, almost immediately after the new govern-
ment was constituted Congress enacted the Alien & Sedition Acts of
1798. Despite outcries as to their unconstitutionality there were nu-
merous arrests, prosecutions, and convictions under their provisions.
However, the constitutional issues never reached the Supreme Court
and the expiration of the Acts after three years stilled the voices raised
against them.166
Nevertheless, the ugly practice of unreasoning censorship of mind,
speech, and person re-emerges now and again, as illustrated by the
disgraceful World War II Japanese Relocation Cases, 16 7 the post-
war McCarthy era, 6" and the current anti-dissent'6 9 attitudes of the
national and local officials and agencies. 170  There have been Know-
Nothing, Ku Klux Klan, and other like organizations throughout the
past and present history of the United States which have continued
such anti-intellectual attacks,' 7' and obviously information and its
dissemination, as well as its control, are their chief targets and de-
sires.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO NATIONAL SELF-PRESERVATION
AND THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH AND INFORMATION
Very briefly, and perhaps too briefly, we present a preliminary and
166. Thomas Jefferson, after he became President, pardoned all those so con-
victed, and later Congress repaid most of the fines. See, on the Acts, SMITH,
FREEDOM'S FETTERS (1956).
167. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). But see ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). See also
M. FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 161, 290, 326, 539 (2d ed. 1969), for a dis-
cussion of these cases.
168. Senator Joseph McCarthy was the Chairman of the Subcommittee on In-
vestigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, and for this dis-
graceful period in American history see, e.g., GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF FEAR
(1969), ROVERE, SENATOR JOE MCCARTHY (1959), although cf. BUCKLEY, et ano.,
MCCARTHY AND His ENEMIES (1954). For the subsequent proceedings against
McCarthy see, e.g., DEFURIA, The McCarthy Censure Case, 42 A.B.A.J. 329 (1956),
and Dorsen, et ano., McCarthy and the Army, 7 COLUM. U. FORUM 21 (1964).
169. The literature is too enormous to cite, and since there is dissent throughout
the world on many fronts, this is not further pursued, although see accounts in, e.g.,
Italy, on the dissent-violence in labor and political agitation (on political, the
Reggio Calabria fighting in the fall of 1970 is a good example).
170. See, e.g., Forkosch, Is Violence An "American" Nightmare?, 4 GA. L. REV.
439 (1970), and also Forkosch, Points of Rebellion: A Dialogue, The "Rebellion"
of William 0. Douglas, 4 GA. L. REV. 830 (1970).
171. See, e.g., HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE
(1963).
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generalized view of the political-judicial philosophy in the areas of
national security and free speech and press. The purpose is to provide
illumination for the special material, i.e., legislation, judicial deci-
sions, administrative and executive actions, later presented.
No Absolute Constitutional Right
John Stuart Mill advocated that speech, and its constitutional cor-
ollary the press be completely and absolutely free. So-called "error"
and opposing views, regardless of any clash, must be tolerated and
given complete opportunity to make themselves heard1 72 and complete
for acceptance. This, in the language of the political libertarians, is
the market-place concept, 17 and Justice Black's absolutistic views are
today's strongest expression of this approach.174 However, this is not
what America finds existing within her borders and accepts today'75
172. MILL, ON LIBERTY 79 (Everyman's Lib. ed. 1910): "[i]f all mankind
minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion,
mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he
had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. . . . If the opinion is
right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong,
they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier im-
pression of truth, produced by its collision with error." But see, STEPHEN, LIBERTY,
EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 3 (1967), inveighing against the generality of Mill's termi-
nology and his views on liberty as he does "not typify, however vaguely, any
state of society."
173. See, e.g., Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United States, supra note 164, at
630 and Douglas's dissent in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951), as
well as Frankfurter's language in note 144, supra, and also throughout other quota-
tions in this paper where the view comes through. Although Holmes advocated the
free market-place, he agreed in censorship at times--Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919). See also infra note 200.
174. See, e.g., references in text and infra note 400, and also infra note 183.
While the Justice's views are within the stream of libertarian doctrines which,
historically, find Socrates by his side, still, when absoluteness conflicts with a na-
tion's (vast majoritarian) values then, as with the Old Sage, one's punishment
follows also. In a sense this is self-inflicted, and therefore self-censorship is a
choice. All this comes within the concepts found in a democratic and pluralistic
society.
However, what of a volume such as that by POWELL, THE ANARCHISTIC COOKBOOK
(1971), which gives detailed information to its reader to manufacture, in his
apartment or home, bombs, grenades, etc. to injure or kill people. This is ab-
solutism at its worst and illustrates the corruption of a publisher's values by the
tinkle of coins, a greening of America which makes suspect a claim of constitu-
tional freedoms when hoist.
175. See, e.g., notes 59, 62, 177, 183, 188, 195, 200, 201, 203, 384, 406, 473,
and 518 et. seq., which all illustrate different qualifications on free speech. A free
marketplace just does not exist where the means of communication are not free.
There is an extreme difficulty, if not impossibility, of access to the media, and it
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX:1
nor, it may be added, does any other nation, although the extreme
counter-position is also not recognized. 76 There is somewhat of a
middle ground, whether to apply some method or test to resolve the
conflict or to apply a reasonable balancing of interests or of conflict-
ing views, and this latter seems to be that adopted in most Western
countries.' 7 7 The key, however, is security.
Security is, of course, one of the strongest urges of persons178 and of
nations. 17  So is the right of and to privacy. However, in times
requires governmental compulsion in just one area to obtain some slight degree of
(in)equality. See infra notes 395 and 451 et seq. See arguments by Barron,
Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641
(1957), and supra note 62.
Separately, the actuality begets rejection where absolutes are attempted in political
and human relations. For example, Florida's "government in sunshine law" re-
quires that everything governmental (not judicial) in that state be open to the pub-
lic, so that its governor cannot confer with its legislative leaders on taxes without
permitting the press to listen in. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1971, at 58, col. 1. This is,
obviously, ridiculous, and either the law or its judicial interpretations must be
changed.
176. E.g., MARCUSE, REASON AND REVOLUTION (2d ed., 1954) and ONE DIMEN-
SIONAL MAN (1964) urges that the present corporate state cannot be replaced with-
out a degree of violence erupting, as violence is ingrained as part of the system,
and that freedoms must be either held in abeyance or else sacrificed until such
replacement occurs.
177. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 138, at 303-04: "Thus the
Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains
subject to regulation for the protection of society."
178. See, e.g., FORKOSCH, LABOR LAW § 4 (2d ed. 1965).
179. See, e.g., James Madison's statement in THE FEDERALIST, No. 41, that
"[s]ecurity against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It
is an avowed and essential object of the American Union." (Mod. Lib. ed. at 261).
180. The right "to be let alone," as a phrase, first appeared in COOLEY, TORTS
29 (2d ed. 1888) (and see latest [4th ed. 1932] I, 34), although two years later the
authoritative and formal expression of privacy as a constitutionally protected right
appeared in the article by the later Justice Brandeis (and Samuel D. Warren). The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). Prof. W.J. Wagner, in THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF THE THEORY OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN FRANCE, - WASH. U.L.
QTLY. - (1971), states that "[i]t seems that the expression vie privi mur~e (private
life behind the walls) was used, for the first time, by Royard-Collard .. . in 1819."
These first two authors recognized exceptions to this right, e.g., where a person re-
nounced this right to live his life screened from public observation, e.g., political and
entertainment figures (see also infra notes 379 et seq.).
There are, of course, certain aspects of privacy which antedate all written and
unwritten constitutions, e.g., marriage, on which see majority opinion of Douglas in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), who also speaks of the concept of
"penumbral" rights as emanating from the Bill of Rights. In the same case the
concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg agrees that "the right of marital privacy
[is embraced within the concept of liberty] though that right is not mentioned ex-
plicitly in the Constitution . . . ," footnoting that "[m]y Brother Stewart dissents
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of stress even constitutional rights and liberties are trampled upon'"'
despite pious utterances to the contrary.' 82 Thus no "absolute" con-
stitutional right exists to free speech or press or any other immunity
found in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution, 18 and
not only can the Chief Executive act unilaterally to deprive a person
of liberty"" or property, 8 5 but so can the Congress 8 ' and even the
Judiciary, 187 e.g., holding, and in particular circumstances finding as
on the ground that he 'can find ... no general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights,
in any other part of the Constitution, or in any case ever before decided by this
Court.' "
The literature in this area is enormous; and is not here attempted. See, e.g.,
pamphlet by LAMOREUX, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY: A BIBLIOGRAPHY, 71 YEARS,
1890-1961 (1962), and also SLOUGH, PRIVACY, FREEDOM, AND RESPONSIBILITY
(1969), and UN Doc. E/CN. 4/1028 and adds. 1-4, the last giving horrendous de-
tails on electronic invasions on which see also infra note 550.
There is, as is later shown, a problem concerning the right to obtain information
and the right of privacy, as illustrated by the despicable conduct of the newsmen
who broke into a Trenton, New Jersey morgue to take and then publish the photo-
graph of the body of the murdered baby son of Charles A. Lindbergh.
181. See, e.g., language of Holmes in text accompanying infra note 200, and in
the opinion in the Schenck case, supra note 173, and also references and cases cited
in supra notes 167 and 175.
182. See, e.g., Frankfurter's concurrence in the Dennis case, 341 U.S. 494, 520
(1951): "But even the all-embracing power and duty of self-preservation is not ab-
solute. . . . [I]t is subject to applicable constitutional limitations. . . . Our
Constitution has no provision lifting restrictions upon governmental authority during
periods of emergency, although the scope of a restriction may depend on the cir-
cumstances in which it is invoked. The First Amendment is such a restriction ....
See also infra note 318.
183. See, e.g., the controversy between Black's absolutism and the Court's bal-
ancing formula as discussed in FoRKOSCH, supra note 167, at § 398, and throughout
this paper.
184. See the Japanese Relocation Cases, supra note 167, discussed in FoRKoscH,
GOVERNMENTS, supra note 110, at 344, 353, and also Forkosch, The Constitution-
ality of the Vietnam Venture, and a Registrant's Right to Counsel Within the Selec-
tive Service System, 22 S. CAR. L. REV. 287 (1970), discussing at length the illegal
and unconstitutional conduct of several Presidents in this incident. Another illus-
tration of the power of a President, intentional or not, is the furor created (and
still not resolved judicially) by Mr. Nixon's unrehearsed television remarks on the
guilt of Charles Manson, then on trial, for the Tate and other murders. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 24, 1970, at 47, col. 1.
185. See, e.g., the judicially-rejected attempt by President Truman to seize the
steel mills in time of peace where Congress had prescribed a formula as a condition
precedent to its own later action, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952), as discussed in FORKOSCH, GOVERNMENTS, supra note 110, at 344,
352.
186. See, e.g., the early Alien & Sedition Acts, supra notes 164, 166, as well as
the hysteria and hysterical statements in the McCarthy era, supra note 168.
187. See, e.g., the decisions in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940), upholding a state law requiring children in school to salute the flag against
their deeply-held religious convictions, fortunately reversed in West Virginia State
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a fact, that continued violence is so intermixed with free speech that
no separation is possible, dooms this constitutional freedom.'
Free speech, therefore, as well as free press, is subject to two over-
all qualifications or limitations, namely, that stemming from the equal
rights of other persons, and that based upon the necessary se-
curity of the nation (even though what these other "rights" and "nec-
essary security" mean and include are open to interpretation and ap-
plication). The first may be illustrated by compelling each person to
be responsible for what he does vis-a-vis his fellow-man, e.g., per-
jury, false advertising, even though in the areas of libel and obscenity
there has intruded the public interest so as to limit this responsibil-
ility, 189 and the second day may be illustrated by what he does vis-a-vis
his government, e.g., sedition.190
The Primas Inter Pares Aspect of Free Speech
At first glance it would appear that one constitutional right is nei-
ther more nor less than any other constitutional right, and all are to
be applied on a basis of equality. In 1938, however, Justice, later
Chief Justice, Stone wrote the famous footnote four, that "when leg-
Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) after the war hysteria had subsided
somewhat. See also FORKOSCH, supra note 167, at ch. xviu-xx for numerous
analogous illustrations. For example, in Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan
Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), Black argues that permitting the picketing there
to continue will deprive Weis of the use of his property without just compensation,
and so if the judiciary so permits, will the judiciary so pay? In the words of Justice
Black: "[I]f this Court is going to arrogate to itself the power to act as the Gov-
ernment's agent to take a part of Weis' property to give to the pickets for their
use, the Court should also award Weis just compensation for the property taken."
Id. at 330. On Logan Valley see also infra note 548.
188. See, e.g., Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., supra
note 136 at 293: "It must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was
the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in
the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to
the mind. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon
rational modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a gen-
erous scope. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an
appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was
not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution." Per Frankfurter, for the majority,
and see supra note 136, on Black's dissent. Or, expression can be suppressed "if,
and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an in-
separable part of it," Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957), and this
applies, pari passu, to all such rights.
189. See text and infra notes 376 et seq.
190. See text and infra notes 336 et seq.
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islation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of...
the [Bill of Rights]" then a "narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality" is to be applied, and that (im-
pliedly) the same is true for "legislation which restricts . . . political
processes . . . [or] particular religious, or national, or racial mi-
norities . . . ."I" This statement with particular application to the
free speech clause has been dubbed the "double standard" approach,
i.e., that the specific free speech right is more equal than any other
non-particular constitutional right. This approach was at first given
a degree of Supreme Court approval, 192 and by 1951 the apogee was
reached. However, by 1956 a majority of the Justices then felt that
"[a]s no constitutional guarantee enjoys preference, so none should
suffer subordination or deletion."19
Fifteen years have elapsed since a Supreme Court majority put the
quietus upon a preferred position for free speech. No express, or
event specifically implied, reversal, has since occurred. However, it
would not be incorrect to say that today's general approach leans
somewhat, but not ocmpletely, toward the earlier position, only the
language being changed. Initially, the question before the court
was whether a "chilling effect" had occurred so that governmental
legislation or conduct, so acting on free speech, should be con-
demned. In so concluding, the factual allegations in a complaint, or
the inferences and conclusions to be drawn, or the presumptions to
be applied, seemed, as a practical consequence, earlier to have been
treated somewhat, perhaps only very more (if at all) loosely in this
area than in the other constitutional ones, even though free speech
was not given an express exalted status. 194  Today, however, the
191. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
192. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937), per Cardozo,
that "of freedom of thought, and speech . . . one may say that it is the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom. With rare aberra-
tions a pervasive recognition of that truth can be traced in our history, political and
legal ...... Although Palko's holding was rejected in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969), the preceding language is still acceptable. See also New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), per Brennan, and Forkosch, Freedom of the
Press: Croswell's Case, 33 FORD. L. REV. 415 (1965).
193. Ulmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956), per Frankfurter. For
the cases and decisions tracing the rise and fall of this "preferred position" status,
see FoRKoscH, supra note 167, at 428-31.
194. For example, in Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), a majority
upheld a Mississippi anti-picketing law involving public buildings, etc., applied in
good faith, where a deliberate violation occurred, stating, inter alia: "Any chilling
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Court seems to have adapted its loosened abstention doctrine to a less
flexible type of intervention (or non-intervention) by insisting upon
a more restrictive factual approach, requiring that the procedural
pleading of facts disclose clearly any such chilling effect, and re-
fusing to permit anyone not a proper party to avail himself of this
cloak; and even as to such a proper party stating:
Moreover, the existence of a "chilling effect," even in the area of First Amend-
ment rights, has never been considered a sufficient basis, in and of itself, for pro-
hibiting state action. Where a statute does not directly abridge free speech, but-
while regulating a subject within the State's power-tends to have the incidental
effect of inhibiting First Amendment rights, it is well settled that the statute can
be upheld if the effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for control of the
conduct and the lack of alternative means for doing so. . . . Just as the incidental
"chilling effect" of such statutes does not automatically render them unconstitu-
tional, so the chilling effect that admittedly can result from the very existence of
certain laws on the statute books does not in itself justify prohibiting the State from
carrying out the important and necessary task of enforcing these laws against
socially harmful conduct that the State believes in good faith to be punishable
under its laws and the Constitution. 195
effect on the picketing as a form of protest and expression that flows from good-
faith enforcement of this valid statute would not, of course, constitute that enforce-
ment an impermissible invasion of protected freedoms." Id. at 619, referring
back to quotation from Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965), that "picketing
and parading [are] subject to regulation even though intertwined with expression and
association" Id. at 617. The dissenting opinion in Cameron by Fortas (Douglas)
disagreed as to the non-chilling effect.
195. The Younger case, infra, 91 S. Ct. at 754. The modem abstention doc-
trine begins with Frankfurter's opinion for a unanimous court in Railroad Com-
mission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), but the present analysis begins with
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965), and see also notes 531 and 536,
inira. That case "confirmed the well-established principle that constitutional de-
fenses to a state criminal charge must be initially tested in state rather than in
federal courts. . . . However, Dombrowski also recognized that exceptional circum-
stances may justify federal intervention when the opportunity to raise constitutional
defenses at the state criminal trial does not assure protection of the constitutional
rights at stake." Two such exceptions considered were when "a State brings or
threatens to bring a criminal prosecution in bad faith for the purpose of harass-
ment," Perez v. Ledesma, 400 U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 674, 693 (1971), per Brennan
(see infra), and second (in this writer's shorthand interpretation), where an "un-
constitutionally vague or overbroad" criminal statute has a chilling effect on the
constitutional rights and thereby prevents non-parties from exercising them.
In Dexter v. Schrunk, 400 U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 7 (1970), Douglas, sitting as a
Circuit Justice, denied an application for a restraining order under Dombrowski,
even though "petitioners make out a strong case for federal protection of their First
Amendment rights. But Dombrowski, a five to four [it was a 5-2 decision, Black
and Stewart not participating] decision decided in 1965 is up for re-examination in
cases set for reargument this fall ...... Those cases included or involved: Younger
v. Harris, 400 U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 746, 756, 760 (1971) (see also infra note
339); Samuels v. Mackell, 400 U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 764 (1971); Boyle v. Landry,
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Regardless of the subduing effect of these new type of "absten-
tion" cases upon the "chilling effect" protections under the Free
Speech (and Free Press) Clause, this constitutional right is still
400 U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 758 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 769
(1971); and Perez, supra.
Younger saw a three-judge district court enjoin the prosecution from proceeding
further after an indictment of Harris under the California Criminal Syndicalism
Act, because the statute was vague and overly-broad, and Harris (and others
intervening) "each would suffer immediate and irreparable injury." 91 S. Ct. 748.
Samuels and others were indicted under the New York criminal anarchy statute
and went to a three-judge district court for an injunction, etc., claiming that the
"trial of these indictments . . . would harass them, and cause them to suffer
irreparable damages ...... 91 S. Ct. at 765. The federal court upheld the laws'
constitutionality and dismissed the complaint. In Boyle seven Chicago groups of
Negro residents sought a three-judge federal district court declaratory judgment and
temporary injunction against the enforcement of numerous allegedly unconstitutional
state and city laws "prohibiting mob action, resisting arrest, aggravated assault,
aggravated battery, and intimidation." 91 S. Ct. at 758-9. Some plaintiffs had
been arrested and the prosecutions were pending, and the complaint also alleged the
use of the statutes to harass, intimidate, etc. the others. The majority of the Su-
preme Court held that the allegations "fall far short of showing any irreparable
injury from threats or actual prosecutions," and that as Younger and Samuels
"show, the normal course of state criminal prosecutions cannot be disrupted or
blocked on the basis of charges which in the last analysis amount to nothing more
than speculation about the future. The policy . . . against interference . . . with
state law enforcement is not to be set aside on such flimsy allegations as those
relied upon here." Id. at 760.
Dyson saw a newspaper publisher, charged with two violations of a Texas ob-
scenity statute, and while these were pending, bring an individual and class action
seeking federal declaratory and injunctive relief which, granted below, had been
made. In Perez a newsstand vendor was charged with four violations of a Louisiana
obscenity statute and while proceedings were pending instituted a federal declaratory
and injunctive action because of the law's unconstitutionality. However, now a
claimed unlawful arrest and seizure had occurred, and on this basis the three-judge
court, while upholding the statute's constitutionality, directed the return of the.
materials and concluded that because of this "the prosecutions should be effectively
terminated." Quoted in 91 S. Ct. at 676. On procedural grounds three Supreme
Court Justices, with two others concurring in a separate opinion, reversed and va-
cated, and remanded to the district court so that a fresh decree could be entered
and a new appeal taken to the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court's voting is a mixture based, as this writer sees it, on the facts
alleged in each complaint. In all cases the stress was that the facts alleged by and
for these plaintiffs, but who were not being proceeded against, were not "sufficient"
(Younger, at 749), but the one plaintiff who "is actually being prosecuted . . .
[is] a proper party" (at 750); that there was "likewise no sufficient showing in the
record" in Samuels (at 766); and that "nothing more than speculation about the
future" was found in Boyle (at 760).
It is interesting to diagram and then compare the "line-ups" in all these cases, and
to see how the Justices aligned themselves and shifted about, but, as experience
discloses, all this might be words and charts signifying nothing. One thing can be
stated, that there is no defined and definite majority in these sensitive social and
political areas, and the cases were decided primarily upon the technical require-
ments of factual pleadings and proper parties (thereby avoiding the substantive
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treated somewhat more tenderly than, if not given such an exalted
or preferred position over, the others. 196
The Practical Approach
In effect, and on a very practical level, all of the constitutional
rights of persons are, therefore, peacetime ones, and not completely
exercisable during war or even during emergency periods. Corre-
spondingly, censorship of person, of utterance, of press, and of all
forms of knowledge and communication is upeld, although questions
of degree also arise, e.g., since the constitutional theory is the pri-
macy of free speech, then aberrations and exceptions thereto must
be permitted only to the reasonable extent required by the necessities
of the situation. Such a situation definitely exists politically and ju-
dicially when the nation is attacked, e.g., in the 1941 attack by Ja-
pan, or when Congress declares war; in all other illustrations we may
say that the type, kind, and degree of the reasonable censorship must
reasonably equate with the type, kind, and degree of the emergency,
i.e., the censorship is a limited one and cannot go beyond the necessi-
ties and requirements of the situation. 19
Application of Constitutional Principles: Two Tests
It is not difficult to create or declare fixed principles of basic con-
cern to government and persons. For example, a constitution may
question). Only in Younger did this plaintiff make out a sufficient case. The
three B's (Black, Burger, and Blackmun) now concurred, among other things, in
the quotation given in the text, and, because of the probability of one or more new
appointments before 1973, their views are, perhaps, of great importance.
196. The Carolene Products case, supra note 191, refers to more clauses, and
see also infra note 512 et seq., and references throughout, but here we have, in the
next sentence, limited ourselves to the free speech clause. It is in this context,
therefore, that this footnoted text sentence is made. On abstention, see, e.g.,
notes 195, 569, and 574.
197. On reasonableness see infra note 253 et seq. Discussed more fully later is
the basic question, who determines whether or not an emergency exists, its nature,
kind, type, and degree, and whether or not, and in what degree, any constitutional
right is (or all are) to be circumscribed. This, obviously, is the really important
problem to be solved (see infra note 305). See, e.g., Forkosch, supra note 184.
One Justice's answer, rejected by others, is that "[pirimary responsibility for adjust-
ing the interests which compete in the situation before us of necessity belongs to
the Congress. . . . We are to set aside the judgment of those whose duty it is to
legislate only if there is no reasonable basis for it." Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 525 (1951), per Frankfurter, concurring.
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proclaim them or a legislature create, or a judiciary enunciate; re-
gardless of origin, they remain words until applied to persons and
things. When the judiciary is involved in such application of stat-
utes and executive orders it is confronted by many questions of in-
terpretation, policy, and feasibility. One of the major considerations
is, of course, the security of the nation; on the interpersonal level
a court must consider the conflicting claims of the parties before it.195
How is the judiciary to apply fixed constitutional principles such as
free speech and press? Or, put differently, how is it to resolve the
conflicting claims of governmental security versus individual rights?
The clear and present danger test: One such method of resolution
was proposed by Justice Holmes in 1919. It has been termed the
"clear present danger" test. Note that it is only a procedural test
or method to attain a resolution of the problem, and that it is not itself
a fundamental concept or principle of a substantive nature 19 (al-
though some would so dignify it). What the Justice proposed was
addressed to a situation where a staute made it a crime to conspire
wilfully to obstruct recruiting and enlistment in the armed forces; his
views were that
the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
(Cases) The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such cir-
cumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree. 200
The test requires three things to be found, namely, that the subject
198. On this latter aspect it is instructive to consider the views of Justice Bran-
deis in United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1924),
where the I.C.C. had to prescribe a division of joint rates and permitted evidence to
be introduced over the objections of one of the parties. The Court rejected the evi-
dence because of a lack of notice and, inter alia, the Justice said that "[t]he fact
that the proceeding was technically an investigation instituted by the Commission
would not relieve the Orient, if a party to it, from this requirement [of specific
reference to the material sought to be introduced]. Every proceeding is adversary,
in substance, if it may result in an order in favor of one carrier as against another."
. 199. See, e.g., Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 353 (1946), where Frank-
furter doubted whether the test was promulgated by Holmes so as to be "a technical
legal doctrine" or even to "convey a formula for adjudicating cases."
200. Schenck v. United States, supra note 173, at 52. Holmes stated that "as the
right to free speech was not referred to specially [in the case and its briefs by
Schenck], we have thought fit to add a few words" (id. at 52) on the subject, i.e.,
free speech and when and under what circumstances it might be controlled or pre-
vented. In other words, his formulation as here given was then dictum, and gen-
eralized dictum at that, i.e., not applied to the facts in the case. See also infra
note 201.
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matter of crime or statute (the substantive evil) be one which Con-
gress has power to forbid, and the state is therefore a valid and en-
forceable one on general constitutional principles; that the evils
sought by this proper statute are now probably about to occur in the
very near (almost immediate) present, not some day sooner or
later201 and that the violation is clearly and beyond question on which
will occur unless immediately restrained.
The clear and present danger test is not used only in cases in-
volving security but may be applied in any situation where even in
times of peace a claim of First Amendment freedoms arises.20 2  One
such application in 1949 is quoted below because it also includes
views on the need for and function of free speech:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It
may indeed serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is
often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions
and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is
why freedom of speech, though not absolute is nevertheless protected against censor-
ship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a
serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or un-
rest. . . . There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For
the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts,
or dominant political or community groups. 203
Despite acceptance by the entire Court of the formulation of the
test in 1919, just eight months later the Court failed to use it as gen-
erously as Holmes and Brandeis felt it should be,2°4 and in 1925
201. See also, on this aspect, Abrams v. United States, supra note 164, and for
extended discussion see Appendix to concurring opinion of Frankfurter in the
Dennis case, supra note 197, at 556, and also see views of other Justices at 503-11,
and 568, n.12.
Holmes's dissent in Abrams, in which Brandeis concurred, devoted pages 624-26
to a statement of the facts and indictments. Id. at 627. He mentioned that "ques-
tions of law . . . alone were before this court in the cases of Schenck .... "
In the same paragraph he concluded by stating that the power to "punish speech"
under his test "undoubtedly is greater in time of war than in time of peace because
war opens dangers that do not exist at other times.
But, as against dangers peculiar to war, as against others, the principle of the
right to free speech is always the same. It is only the present danger of immediate
evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the
expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned." Id. at 628. In
this case his dissent was predicated upon the lack of "intent required by the statute
in any of the defendants' words." id.
202. See, e.g., contempt cases discussed in text and infra notes 418 et seq.
203. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949), per Douglas for
the majority.
204. Abrams v. United States, supra note 164, these Justices therefore dissenting.
1971] FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 61
a majority refused to follow it.2" 5 Nevertheless, numerous decisions
since then have been based on this test 20 6 and it is generally the ap-
plication, not the formulation, which is at the nub of the judicial con-
troversies. This does not mean that the clear and present danger
test itself as so formulated by Holmes has not been criticized; for one
thing, its language is ambiguous, and for another thing it still re-
quires men to evaluate and apply it to fact situations. Thus, in 1927,
Justice Brandeis pointed out that
[tihis court has not yet fixed the standard by which to determine when a danger
shall be deemed clear; how remote the danger may be and yet be deemed present;
and what degree of evil shall be deemed sufficiently substantial to justify resort to
abridgment of free speech and assembly as the means of protection. 207
The balancing test: Until 1951, save as previously mentioned, the
clear and present danger test was the one used by the courts; then,
in a case upholding the conspiracy conviction of Communist Party
leaders, four Justices suggested the adoption of either a restatement
of the test, a variation of the test, or another one. The language used
by the intermediate judge below (Learned Hand) was now accepted
for use, namely, "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity
of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of
free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger," i.e., the "not im-
probable test. '20 8
The division among the Justices now reflected their own confu-
sion in this area, for one felt that it would be better if the Holmesian
language were "abandoned than that it be sounded once more," an-
other "would save it, unmodified, for application as a 'rule of reason'
in the kind of case for which it was devised," a third would retain
the test although believing it "does not 'mark the furthermost constitu-
tional boundaries of protected expression' but does 'no more than
205. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), Holmes and Brandeis dissent-
ing.
206. E.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
207. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374-377 (1927). As Justice Black
wrote in 1941, before his absolutistic bent had solidified, "[w]hat finally emerges
from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working principle that the sub-
stantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
before utterances can be punished." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263
(1941), for a bare majority.
208. Dennis v. United States, supra note 197, at 503, 504, 510, 544, 568, 580,
and also 585-87 (1951), giving not only those views but those of other Justices, the
"not improbable" test being given by Hand in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,
214 (2d Cir. 1950).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights,'" while a
fourth spoke of and apparently used the test without criticism. If
Judge Hand's language above quoted is merely a variation of the clear
and present danger test, then seven Justices agreed to its use; if it is
merely a variation, then the same basic conclusion follows. How-
ever, it is possible, even probable, that another test was proposed.
Is this so?
The 1951 proposal can be termed either balancing test or else a
variation of it; this is, when one speaks of "the gravity of the 'evil,' "
and then states that this is to be "discounted" by another item, namely,
"its improbability," we can substitute other and clearer language to see
exactly what occurs. Thus, one is to take the probability of (the
gravity of) the evil and then, on the other hand, take those items
which discount from this probability, and now determine whether
an invasion of free speech is justified so as to avoid the danger threat-
ened; which means, simply put, that when one takes one set of facts
on the one hand, and then another set of facts on the other hand,
whether the term used is "discounted" or "weighed" is immaterial,
for the average man will understand that he is balancing the two, one
against the other, or the probabilities against each other. Whether or
not a balancing test in actual language, the proposal thus seems to be
one in application, or else a slight variation of it.2 °9
209. Justice Black states that "the 'clear and present danger test' was diluted and
weakened by being recast in terms of this 'balancing' formula" in the Dennis case,
supra note 197, so that "there seems to me to be much room to doubt that
Justices Holmes and Brandeis would even have recognized their test." Konigs-
berg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 64 (1961). See also Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), a per curiam decision under the Warren Court in which
a concurrence by Douglas (Black) rejected the Holmesian test, referred to Hand's
not improbable one (supra note 208), and then said: "My own view is quite dif-
ferent." But the Justice did not, first, specifically reject the Hand test, and, second,
did not explicitly set forth his own "different" view save in general terms of the
absolutism of "one's thoughts, ideas, beliefs, and convictions. . . . The line be-
tween what is permissible and not subject to control and what may be impermissible
and subject to regulation is the line between ideas and overt acts." Id. at 456.
Where "speech is brigaded with action" and inseparable, then the overt act may be
prosecuted, but these are "rare instances" so that save for such a situation (as it was
in the instant case) "speech is, I think, immune from prosecution." Id. at 456-7.
In other words, advocacy as such of anything is not an indictable offense; couple it
with action, then if such is indictable then it, and not the speech, is to be prosecuted.
Douglas, however, here leaves open the question of the use of speech to disclose a
conspiracy to commit such acts as do actually occur, although he and others on
that bench were vehemently opposed to such umbrella-ing dragnets procedurally.
It is suggested that Douglas is not too far from being, if not already, a
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The balancing formula, whether as found in the 1951 proposal or
in its undiluted form and language, has been severely criticized be-
cause it requires the courts "to label one [side] as being more im-
portant or more substantial than the other,"21 although another
Justice felt that "[t]he problem, like all those with which we are
concerned, is one of balance; too little liberty brings stagnation, and
too much brings chaos."2 1' The problem was highlighted in 1959
when one Justice refused to "agree that laws directly abridging first
amendment freedoms can be justified by a Congressional or judicial
balancing process. '"212
The result is a continuing and inconclusive balance compromise,
seeking to enable private,213 public,214 and national215 interests and
balancing user, as may be illustrated by his dissent in Wyman v. James, - U.S. -,
91 S. Ct. 381, 394 (1971), inveighing against the majority's support of a require-
ment for home visits by welfare officials as a condition for assistance under the
AFDC program. The Justice conceded that a degree of chiselling was present,
i.e., "in some tenements one baby will do service to several women and call each
one 'mom,' " but felt that "the need for protection of the individual becomes indeed
more essential if the values of a free society are to remain," that is, balancing the
good and the bad disclosed the former preponderating (and his Appendix I statistical
abstract disclosed the bad to be only a little bit bad!).
For a strong position against that taken by this writer in the preceding text para-
graph see Wormuth, Learned Legerdemain: A Grave But Implausible Hand, 6
WEST. POL. ScI. QTLY. 543 (1953).
210. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268, n.20 (1967), per Chief Justice
Warren.
211. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 314 (1951), dissent per Justice Jackson.
212. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141 (1959), per Justice Black,
with two others (Warren and Douglas) concurring in this view. Additionally Black
felt that "[i]t is these interests of society, rather than Barenblatt's own right to
silence, which I think the Court should put on the balance against the demands of
the government." Id. at 144. In other words, Black did not (1) like the theory of
the balancing formula, and (2) objected even so to its improper application.
Black, as disclosed previously, is an absolutist: see, e.g., supra note 183 and infra
note 406. However, Black did not object to the use of the balancing formula by
Chief Justice Burger in Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't., 397 U.S. 728,
736 (1970), "the right of every person 'to be let alone' must be placed in the
scales with the right of others to communicate," and so, "[wleighing the highly
important right [of a commercial mailer] to communicate . .. against the very
basic right [of a householder] to be free" of the (obscene) material so mailed, "it
seems to us that a mailer's right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an
unreceptive addressee." See also infra notes 268 and 368.
213. See, e.g., the libel cases, text and infra notes 375 et seq.
214. See, e.g., the dispute between Justices Harlan (majority opinion) and Black
(dissenting opinion) concerning "absolutes" and "balancing" in Konigsberg v.
State Bar of California, supra note 198 (first case: 353 U.S. 252 [1957]), and
also their like clash earlier in Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 201.
215. See, e.g., the Dennis case, supra notes 118, 144, 182, and 208, and cases
discussed infra notes 320 et seq.
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securities to be recognized and furthered, and without permitting
one or the other to be or become an absolute, i.e., a rigid and in-
flexible requirement.2" The practitioners of this view believe it
adequate to prevent statism and authoritarianism from reducing or
overcoming individualism and libertarianism-unless, of course, the
modern Cincinnatus refuses to relinquish the power temporarily
granted217 or a coup d'gtat eliminates the government and the con-
stitution. Information, therefore, whether as a freedom, liberty, or
right, follows in the path so trod by free speech and the other con-
stitutional rights.21 8
The result of all this search for an acceptable formula or test
whereby absolutely necessary incursions into first amendment free-
doms may be justified is a sort of individual and personal use of lan-
guage by each Justice. In this sense this may be termed oppor-
tunistic; in another sense, it may be termed idealistic, i.e., each
216. The Israeli-Arab situation is, of course, one commanding the attention of
the entire world. It is significant that both leaders in the differences between the
nations concurred in such a balancing approach, e.g., the late President Gamal Abdel
Nasser of Egypt, following the battlefield defeat of 1967, is quoted as saying:
"Political action is not undertaken by angels but by human beings. Political leader-
ship is not a ruthless and sharp sword but rather a process of balance . . . be-
tween various possibilities and, in many cases, between obvious risks." N.Y. Times,
Oct. 11, 1970, ed. sec. 4, at 1, col. 7.
217. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his 1942 Message to Congress, re-
quested wartime legislation granting him great powers although he promised that
"[w]hen the war is won, the powers under which I act automatically revert to the
people-to whom they belong." Cong. Rec., 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88 Cong. Rec.
7044 (1942). See also the pledge of Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, of
Canada, who implemented a never-used War Measures Act, which technically de-
prives the people of many civil rights, so as to combat what he termed an "insurrec-
tion," that "I pledge that all extraordinary powers will be withdrawn as soon as it
has been demonstrated that there is a cessation of the violence and the threats of
violence which made necessary their [the war-time measures] introduction." U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 2, 1970, at 53. On November 2, 1970, the Prime
Minister introduced legislation in Parliament to limit the sweeping powers of that
Act by replacing it with a Public Order (Temporary Measures) Act, 1970, which
would expire the following April 30th unless continued by a joint resolution of
the House of Commons and the Canadian Senate. On December 1, 1970, the
House of Commons approved such a limited emergency-powers bill, and the Senate
approval is a formality. See also infra note 335.
218. See also Justice Black's views in the Barenblatt case, supra note 212 and
214, in which, in some disgust, the Justice concluded that the balancing test was
equivalent to changing the first amendment so as to read: "Congress shall pass no
jaw abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition, unless Congress and
the Supreme Court reach the joint conclusion that on balance the interest of the
Government in stifling these freedoms is greater than the interest of the people in
having them exercised." 360 U.S. at 143.
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searches his own conscience for guiding stars and refuses to com-
promise by using judicial clichs or shorthand phrases whereby his
own confusion is submerged in precedential language.
THE FREEDOMS, RIGHTS, AND DUTIES TO
INFORM AND TO BE INFORMED
These freedoms of information are "not confined to newspapers
and periodicals." They not only embrace "pamphlets and leaflets,"
which "have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty," but also
the constitutional term "press in its historic connotation comprehends
every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and
opinion. ' '219  Today this 1938 language has been expanded to go
beyond any newspaper, or other printed communication or "publi-
cation" and to include, as with free speech, motion pictures, radio,
television, and any and all media for communicating or disseminating
or distributing the written or spoken word. 220  For example, although
in 1964 California voters approved an initiative measure barring pay
television, their supreme court held it invalid "as an abridgement of
the free speech guaranties of the state and federal Constitutions. 22'
The constitutional negative language recognizes the affirmative
right of a person to speech and press, but there is also necessarily em-
braced the correlative affirmative right to receive information. Mil-
ton's comparison of truth "to a streaming fountain" which must be
"in a perpetual progression ' 222 epitomizes man's need for the Her-
221aclitean indistinguishable continuum, which in turn necessitates a
receiver in order for a giver to be able to give. Similarly information
requires a recipient; for example, a genuine hermit will receive no
thoughts or ideas from others, and his knowledge is thus limited, for
practical purposes, to his sense-experiences and his reflections
219. Chief Justice Hughes in Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452
(1938), striking down as too broad a city ordinance forbidding any distribution of
every kind of circular, etc.
220. See also supra note 13. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57
(1965), Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 499-502 (1952), and also
FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 435-45 (2d ed., 1969).
221. Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 238, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 539, 411 P.2d
289, 291 (1966).
222. MILTAN, AREOPAGITICA 38 (1874).
223. And this regardless of non-acceptability of his other views. See gen-
erally, on his philosophy, KIRK & RAVEN, THE PRESOCAIAC PHILOSOPHERS (2d
ed. 1960), and KIRK, HERACLITUS (1954).
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thereon.224 This reduces him to a rather low level of intelligence and
capability, and if the average citizen is so treated (regardless of in-
doctrination) then not only he but the nation suffers. This all
boils down to the indispensable receiver at the other end of the infor-
mation stream. That this is judicially recognized is without question,
i.e., freedom of "press . . . necessarily protects the right to receive
. . "22 "This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of
their social worth, . . . is fundamental to our free society." '226
This "right to receive" must be compared with a negative, namely,
the right to refuse to receive, just as the right to speak may be con-
trasted to the right not to speak. 227  There is, for example, a right
in reporters or other news gatherers to refuse so to gather, and in others
a right to refuse to edit, publish, distribute, circulate, etc.; all these
are personal, individual rights protected not only by the other consti-
tutional clauses but also by the thirteenth amendment, 28 regardless of
their reasons. So with the recipients of publications, exhortations,
and otherwise: they may refuse the proferred item, leave the site
of the speech, if out-of-doors, twist the dial, or otherwise exercise
their freedom of choice, as by refusing to open their doors to intrud-
ers. 229  A startling aberration to all this is the 1952 Captive Bus
Audience Case, where only one Justice felt that permitting a bus and
street-car company to broadcast radio programs in its vehicles, de-
spite the objections of some riders, was a violation of privacy.23 0
224. His background is here ignored, so that a better analogy would have a child
taken at birth to this isolated spot. In theory, if not in practice, this could be
done, and the English empiricists might therefore now discuss their tabula rasa
in actuality. On this concept of epistemology, i.e., sense experience as the sole
source of one's ideas, and so rejecting innate ideas, see, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, AN
ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, (J. Yalton ed. 1961), and also RYLE,
LOCKE ON THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1933). No epistemological position is
here taken, e.g., can the child above ever have such a clean slate?
225. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
226. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). See also concurring
opinion of Brennan (Goldberg) in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 307
(1965).
227. See West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943),
that the state "requires the individual [child] to communicate by word and sign
[pledging allegiance and saluting the flag] his acceptance of the political ideas it
thus bespeaks. Objection to this form of communication when coerced is an old
one, well known to the framers of the Bill of Rights."
228. See, e.g., FORKOSCH, LABOR LAW § 249 (2d ed. 1965), discussing applica-
tion to individuals and citing group, contract, and other exceptions.
229. See, e.g., the Breard case, infra note 257, and text keyed to it.
230. Public Utilities Comm'n. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), Douglas being the
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Apart from these preceding rights of persons, including the em-
bracing of things and methods within free speech and press, dis-
tribution is also found, e.g., "Liberty of circulating is as essential to
that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation,
the publication would be of little value."23' There is, of course, no
difference between "circulating" and "distributing," and if there is,
then the latter is also included within the constitutional guarantees.2"2
The gathering, publishing, editing, distributing, and receiving of
information by persons are thus constitutionally embraced not only
by the first amendment freedom of the "press," but also by that of
free "speech" and, where applicable, any and all other constitutional
guarantees and protections, e.g., the fourth amendment's search and
seizure clause.
AN ACTIVE FREEDOM
As already pointed out, the first amendment is couched negatively;
that is, it is a prohibition placed upon Congress2 3 forbidding it to
make any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.
." The constitutional preposition is "of," whereas here we dis-
cuss "to." 234  The reasons for this difference, previously examined,
lone dissenter. The broadcasts were ninety percent music and ten percent announce-
ments and commercial advertising. Black's concurrence stated that if there had been
broadcast "news, public speeches, views, or propaganda of any kind and by any
means [this] would violate the First Amendment." Id. at 466. In the lower court,
191 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1951), the "loss of freedom of attention" was referred to
at 457, i.e., riders giving attention to their own reading, discussing, and even
relaxing, now lost by reason of the forced listening, and the rhetorical comment
made: "If Transit obliged its passengers to read what it liked or get off the car,
invasion of their freedom would be obvious. Transit obliges them to hear what it
likes or get off the car. Freedom of attention, which forced listening destroys, is a
part of liberty essential to individuals and to society." Id. at 456.
. To what extent the language in one of the last decisions in the Warren Court
(opinion April 7, 1969, Chief Justice Burger taking the oath of office June 23, 1969)
may indicate a revised view today is not only questionable but, with a reconstituted
Court, immaterial. See opinion by Marshall in Stanley v. Georgia, supra note 226,
at 556-65.
231. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878), per Justice Field, quoted in
Lovell v. Griffin, supra note 208, at 452.
232. Freedom of "press has broad scope . . . . [And] embraces the right to
distribute literature, . . . and necessarily protects the right to receive it." Martin
v. City of Struthers, supra note 214, at 143, per Black.
233. On the inclusion of the entirety of the federal and state governments,
agencies, and their officials and employees within this prohibition, see supra note 115.
234. See supra note 117 and references there.
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include not only a practical and necessary limitation here imposed by
considerations of length, but also the conceptual aspect that without
such an active285 freedom 26 the constitutional language becomes hor-
tatory, jejune, and innocuous.2 37
Regardless of these reasons for stressing "to" instead of "of" in this
essay, the more important and decisive ones are: that a government
such as this requires, for its own continuance and well-being, for its
support and continued growth, and for the ends for which it was con-
stituted, such a substitution; and, further, that "freedom of speech,
or of the press," means exactly what it says, namely, that the uttering
of speech and press is not to be abridged,238 that is, there can be no
free press unless it is able and free effectively to do239 something
(i.e., speak or publish).
THE EARLY NARROW SCOPE OF SUCH FREEDOM
AND THE BROADENED ONE TODAY
It was against censorship, which has come in American law to be
called "previous restraints," imposed by an English statute on the ac-
tuality of publishing that Milton protested in 1644, giving the societal
value of a free press thus: "Truth is compar'd in Scripture to a
streaming fountain; if her waters flow not in a perpetual progression,
they sick'n into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition."240  Half
a century later the act expired by its own terms and was never re-
newed, so that in 1769 Blackstone could write, "[t]he liberty of the
press . . .consists in laying no previous restaints upon publications
"241
235. See text keyed to supra note 62, et seq.
236. See text keyed to supra note 41.
237. See text keyed to supra note 63 et seq.
238. See the advocacy of Black (Douglas) of the absoluteness of the first
amendment's prohibitions, so that he rejects any limitations thereon, even to the
extent of preventing libel and slander suits; New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 293 (1964). See also supra note 10, as well as FORKOSCH, supra note 220, at
420-21, n.6.
239. See also supra note 35 and text keyed thereto.
240. Supra note 222.
241. His entire thought is: "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the
nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon pub-
lications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before
the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes
what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own
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To Justice Douglas this background indicates that in Milton's and
Blackstone's times there was no governmental censorship of any kind
over ideas, views, and expressions save that of a previous restraint
(else why did not Milton inveigh against other forms of control if
they existed?), so that the first amendment continued this prohibition
upon government and therefore left open and free. the inititation of
speech and press, including distribution; therefore, any attempt to-
day to impose on these any form or degree of censorship flies in the
face of that amendment's language, background, and interpreta-
tion.242 The Justice does not, however, feel that such unlimited
freedom to speak includes unlimited freedom from, e.g., a libel suit
for damages.24 And Justice Black agrees in forbidding "any kind or
type or nature of governmental censorship over views as distinguished
from conduct. 2
44
In 1907 Justice Holmes, however, and the majority of the Court,
felt that
the main purpose of such constitutional provisions [of freedom of speech and of
press] is "to prevent all such previous restraints [sic] upon publications as had been
practiced by other governments," and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment
of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare. . . . The preliminary free-
dom extends as well to the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend
as well to the true as to the false. 2 4 5
In effect this somewhat agrees with the Douglas-Black views, i.e.,
at this stage in his career Holmes would have let people speak and
publish as they please, but would have held them accountable there-
after, with the type and degree of accountability the only question.
Whether or not Holmes would have fixed the boundary of non-ac-
countability at the point the other two do is not material; the point
temerity. . . ." BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 917-
918 (4th ed. 1914). For criticisms as being too narrow a view of the freedoms of
the press, see text keyed to infra note 245 and quotation in that note.
242. See, e.g., his dissent in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 491-92
(1966).
243. See, e.g., infra note 381 and discussions in cases cited.
244. Dissenting in Ginzburg case, supra note 242, at 481.
245. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907), and see also infra notes
442 and 443. But see, Chief Justice Hughes' later criticism of the Blackstonian
statement, not because such freedom "has not been regarded as deserving of spe-
cial emphasis, but chiefly because that immunity [from previous restraints) cannot
be deemed to exhaust the concept of the liberty [of the press] guaranteed by state
and federal constitutions." Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714 (1931). See also
Mr. Justice Sutherland's remarks in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936).
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is that today the majority of the High Bench upholds some forms and
degrees of censorship so as to permit restriction upon the full, com-
plete, and total assertion of first amendment freedoms, e.g., distribu-
tion, showing of motion pictures, without any prior accountability to
any person or government whatsoever.
Regardless, what does freedom of the press mean, what other lib-
erties does it include, and what governmental conduct does it curtail?
The detailed answers are found in the analyses which follow; for the
present, a few illustrations may be given. Liberty of anonymous24
circulation247 is within the constitutional safeguard, and a local un-
limited and comprehensive "ordinance is invalid on its face" which
"in its broad sweep prohibits the distribution of 'circulars, handbooks,
advertising, or literature of any kind' " without first obtaining a per-
mit from the city manager.2 41 So, too, is an extraordinary "single
in kind" punitive tax on newspapers bad where "it is seen to be a
deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the cir-
culation of information to which the public is entitled . . . . A
free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the govern-
ment and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter our-
selves."24 9  The guarantee of freedom of speech and press thus for-
bids not only direct prohibitions upon action (i.e., the use of "to")
but also a wide variety of fetters and conditions. This active right,
as so broadly construed, can be viewed most simply through analyzing
the three freedoms, rights, and duties through the tripartite aspects of
persons, things, and methods.
RESTRICTIONS ON COVERAGE AND THE USE OF REASON
Who may, and generally does, engage in the overall informing
process, i.e., the total flow of information? Speech and press being
coupled, the participants in each area usually, but not always, become
constitutionally interchangeable, with the minor exceptions not being
246. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), striking down an ordinance mak-
ing it criminal to distribute handbills without having thereon the names and ad-
dresses of those who prepared, distributed, or sponsored them.
247. See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, supra note 219, at 452 assimilating distribution
to the constitutionally protected publication, and quoting that "[l]iberty of circu-
lating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the
circulation, the publication would be of little value."
248. Id. at 451 and 450, respectively.
249. The Grosjean case, supra note 245, at 250.
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of moment.2 50 In a functional view, we may start with the gathering
of the information, later to be actively communicated, and then trace
it to its ultimate recipient, i.e., we move from the freedom of obtain-
ing, editing, and distributing information to the right of the recipient
to receive it. This chain of persons would include not only the re-
porter in the field but also the researcher for the facts, whether in a
library or a governmental office, and would also shelter those neces-
sarily, directly, and immediately connected with such gathering and
other efforts, e.g., the publishers, the wire services, the distributors.
This last, i.e., the inclusion of others, may be questioned. For ex-
ample, the reporter going to a foreign country must seek the aid of
others and must use some form of transportation. Without such out-
side assistance and also a form of transportation, i.e., the means, the
end (the facts) is unattainable. Therefore unless the means is free
from control, the end likewise may be circumscribed, and the con-
stitutional right evaporates. Thus, without a sufficient alternative
(e.g., transportation provided by the controller?), the very important
first amendment rights of speech and press, which are the bulwark
of our society, are really superficial and become inefficacious.
One immediate objection to this logic is that nothing in human en-
deavor or conduct remains outside its scope;"' i.e., if the first
amendment were to be applied literally then government would be
ousted of even the slightest power over even the slightest conduct by
even the slightest person.25  Obviously this is going too far. The
reasons for rejecting such a logical monstrosity include not only the
(political) concepts of, e.g., necessity, contract, and sovereignty, but
250. E.g., newspapers, as monopolies, are subject to the antitrust laws, Associ-
ated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See also infra note 534 they are
subject to the labor relations laws, Associated Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103
(1937), and to wage and hour laws, Oklahoma Press Publ. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186 (1946).
251. See, e.g., the arguments by the newspapers in the cases cited in preceding
note, and the answers by the several Justices, as well as N.L.R.B. v. Virginia Electric
& Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941), where the employer's claim of free speech
was rejected insofar as it amounted to "coercion" under the statute. In gen-
eral, and on the addition of the "free speech" section to this labor law, and also
discussions on all aspects of the Act, see FoRKOSCH, LABOR LAW (2d ed. 1965).
252. As one illustration of the converse of this reductio ad absurdum, that
is, instead of rejecting power to the government there is an exceedingly large grant
of power, see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), reaffirmed in United
States v. Haley, 358 U.S. 644 (1959). The dissenting language of one Justice, in
N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 609-10 (1939), where the Court upheld the
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also that of reason or reasonableness. It is this last which has as-
sumed major proportions in the American political-judicial system,2"'
and its use and application are almost omnipresent and omnipo-
tent. 25
4
This rule of reason, as now applied, limits the coverage of the first
amendment's speech and press rights generally to those persons en-
gaged in the advocacy and dissemination of facts, opinions, thoughts,
views, principles, and even prognostications, as well as in their col-
lection, publication, distribution, and receipt. 215  This ordinarily
permits the office boy in a newspaper plant, or the truck driver who
delivers the product, to be covered in some degree, as well as other
necessary caretakers. Problems, however, arise when the umbrella
(first amendment) is sought to be extended beyond that point rea-
sonably necessary to protect the holder (the one so engaged in
speech or press) from the rain (the government power).
For example, a newspaper or magazine "lives" on circulation, and
requires "selling" campaigns for this purpose;256 however, a canvasser
for a nationally known magazine does not enjoy an unqualified free-
dom to solicit householders for subscriptions, and is, therefore, or-
dinarily subject to a city ordinance requiring him to obtain the own-
er's prior consent for this purpose.257 This illustration also discloses
federal power under the Commerce Clause, is apropos, his conclusion being that
"[s]o construed, the power to regulate interstate commerce brings within the ambit
of federal control most if not all activities of the Nation . ... "
253. See, e.g., Forkosch, Reason and Reasonableness in the Supreme Court's In-
terpretations of the Sherman Act, 21 BROOKLYN L. REV. 208-18 (1955), and also
FoRuoscH, ANTITRUST AND THE CONSUMER 433-38 (1956). In St. Joseph Stock
Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 81-82 (1936), Brandeis wrote that in ad-
ministrative rate making "the Court has followed the rule of reason," and his
co-toiler in the vineyards of the law, Holmes, led the assault on a strict and literal
construction and application of the antitrust statutes, i.e., advocating instead the use
of a rule of reason, and his success in this endeavor is disclosed by his dissenting
comments in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 211 (1904).
The concept of a "reasonable man" in torts (delicts), contracts, and in practically
every other field of law is unquestioned, with the major exception being international
law in which reason and a "reasonable nation" view is rejected save when neces-
sary, i.e., it is the "expedient man (or nation)" view which is utilized, with terms
being applied such as rebus sic stantibus as justifications.
254. One is tempted to remark that the rule of reason is found in all countries
but this is obviously too broad a generalization. However, whether domestically or
internationally, all governors in all nations do exercise a (greater or lesser) degree
of such a standard.
255. On circulation and distribution see, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, supra note 219.
256. See Lovell v. Griffin supra note 219.
257. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). See also infra note
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another aspect of the application of the rule of reason, that which
occurs where there is a conflicting, simultaneous exercise of two
rights, both coming under speech or press. For example, one's con-
stitutional right to privacy2 58 in his own home is not invaded when
another person rings the doorbell for the purpose of distributing a
handbill announcing a religious2 59 meeting; 260 nor, since a news-
paper cannot object to those ordinary and general limitations im-
posed upon other private businesses, 261 neither can it object to the
peaceful picketing 2 2 by other persons of its premises in order to pub-
licize views and contentions, e.g., informational or educational (la-
bor) picketing, even though such conduct thereby results in a dis-
ruption of deliveries and circulation."'
ARE PERSONS IN THE FLOW AND RECEIPT OF INFORMATION SUBJECT
TO ANY NEGATIVE OR POSITIVE GOVERNMENTAL LIMITATIONS
OR CONTROLS SUCH AS LICENSES OR CENSORSHIP
Since there is no absolute and unqualified freedom of information,
whether in its sales soliciting aspect 2 4 or even in its ordinary tax
aspects, 2 5 what is now generally to be queried is whether a specifc
260. See also Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297
N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433 (1948), cert. den. 335 U.S. 886 (1948), where the require-
ment of prior tenant invitation was imposed by the management of a privately-
owned housing development, and now upheld; Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313
Mass. 632, 48 N.E.2d 678 (1943), where as between a tenant's invitation and a
landlord rule to the contrary, the former's invitation controlled.
258. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 478 (1965), for the constitutionali-
zation of this right, there involving the sanctity of marital privacy.
259. When an appeal on civil or religious grounds, allegedly as freedom under
the first amendment, is purposely coupled with, and subverted to, commercialization,
it cannot get a free piggy-back ride and is therefore rejected, e.g., Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
260. Martin v. City of Struthers, supra note 225, where no explicit command of
the householder to stay away was given (and see also Ex parte Luehr, 159 Tex.
Crim. App. 566, 266 S.W.2d 375 [1954]), although in the Breard "commercial maga-
zine" case supra note 257, the Struthers' "religious" case was distinguished.
261. See, e.g., cases, supra note 250.
262. As a constitutionally protected right of free speech, see Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
263. See FORKOSCH, supra note 251, at 449-99 for an extended analysis and
discussion of picketing as a constitutionally protected right and yet subject to vari-
ous restraints under different circumstances.
264. E.g., Breard v. Alexandria, supra notes 19, 257, and 260.
265. Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra notes 245 and 249, in which it is
stated, at 250: "It is not intended by anything we have said to suggest that the
owners of newspapers are immune from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for
support of the government."
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exception is being made for the information media under particular
circumstances, or whether governmental control has gone too far in a
specific situation. 266
The pertinent stages within which a newspaper, or any other infor-
mation medium, operates, are usually time-and-place connected, i.e.,
pre-editing limitations and requirements, those during the editing
period when the gathered information is meant for a mail truck driver
is unconstitutional. 6 ' That the post office is used in the flow of in-
formation, and thus is necessary, if not indispensable, in having a free
press, is undisputed. But information and the freedom of speech
and press are not confined to newspapers, broadcasters, magazines,
etc; they apply equally to first-class correspondence between private
persons, 2I s and here any kind or type of undue burden or hindrance
upon this federal function diminishes not only the exercise of this ple-
nary power, but also the freedoms of these persons. So, in either
an entrepreneurial or a private situation a state exertion is denounced
when, e.g., it takes the form of a toll tax on its roads as applied to the
mails, there is union interference with postal transmission, or cir-
cular advertising is excluded.269
Separately, the difficulties of the railroads (at least in their pas-
senger services) are by now legend; as of this writing there has been
created a National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Railpax") to
be owned jointly by the railroads and the public, eventually to result in
266. On governmental control on its own issuing of information see text keyed
to supra notes 93 et seq., and infra notes 320 et seq.
267. Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920).
268. See, e.g., supra note 212 and infra note 368, Rowan v. United States P.O.
Dep't., supra note 212, upholding the Pandering Advertisements Act of 1967
[Title III of the Postal Revenue & Federal Salary Act of 1967, 39 U.S.C. § 4009
(1964) replaced by 1970 Act, on which see note 368] by which a householder may,
through a notification to the Postmaster, require a mailer to remove his name from
its mailing lists and stop all future mailings to him (where obscene literature is
sent), which statute therefore impliedly permits the use of the mails where no such
householder request is made and further impliedly rejects any Postmaster authority
to halt such mail. If this latter implication follows for these "publishers, dis-
tributors, owners, and operators of mail order houses, mailing list brokers, and
owners and operators of mail order houses, mailing list brokers, and owners and
operators of mail service organizations," then it should be even more applicable
to private first class mailings between adults desiring this material to be sent and
to be received, and this was so held in Dellapia v. United States, - F.2d - (2d
Cir. 1970) (see also infra note 403). See also infra notes 366 and 404.
269. Searight v. Stokes, 3 How. (44 U.S.) 150, 169 (1845); In re Debs, 158
U.S. 564, 599 (1895); Ex parte Jackson, supra note 231.
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a single national system with a pooling of equipment, etc.270 Re-
gardless of financial and other aspects, bow will this affect the flow of
information? Will the government continue to subsidize all busi-
nesses, but of present relevance those involved in the subject-matter
of this paper, by methods such as take-overs, infusions of capital,
loans, subsidies, etc., i.e., an entrepreneurial welfare state, which be-
gan with the 1933 administration's wholesale efforts, and which, in
the incestuous relationships today illustrated by the military-indus-
trial complex, results in an intertwining influence upon all media
which isi rreconcilable with the concepts and precepts of a democ-
racy?
Travel: nonresidents: Nonresident aliens, i.e., aliens temporarily
within any country, are deemed subject to that country's otherwise ar-
bitrary laws and can be deported at will, their travel within the coun-
try limited arbitrarily in any way, and their professional and private
lives circumscribed drastically. Thus such a person who is, for ex-
ample, a news agtherer (or an editor, conveyor, etc.) and in the in-
formation stream can be dealt with summarily by any government so
as to control all his activities. This is as true of the United States as of
Russia, China, England, or France, to mention but these.2 71 To
what extent, therefore, can such news gatherers voluntarily condition
270. Pub. L. No. 91-445, 84 Stat. 915, in § 301 creating such corporation. See
also the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-453
(Oct. 15, 1970). On the situation for news-gatherers in Russia, see, e.g., Amalrik,
News From Moscow, N.Y. REVIEW, March 25, 1971, at 9. The United States has
judicially, if not governmentally, finally ruled that Dr. Ernest E. Mandel, a noted
Belgian Marxist scholar, could not be prevented from lecturing or attending confer-
ences here, and held unconstitutional a portion of the McCarran Act (see infra
note 337, and references) which in effect gave the Department of State power to
refuse a visa to him. The court majority support the right to a "free and open
academic exchange" and denounced any such Congressional grant of authority as
"imposing a prior restraint on constitutionally protected communication" even though
the government contended that Dr. Mandel had advocated and taught "the doctrine
of world Communism." The majority distinguished between action to support or
effectuate these views, and merely teaching them. N.Y. Times, March 19, 1971,
at 1, col. 5.
271. See further the Greek decree making correspondents of foreign press,
radio, t.v., etc., whether Greeks or foreigners, liable to prison and fines for "dis-
seminating false reports." N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1970, at 2, col. 4.
See, e.g., the inability of a New York graduate student visiting Japan, and also a
marine stationed there, to engage in demonstrations or political activities while
there, even though Japan is a democratic country. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1970,
at 4, col. 3. The former could not be deported summarily, ruled an appellate
Tokyo court, but she could not enter the country legally, and so the lower district
court must now decide what is to be done. Id., Nov. 26, 1970, at 44, col. 6.
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their activities and their reports for physical publication and distri-
bution, within those limitations and regulations which occur after
such physical publication, and into its receipt and use? Each of these
stages might well be subdivided and discussed from identical aspects,
e.g., travel, which affects the flow of information throughout, and
this is what will be done. Thus the freedoms and rights of persons in
and to the stream of information will be discussed in the pre-editing,
etc. stages, but concentrating upon several different aspects which are
common to all of the states; but, since many of these aspects will
themselves overlap, e.g., licenses are required in travel by drivers, a
static compartmentalization is impossible.
Communication, transportation, and travel
Communication and transportation: There is always involved one
or more requirement for the use of the telephone, telegraph, radio,
television, and any and all other forms of physical intercommunica-
tion and transportation for the gathering, etc. of information, and of
the transportation of such information, e.g., cans of reels of news
shots from the field through to the editing center, or even in the hir-
ing and maintaining, not only of automobiles for these purposes, but
also of airplanes, boats, etc. In all of this, those persons connected
with and involved in these operations enjoy no freedom not given to
others so traveling in other lines, e.g., all must have drivers' licenses,
their vehicles must be inspected and licensed, taxes must be paid
thereon. Freedom of speech or press does not ordinarily or usually
extend to such operations so as to free them from the same limitations
and burdens assumed by other businesses and professions2 72 although,
conversely, preferences may be and are given to the media engaged
in information because of their great value to the nation.
If the federal government's plenary power is involved, however,
then it is free of state interference, e.g., in transmitting the mail a
state's license requirements be known; and, of course, involuntary sub-
mission to the authorities of their dispatches discloses to them what
their status permits in the way of governmental control and censor-
ship.
272. E.g., antitrust prosecutions, Associated Press v. United States, supra note
250.
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Travel: citizens: However, what is true of such aliens is not nec-
essarily true of other persons within the United States, e.g., there is a
right of a person to travel within the United States. 273 At first the
federal Department of State denied that all citizens had a right to
travel to all places outside the United States, and so passports were
denied "to" and "for" various persons, reasons, and places, e.g., to
members of the Communist Party, for certain countries, such as
China; temporary visas were also denied to certain foreigners to enter
the country.274
In a series of cases beginning in 1958 the Supreme Court de-
nied and also limited these claimed powers of the federal government.
Thus a passport could not be denied to a citizen to visit England
and attend a meeting of the "World Council of Peace" in Finland, 27 5
even though in another case the Secretary of State found that there
was "reason to believe .. . that the applicant is going abroad to
engage in activities which will advance the Communist movement for
the purpose, knowingly and wilfully of advancing that move-
ment. '2 76  And even an admitted Communist Party member could
not be denied a passport2 77 despite a statutory requirement that the
Party register as a Communist-action organization, which registra-
tion then made it unlawful for such a member to obtain the docu-
ment.2 78
273. See, e.g., the Okie Case, i.e., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941),
denouncing a California law which made one guilty of a crime if he brought into the
state a nonresident indigent, because such a law interfered with interstate commerce
and was therefore outside the state's police powers, and further refusing to make
an exception in the case of paupers. See further Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969), and Bower v. Vaughan, 400 U.S. 884 (1970). See also the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by the United Nations General Assembly,
Article 13 "(1) Everyone has the right of freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state."
274. See, e.g., policy statement by Secretary of State Dean Acheson concerning
Communists, issued in May, 1952, 1952 DEP'T OF STATE BULL., 919; policy embodied
in regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.135-.143 (1970).
275. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
276. Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958), decided simultaneously with Kent.
277. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), denouncing § 6 of
the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1964), this Act
being Title I of the Internal Security Act of 1950.
278. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1
(1961), upholding the Board's order that the Party register as such under the 1950
Internal Security Act, which now brought into play § 6 of Title I, supra note 277.
After this 1961 decision the Department of State revoked the passports held by
Aptheker and others, and they sued to compel return, the Court now upholding them.
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However, even though such a right to a passport now existed in all
citizens, regardless of their political beliefs or associations, and their
reasons for going abroad, still, the countries to which they desired to
go might be administratively limited. Thus in 1965 the Court up-
held a refusal to validate a passport to Cuba, with which the United
States had broken diplomatic and consular relations in1961 ;279 there-
after the State Department announced a series of exceptions to its
area restriction policies, e.g., journalists and graduate scholars might
receive passports to Communist China, Albania, Cuba, North Korea,
and North Vietnam, but what of those not so listed who, with other-
wise valid passports containing such area restrictions, nevertheless went
into these prohibited zones? Apparently such travel might be made
criminal, but in 1967 it was ruled that another law could not create
such a crime "by inference," and that "If there is a gap in the law,
the right and the duty, if any, to fill it do not devolve upon the
courts.
28 0
Licenses
Licenses for ordinary and usual business operations: Are licenses
required of persons seeking to engage in the field of information?
For example, a newspaper publisher, or a television or broadcast-
ing station, seeks to erect a building, just as does any other business,
in order to operate; must he or his agents first obtain a building li-
cense or series of approvals before the physical plant can function?
Obviously yes, for here questions of safety, health, zoning, and other
community aspects enter, and newspapers are subject to such ordinary
and usual requirements as are all businesses.18 1 What, for example,
279. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), upholding such a grant, and here the
exercise, of authority to the Executive under the Passport Act of 1926, 22 U.S.C.
§ 211a (1964).
280. United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 486, 487 (1967). Although bills au-
thorizing the Secretary of State to impose area restrictions have been introduced in
the Congress, they have not been enacted into law, e.g., S. 3243, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966), and H.R. 14895, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Suit was also filed in
the federal district court in Washington, D.C., to halt the Passport Office from
administering a loyalty oath (see also infra note 348 et seq.) to passport applicants
(by swearing to contents of the application) on the ground that there was no au-
thorization for it. N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1970, at 2, col. 6. On a possible search
of a returning citizen by the Customs Office, see infra note 549a.
281. See, e.g., supra notes 250, 265, 272. Cf., statement by D. Lawrence editor
of U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 2, 1970, at 85: "The conservative liberal
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of telephones, telegraphs, teletypewriters, and other such communi-
cations requirements, their installation, lines, and operations? Here
problems may arise. There is generally no question but that a gov-
ernment's police powers enter, and so the physical facilities, com-
munications installations and operations, etc. must ordinarily comply
with the usual and common requirements imposed upon other busi-
nesses, e.g., a stock exchange. Suppose, however: (a) the con-
straints are particular and peculiar to (say) newspapers; or, (b) if
they are not, that they nevertheless are so onerous as to impose un-
bearable obligations preventing the continuation of the newspaper.
As to the first, the analogy to the tax case is apropos, and such
exactions should be denounced. The second is a policy question re-
solvable by the legislature and not the courts; an example is the case
of newspapers, magazines, and other publications (as well as authors
and manuscripts) which have traditionally enjoyed second class (less
costly) mail privileges (and also lower rates in other forms of quasi
or nongovernmental transportation) vis-at-vis ordinary businesses.
They must apply for and receive a permit (license) to mail at a lower
rate. This is unquestionably a form of governmental subsidy, and
some publications undoubtedly would be rendered bankrupt if this
dispensation were removed. Does this consequence limit the power
of the Federal Government to remove the cause, or, put differently,
prevent it from revoking the permit and requiring publications to
mail on terms of economic equality with others?2" 2 To date this
believes in representative government and its principal safeguard-freedom of
speech and of the press. To this end, he believes that the press cannot be free if the
Federal Government, by invoking a licensing power over newspapers or radio or
television, usurps the right to say what shall be transmitted through these media
of public expression."
282. Since the power of Congress is plenary under Art. I, § 8, cl. 7 of the Con-
stitution, this is, perhaps a rhetorical question, e.g., Congress may give itself a
franking privilege, or grant to others a like free mailing one (as to deceased Presi-
dents' widows, Pub. L. No. 91-10 (April 25, 1969) ). Thus in view of the great past
deficits in the postal service, the need for better service, and, beginning with the
President's Message of April 16, 1970 (and its background), there was enacted the
Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375 (August 12, 1970) (see
also the legislative history of the statute, U.S. Cong. & Adm. News, adv. pam. no.
9, Sept. 5, 1970, at 3409 et seq.).
The statute provides, inter alia, for the reorganization of the Post Office De-
partment and its conversion into an independent establishment within the Executive
branch; while continuing the policy of reduced-rate mail, it also provides that
deficits involving this portion of the service must be made up by "congressional
appropriations for their continuance. If there should be a deficit in appropriations
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aspect of the government's postal power has not been seriously ques-
tioned so that, regardless of the effect upon the flow of information,
such mail privileges may be reduced or revoked.2"3 So, assuming
no other factor, a paper's life-blood of incoming (and outgoing) in-
formation via telephones, mail subsidies, etc. may be stopped or
gravely hindered because of noncompliance with valid requirements
or the government's exercise of its plenary powers, and this form of
governmental limitation or censorship must be upheld-otherwise
news gatherers become not only (one of) a privileged class (as they
are and should be in many respects), but also able to operate under
physical and financial conditions inimical to the public health and
welfare, or to the nation's financial structure.284
What is true for newspapers is also true for broadcasting. To illus-
trate here (the subject will be discussed further below), in the United
States broadcasters have no right to the use of the air; these are not in
the public domain but are the public's domain. Thus a license is re-
quired in order to operate, i.e., before finally investing the millions of
dollars to erect the facilities the broadcaster seeks a license. Licenses
are conditioned upon not only meeting certain requirements before is-
suance, i.e., conditions precedent, but also thereafter, i.e., conditions
subsequent. 28 '  Furthermore, licenses are time-limited (three years),
subject to challenge by the government or another person-.. on an
for this purpose, the bill provides for proportionate increases in the free and reduced
rates [so as] to generate the necessary funds [to make up this deficit] ... I." ld.
at 3426. See § 3627 of the enacted statute on this.
Obviously an indirect method of control of the information media presents itself,
for if Congress must appropriate, otherwise the media bear the increase, then it
takes no genius to see and understand what may occur. Which means that the
party in power can, as the first Roosevelt suggested, speak softly but hold onto the
big stick. And, logically, if Congress thereby eliminates or reduces the traditional
second-class (favorable) mailing rates for magazines, etc., how many such media
of information will survive? What will be the cost? And will oligopoly raise its
banner of further mass information and conformity?
283. See text and infra notes 364 et seq., with a constitutional qualification
given in 364.284. There are numerous illustrations available of exactly such privileged types
of businesses or operations which are so inimical, and in the field of ecological and
environmental pollution the list can be endless. See, e.g., Forkosch, Administrative
Conduct in Environmental Areas-A Suggested Degree of Public Control, 12 S. TEX.
L.J. 1-23 (1970).
285. The F.C.C. may also seek to enforce its new rules prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination by denying a renewal, or giving a qualified (warning) one. See,
e.g., the WMUU license renewal situation discussed in the SATURDAY REV., Oct. 31,
1970, at 36.
. 286. The government, itself, through the F.C.C. which licenses and renews,
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application for renewal, and create no legally vested right or inter-
est. There is, therefore, a form of control governmentally exercised
not only prior to a license being issued, but also subsequently. This
control is not only an open one but also subtle. Therefore it is
contended, invidious, that a licensee must conform to the desires of
the Federal Communications Commission, which exercises the gov-
ernment's power, else nonrenewal, if not revocation, occurs.287 To an
extent this is also found in any sale of a station, so that the ultimate
content of the program (information) reaching the public may be so
influenced. 28
There is another problem which confronts the information media,
polices and controls, charges the licensee with acts of commission or omission during
the preceding license period and at a hearing attempts to adduce proof of these
allegations so as to deny a renewal. This is different from the comparative hearing
referred to in infra note 287, and see also infra text and notes 468 et seq. Other
persons may challenge renewal or even, for themselves, seek the license on
such and other charges, as in infra note 287.
287. On the subtle and invidious government control and also the use of a
subpoena see notes 63, 81, 323, 424, 450, 451, 455, 471, 487, 499, and 556; on the
open control, see, e.g., the 1970 renewal application by Station WPIX, owned by the
New York Daily News, one of the largest circulation papers in the country, for re-
newal of its Channel 13 license in the rich New York market, was challenged by a
group desiring not only to prevent renewal but also to obtain the channel for itself,
the group contending WPIX had not lived up to its license commitments and was not
deserving of continuation; a hearing was therefore held during the fall 1970--Spring
1971 period to determine not only the truth of the charges, but also the claims of
the opposing group that it could offer the necessary public service; the decision of
the examiner, and the federal agency, has not yet been given. However, in
Boston Herald-Traveler v. F.C.C., - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. - U.S.
- (1970), a newspaper was permitted to be stripped of its television outlet's
license, WHDH-TV, valued as high as $60 million on the basis of operating reve-
nues, in part because of a desire to diversify the Boston media and their ownership,
and the license given without cost to a group of lawyers, businessmen, and others
without broadcasting experience, but who promised to set high standards of public
service. The court, however, stressed the "special and unique category" into
which the case fell, "because of the past history of WHDH," thereby removing
some of the fears of the many other newspaper-broadcasting marriages in the
country to such an agency forced divorce. See also infra notes 471-72.
Insofar as license renewals are concerned, S. 2004, introduced in 1970, was de-
signed to protect licensees who have made large investments in broadcasting facili-
ties, e.g., renewals could be denied only on the basis of public interest, convenience,
and necessity. Critics contended it would stifle ideas, innovations, and competition
and, it may be added, grant practical immunity from challenge by others, i.e., a
monopoly position in fact if not in law. It appears to be a pigeon-holed bill.
288. E.g., in 1961 New Jersey Station WNTA was in the process of sale, with
bidding going on. One member of the F.C.C., which had to approve a sale, said
he gave "moral support" to a group of educational broadcasters (as opposed to
commercial ones) and, even though not the highest bid, the station was sold to
them.
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whether in the air or on or under the ground, and this relates to doing
business in local jurisdictions other than their own, e.g., a newspaper
is incorporated in one state and desires to set up an office as a center
from which to gather information, sell advertising, obtain subscrip-
tions, etc. in another state. Can this latter jurisdiction prevent this,
i.e., stop the flow of information at its local source? A paper, as
with any other business, must ordinarily comply with the valid laws
of all states, although these laws must be equally applied and not be
unduly restrictive of the free flow of commerce.289 A general rule
derived from the Commerce Clause is applicable to papers: a local
statute requiring all vendors of merchandise not produced within the
state to obtain special licenses is bad.2 90
Licenses for reporters and others directly involved in the flow of
information: Licenses may validly be required of, e.g., drivers of
cars, trucks, airplanes, or other such vehicles, and for trucks and other
vehicles or methods of transporting reporters and news gatherers,
broadcastisg equipment, etc. to the source of the news, but quaere:
can reporters and other gatherers, processors, or distributors of in-
formation themselves be required to be licensed as such? The gov-
ernmental use of a license or accreditation29' requirement is, obvi-
ously, for control,292 and so a direct conflict arises between govern-
mental power and the right to the free flow of information. The rea-
son for rejecting this governmental power is that it is now that Mil-
289. On this last see discussion in FoRKoscH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 10,
§ 231 (2d ed., 1969).
290. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
291. The distinction here made is that foreign reporters, as aliens, are subject
to a degree of power not able to be enforced against citizens and permanent resi-
dents, e.g., text and note 271 supra. Thus the United States has, quite often, re-
taliated against reporters for many reasons, and compelled them to leave the coun-
try. See also the threat by the Vatican "to withdraw accreditation from any
correspondent deemed to have demonstrated an 'incorrect attitude' toward the Pope,
the Holy See or the Roman Catholic Church." N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1969, at 9,
col. 1, and April 26, 1970, at 26, col. 1, where the Pope and Vatican newspaper
were critical of the Italian press for reporting a stone-throwing incident during the
Pontiff's visit to Sardinia.
292. One locality's official suggested that "special licenses" be required for so-
called bookstores featuring "peep shows," thereby enabling the city "to know who
owned, operated and worked in the stores and [so] might put the businesses under
some measure of control." N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1970, at 51, col. 1, where the
chairman of the N.Y. State Commission of Investigation also suggested that the in-
come of these stores be recorded, and "that pre-arrest procedures regarding al-
legedly pornographic 'peep shows' might be simplified."
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ton's plea for the unfettered flow of the streaming fountain enters,
and it is also here that Mill's views have become part of the American
political-constitutional scene.2 93  It is basically free thought and free
speech, in combination with free press, which form a trinity for this
volume; so that if, for example, a license is (can be?) required for
one to think as he desires then society suffers, government is weak-
ened, and political democracy becomes impossible. To this political
rejection of a license to think 29 4 one may also add moral, practical,
and other objections but, regardless, we may assume that at least in
the Western countries no governmental fetters are placed upon one's
mind.
To license a reporter-to enact that without a license he cannot
engage in such an occupation on pain of penalties-involves not only
the reporter's personal interest in being able to work and therefore to
live29 but also the greatest of national interests, which is secured by
having a free and unimpeded flow of information. Ordinarily, the
government's ability to demand that one be licensed must, in some
manner, relate either to the discharge of a plenary governmental
power or else somehow be required to protect the public's health,
safety, and welfare-this phrase is the classical expression of the police
power doctrine. There is no such general governmental interest which
293. See supra notes 240 and 172, respectively.
294. Of course one may refer to philosophers and philosophies, e.g., Spinoza, ex-
istentialism (but not to couple them), political and literary views, e.g., Socrates, and
other individuals and concepts, to disclose a remarkable degree of uniformity in
refusing to bind or constrain thought and thinking, but, quaere: is a man able to
think freely in an age of conditioning, conformity, and confusion? Do the
institutions into which man is born condition his thought from birth, even though in
greater or less degree he may think separately and independently and therefore re-
act upon and even somewhat condition and alter these same institutions? See, e.g.,
ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 5 (G.D.H. Cole transl. 1913), in
which his opening sentence of Chapter I is: "Man is born free; and [yet] everywhere
he is in chains." While it may be argued that man's thought and thinking cannot be
chained, still, in this age of brainwashing, conditioning, influencing, and manipula-
tion, whether by subtle subliminal messages or otherwise, this view of man's ability
really to be free may be questioned. See, e.g., Steele, Preparing the Public for War:
Efforts to Establish a National Propaganda Agency, 1940-41, 75 AM. HIST. REV.
1640 (1970).
295. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), voiding a law requiring employers of
five or more to hire not less than eighty percent qualified electors or native-born
Americans. One must also include the separate question of non-white reporters, and
of non-white media, e.g., black newspapers and magazines, the former having prob-
lems because of color which directly and indirectly affect his right to work, follow
his bent, and receive his due, solely on merit.
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can be validly invoked as against this particular and narrow instance of
conduct under a first amendment right, i.e., desiring merely to gather,
process, or distribute news, and being unable to begin to do this
solely because of the license requirement; and while under condi-
tions permitting another plenary governmental power to be exer-
cised, a person's ordinarily protected constitutional rights are some-
times upheld, e.g., for travel purposes, they are generally, in other in-
stances, rejected. For example, the Federal Communications Com-
mission formerly required applicants for a broadcasting or operator's
license, or for a renewal, to answer questions concerning membership
in the Communist Party or in organizations advocating or teaching
the violent overthrow of the government; in one case this practice
was upheld,29 and in another the privilege against self-incrimination
was held not of aid to the applicant.29 7
The police power is, of course, an undefined one involving an in-
determinate reservoir of governmental capabilities, but here, too, the
licensing requirement directed against a reporter qua person gath-
ering news does not ordinarily appear to have any reasonable basis
in the public protections to be secured in time of peace or non-emer-
gency situations. There are sufficient other punishments and pen-
alties which can be visited upon a gatherer of information who acts
in a manner detrimental to the national or public interests, and the
need for this additional governmental power does not appear sub-
stantial enough when weighed against the freedoms and consequences
involved. So, too, with processors and distributors29 of information.
However, as we have seen, when use is made of things, e.g., automo-
biles, airplanes, etc., for the purpose of collecting and gathering news,
as where an airplane flies over a sinking vessel to take photos, such
an instrumentality is not exempted from any protections against li-
cense or other requirements merely because a reporter is concerned.
296. Borrow v. F.C.C., 285 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. den., 364 U.S. 392;
accord, Cronan v. F.C.C., 285 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir 1960), cert. den. 366 U.S. 904
(1960), holding the failure of the Commission to adopt formal rules was not ma-
terial. See also Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1961), there re-
manding and requiring a hearing.
297. Blumenthal v. F.C.C., 318 F.2d 276 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. den. 373 U.S.
951 (1963).
298. In Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567 (1st Cir. 1970), a city ordinance
was struck down where it required a "bootblack or newsboy" to register and obtain a
permit provided he was of good "character," revocable "for the use of 'indecent or
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Taxes
Ordinary forms of taxation 29 9 for the support of government are
equally applicable to those engaged in the purveying of informa-
tion, 00 as are other governmental regulations and laws not discrimi-
nating against information media, e.g., regulation of labor301 or of
business.302 However, a -particular and punitive tax, calculated "to
limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled,"
is bad; 3 pari passu, the information media should also be exempted
from those forms of taxation imposed on the similar operations of or-
dinary businesses. In some few instances there has even been judi-
cial language which can be (mis)construed as intimating that speech
and press should somehow be (completely?) free of taxation, e.g.,
"[t]he exaction of a tax as a condition to the exercise of the great
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment is as obnoxious as the
imposition of a censorship or a prior restraint."3 4  However, the
media do obtain the same freedom from local taxation as does any
other analogous out-of-state vendor, e.g., when a newspaper solicits
subscriptions in another state an "annual privilege tax" or license fee
cannot be imposed. 03 So, too, is a license tax void as applied to one
engaged in door-to-door sales of religious literature, as is one on a
profane language' or 'disorderly conduct' or otherwise, in the discretion of the
bureau ... "
299. On the problem in general see, e.g., Note, Use of Taxation and Licensing
in Suppression of Religion and the Press, 52 YALE L.J. 168 (1942). Not all
"taxes" are negative, e.g., postal rates are, of course, for services, but to the extent
that a postal deficit must be met by general taxation then any preferential postal rate
is an indirect form of a preferential tax, on which see supra note 282.
300. See, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936), and
also City of Corona v. Corona Daily Independent, 115 Cal. App. 2d 382, 252 P.2d
56 (1953), cert. den. 346 U.S. 833 (1953), upholding a general license tax on busi-
nesses, including newspapers.
301. Under, e.g., the labor relations statutes, on which see supra notes 250
and 251.
302. See infra note 534, on the application of the antitrust laws to newspapers.
303. See text keyed to supra note 249.
304. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944), a case involving
freedom of religion from taxation there, so that this broad language may be said to
be dictum. Three dissenters felt that "[i]f the First Amendment grants immunity
from taxation to the exercise of religion, it must equally grant a similar exemption
to those who speak and to the press. Id. at 581-82.
305. By analogy to Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940), one in a series
of "drummer cases" beginning with Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S.
489 (1887), although see discussion in Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v.
Stone 342 U.S. 389 (1952) of "peddler cases" in which state taxation has been up-
held, e.g., Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc. v. Alabama, 393 U.S. 537 (1969).
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resident book agent making his living by selling these items.80 6
Nevertheless, where these sales are made primarily for commercial
reasons, or handbills which are primarily commercial advertising seek
to avoid any (license, tax, or) prohibition upon their distribution by
having a religious message on the other side, the judiciary has re-
fused to except these from governmental power.307 But quaere: to
what extent can governmental taxation on the sale of newspaper ad-
vertising be limited?3"8 And, in line with the preceding, a local bur-
den cannot be exclusively imposed in the guise of a "privilege tax, '30 9
nor under the export-import clause of the Constitution may a state
make inspection charges which are really a disguised tax." 0
Censorship
This huge and sprawling area of control, which cross-cuts all
phases and stages of the flow of information, is probably the most diffi-
cult to comprehend and articulate. The reasons include: there are
too many ways to censor which are available (some ha;re already been
discussed), e.g., preventing or circumscribing picketing, the distri-
bution of handbills, meetings;311 such methods can be formulated
30,6. Respectively, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), coupled with
Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943), and Follett v. McCormick, supra note 304,
and on the questionable need for invitations see supra note 257.
307. Respectively, Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), and Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Other aspects of taxation, previously discussed,
are likewise applicable here.
308. See, e.g., Silverstein, To What Extent Should Freedom of the Press Limit
Municipal Taxation of the Sale of Advertising?, 20 U. PITT. L. REV. 607 (1959).
Advertising, of course, helps support each medium of information (excepting, of
course, service or transmitting agencies, and these do benefit indirectly). To what
extent does this income affect the price of a (say) newspaper or magazine? The
penny press of Colonial times is no more; has the ten and fifteen-cent paper
reached a point of diminishing returns? Has it become regressive? Can there be
too much asked of a purchaser? Additionally and separately, what of the pres-
sures on all media by advertisers? For example, one may dig into local super-
markets and go up to national food manufacturers which all attempt to "use their
advertising to eliminate critical news stories or place favorable publicity under the
guise of news. The news media receive some $2-billion a year in revenue from
food advertising alone." Johnson, in N.Y. Times, March 21, 1971, at D17, col. 1.
309. Railway Express Co. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954), and see later case
in 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
310. Art. I, § 110, cl. 2, as applied in Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890).
See also Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U.S. 345 (1898).
311. All these, and others, properly embrace restrictions on information prac-
ticed by governments, but their complete analysis is unnecessary. See, e.g., Mass
Media and the Law (CLARKE and HUTCHISON, eds. 1970); FoRKoscH, supra note
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and utilized by all three branches of the government, 12 by agencies
and by private persons.3s 1a And not only are legal types of controls
289, (2d ed. 1969), and LABOR LAW which go into these in detail. To illustrate, a
state cannot suppress anonymous handbills, advocating a boycott against certain
named merchants and businessmen because of their failure to give equal employment
opportunities to certain groups just because of the anonymity, Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1960), although when anonymous political campaign literature was
distributed the Court refrained from passing on the constitutionality of a state law
making this criminal. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-110 (1969).
312. E.g., on October 12, 1970, President Nixon vetoed a bill designed to im-
prove the political campaigning processes by giving political advertisers cheaper
rates, limited political spending on broadcasting in federal elections, and repealed
the equal-time provisions of the federal Communications Act for presidential elections
(thereby permitting air debates between the major presidential candidates). For
text of veto message see N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1970, at 41, col. 2. See also infra
notes 477 and 489, re the broadcasting censorship of a member of the F.C.C.
312a. There are too many kinds of private censorship to permit lengthy discus-
sion. A few may be mentioned. First, a Baltimore reporter's story was allegedly
mangled in the editing and published over her by-line (name); what can she do, as
her reputation is involved? In the first such case of a reporter seeking to prevent
the use of his name on a story, an injunction to bar such use was denied on the
merits because the editing had not resulted in distortion sufficient to mislead the
public or to injure the reporter, but the judge had first denied the paper's motion
to dismiss on the constitutional ground of freedom of the press, i.e., if proved on
the facts, plaintiff's complaint would have been good. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1971,
at 35, col. 1. The second illustration of private censorship relates to the activities
of the Italian Anti-Defamation League in having a good many advertisers, motion
picture films, and broadcasters delete mention of "Mafia" or "Cosa Nostra," or
have Italian dialect used, and also to the partially successful efforts of several Jewish
organizations to have a half-hour TV film, "The Passover," withdrawn from sched-
uled broadcasts because it allegedly presented a distorted version of the story of
the Exodus, the Last Supper, etc. TIME, April 12, 1971, at 70.
Separately, while book burning may not be indulged in literally, book banning is.
Numerous private individuals pressure local school boards, principals, librarians, and
others to remove items offensive to their personal views and tastes, and too many of
those pressured acquiesce. Additionally, the famous "Monkey Trial," in which
William Jennings Bryan fought Clarence Darrow over the Tennessee statute banning
the teaching of evolution in the schools, is still with us conceptually. To illustrate,
when a group of state legislators asks sixteen state university colleges for informa-
tion on the "content and thrust" of their political and social science courses, par-
ticularly those dealing with "revolution" and "the Establishment," all educators nec-
essarily find this to be a chilling effect, and whether indirect or direct, Tennessee-
like censorship comes in sideways. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1971, at 30, col. 3,
and at 26, col. 2, on such a request. This, obviously, raises numerous problems
and questions, e.g., what is the purpose and function of a university, and, if censor-
ship continues then is it a ninnyversity" we can foresee? See Stone, The Ninny-
versity?, N.Y. REVIEW, Jan. 28, 1971, at 21, and see also supra note 9.
A coin-face must be added, namely, to what extent and degree do the schools and
educators have authority and power to censor their students (in many different as-
pects not here enumerated), e.g., can a journalism student, as editor of a school paper
used as a student forum, be restricted in "controversial" material and its use so as to
prevent publishing and distributing, or else be suspended? In Trujillo v. Love, -
F. Supp. - (D. Colo. 1971), 39 L.W. 2490, and on the facts therein, an unconsti-
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practiced but also economic, psychological, sociological, and others of
a direct or an indirect nature. To illustrate these latter, can a pub-
lisher or reporter simultaneously hold a position in the government
without in some manner or degree compromising the former status?
And even if he severs the information relationship during his term
of office, does not his expected later return likewise impinge upon his
press freedom? 313
Separately, other problems arise, e.g., in one stage during the flow
of information censorship is conceded to exist (whether at all or only
sometimes being immaterial), but in another stage it is denied; what
of a situation where these two overlap? 314  Furthermore, does a little
initially required or justified censorship, quantitatively or qualita-
tively, later permit total and blanket coverage in scope or degree or
both? For example, total censorship in the mid-flow stage of infor-
mation is ordinarily void, e.g., no state injunction may be issued to
prevent the processing and publication, 15 nor may other legal de-
vices, otherwise valid and validly exercised, be applied where a col-
lateral effect is to inhibit "the freedom of expression, by making the
individual the more reluctant to exercise it." 16
tutional abridgement of the First Amendment was found.
Finally, there are too many private censors in the printing and distributing fields,
as distinguished from repertorial, etc., for example, refusals by printers to put con-
troversial articles out, or truckers to distribute, and this vigilante-type conduct usurps
not only a governmental function (if permitted constitutionally) but also becomes a
private gestapo over the mind of man.
313. See, e.g., what Mohammed Hassanein Heykal said, when he resigned as
Minister of National Guidance, the top information post in Egypt: "It is an ex-
tremely complex relationship. The journalist wants to get as close as he can to au-
thority because it is a source of news, but he fears it will impair his freedom of
expression.
The man in authority wants to get as close as he can to the press because it is a
medium of contact with the masses, but he is afraid for his secrets. Both want
each other but fear each other." N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1970, at 4, col. 1. See,
further, text and infra notes 518 et seq. See also ARONSON, THE PRESS AND THE
COLD WAR (1970), its thesis being that the press has, in large degree, become an
(voluntary) arm of the government.
314. See, e.g., Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 273 (1951), where he listed and analysed prior cases, phrased the four
questions drawn from them and applicable to the instant case, and then sought to
apply all this to the facts before him (the entire Court held unconstitutional a
"practice" requiring a license for the use of a public park for a meeting). See also
his listing of cases in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951), con-
curring opinion.
315. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
316. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959), continuing: "The States
generally may regulate the allocation of the burden of proof in their courts, and it
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All this does not mean, however, that during war the media cannot
voluntarily engage in a form of collective self-censorship,3 17 or that in
battle or emergency"" zones it may not be (selectively and tempo-
rarily) imposed, or that national interests may not uphold a degree
of censorship, or that governmental needs do not require forms and
degrees of secrecy permitting the imposition of classifications upon
material and making it a crime to publish regardless of how ob-
tained.
However, and regardless of all else, the constitutional rights of all
is a common procedural device to impose on a taxpayer the burden of proving his
entitlement to exemptions from taxation, but where we conceived that this device
was being applied in a manner tending to cause even a self-imposed restriction of
free expression, we struck down its application."
317. And even during times of peace, e.g., since 1953, a Press Council, supported
by most national and provincial newspapers, periodicals, and journalists' unions,
and composed of twenty journalists and five laymen, has functioned to preserve
freedom of the press and to safeguard professional standards. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 10, 1970, at 15, col. 1, and also at 14, col. 1, giving excerpts from the Canadian
Special Senate Committee on Mass Media's Report, one recommendation being to
adopt such a council (see also supra note 136).
Voluntary self-censorship by the media themselves, however, is not all that
applies in and during the entire flow of information. All organizations involved in
or connected with communications, e.g., broadcasters, motion picture producers,
newspaper publishers, employees' unions or associations, are brought within the
ambit of censorship. The reason is plain, that is, a publisher can be prevented from
disclosing information but, unless the employees gathering, processing, and dis-
tributing it are also included in the prohibition, the censorship is ineffective.
318. There is much of judicial double-talk embraced within this word and the
rest of the paragraph. For example, the court generally agrees with the language of
Justice Frankfurter that the constitution and its rights are not lessened or removed
during war ("self-preservation") or emergencies (see supra note 182). Yet in that
same passage he observes that "the scope of a restriction ["upon governmental au-
thority"] may depend on the circumstances in which it is invoked." Which permits
one to resurrect the coin-face of this limitation, namely, the quiescent unused (por-
tion of) power which is called forth in an emergency, i.e., "whether the power pos-
sessed embraces the particular exercise of it in response to particular conditions."
Chief Justice Hughes in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,
425-426 (1934), also then commenting: "But even the war power does not remove
constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties." See also infra note 329.
Thus from both sides of the constitutional doctrines of grants of powers and
limitations on the powers so granted (or possessed), it appears that the judiciary
agrees that war does not bring forth or grant any power not thereafter pos-
sessed, and that the limitations on the powers are not discarded or reduced. Yet,
in the next breath, the judiciary agrees that emergencies (or war) permit powers to
be exercised and limitations to be held in abeyance whenever the government (the
judiciary is a part of the government, or have they forgotten this) deems it neces-
sary. To illustrate all this, we can include not only the above citations, but also,
e.g., the lapanese Relocation cases, supra note 167. See also infra note 330. Se-
crecy during wartime and non-war emergencies also enters, on which see infra
notes 490 et seq.
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persons are peculiarly involved at all times, i.e., in war or peace, dur-
ing every stage in the flow of information, e.g., when and if wiretap-
ping or bugging occurs, and these rights must be respected. Respect
may be given or found in various approaches, e.g., complete, none,
or in-between. Where no respect to personal and other rights is given
then totalitarianism is there found, and Big Brother holds sway;
where complete respect occurs then problems arise when a nation's
very life is at stake; and it appears that a shifting mean is utilized by
Western nations, depending for its immediate locus on numerous
factors. This generality, however, may be ignored for particular
items. For example, obscenity may have little, if any, direct impact
on a nation's struggle for survival (even though it is argued that
the indirect and long term effects conduce to decadence). So, for
this area, two Justices have urged absoluteness in this language:
"That does not mean that 'obscenity' is good or that it should be en-
couraged. It only means that we cannot be faithful to our constitu-
tional mandate and allow any form or shadow of censorship over
speech and press." '319
However, the three branches of government all hew to the shifting
mean approach, so that while rights must be respected, they are not
required to be enforced at all times and under all circumstances, e.g.,
war. Thus a war-peace dichotomy appears, and in each there are
separate aspects of permissible and nonpermissible censorship, all of
which may be somewhat touched upon; separately, in the peacetime
aspect, other subdivisions appear, and it is here that current prob-
lems are found, and that in a pluralistic and democratic society the
sharpest attacks upon governmental power occur.
Censorship during war: We have heretofore discussed the com-
mon law concept of "previous restraints" and the government's accep-
319. Byrne v. Karalexis, 396 U.S. 976, 980 (1969), per Douglas (Black) dis-
senting, court granting stay of temporary injunction issued below, motion to vacate
order denied, and probable jurisdiction noted, 397 U.S. 985 (1970), and for ulti-
mate determination see infra note 405 (and see also supra note 195). Justice
Douglas footnoted a quotation in which Alexsander Solzhenitsyn (removed from
the Russian Writers' Union late in 1969) said: "It is time to remember that
the first thing we belong to is humanity. And humanity is separated from the
animal world by thought and speech, and they should naturally be free. If they are
fettered, we go back to being animals. Publicity and openness, honest and com-
plete-that is the prime condition for the health of every society, and ours too."
See also supra notes 17, 93, and 153, and infra 390.
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tance of the broadening aspects of free speech and press adopted by
the judiciary; some of the problems raised by these concepts are
shortly treated in greater detail, e.g., when controls are sought to be
exercised in peacetime over writings claimed to be obscene. How-
ever, such constitutional protections are not automatically rendered
innocuous or rejected during war; even if there is great need for cir-
cumscription, this does not include elimination, although from a prac-
tical point of view it might be said that there is a de facto prescrip-
tion.320 Nevertheless, even in peace, such constitutional ". . . pro-
tection . . . is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been
recognized only in exceptional cases." '21 Thus any restrictions in
times of peace are "exceptional;" what of non-peace situations, i.e.,
peace has given way to, say, a shooting war. Now "free speech
[, which] is the rule, not the exception, . . . loses its [absolute]
constitutional immunity. . . . Otherwise, free speech which is the
strength of the Nation will be the cause of its destruction." '22  But
even during war a further distinction must be made, namely, are we
in the battle zone or within the United States? The reason is that
while the "Constitution has no provision lifting restrictions upon gov-
ernmental authority [The first amendment is such a restriction] dur-
ing periods of emergency, . . . the scope of a restriction may de-
pend on the circumstances in which it is invoked." '323
320. "However, the phrase 'war power' cannot be invoked as a talismanic in-
cantation to support any exercise of congressional power which can be brought
within its ambit. '[Elven the war power does not remove constitutional limitations
safeguarding essential liberties.' " United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-64
(1967), and see also infra note 346.
321. Near v. Minnesota, supra note 315, at 716.
322. Per Douglas, dissenting in Dennis v. United States, supra note 314, at 585.
This language is lifted out of context; this disclosed the application of the clear and
present danger test, on which see text keyed to infra note 200 et seq. See also
Holmes's statement that many things are prevented "so long as men fight, and . . .
no court could regard them as protected by any constitutional rights." Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
323. Per Frankfurter, concurring in Dennis, supra note 314, at 520. It is not
amiss to refer to the Army's heavy-handed censorship in Vietnam, as well as
domestically, but especially its double-talk with respect to its own military writers
for the radio broadcasts as well as the 140 unit newspapers and 18 color magazines
prepared for troop consumption. These media rarely bring up the battle tolls in
dead and wounded, battles are never lost, morale is never low, and mistakes are
never made. There is, however, an undercurrent of rebellion against this "propa-
ganda" and a desire to "tell it like it is," so that many of the young non-coms are
either publicly protesting or refusing to continue. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1970,
§ E at 5, col. 5. See also notes 81, 455, and 504a, and special issue of THE
PROGRESSIVE, June, 1969, on The Power of the Pentagon.
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During a shooting war there is no question but that a reporter
within the battle zone is subject to a species of complete and un-
limited censorship; and, domestically, there is also a degree of cen-
sorship permitted, e.g., "[n]o one would question that a govern-
ment might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and lo-
cation of troops." '324 The real problems which arise daily and hourly
during such a war situation really involve questions of degree-that
is, censorship is not ruled out, but what kind, how much, when, under
what circumstances, for how long, etc.? These eventually become
extremely practical questions and cannot be generalized and answered
in advance,325 e.g., the Japanese Relocation Cases of 1943-44 which
illustrate the terrible power of a government to place native-born
citizens in what were euphemistically termed relocation centers, in
which forms of information were stifled pending the lifting of the con-
trols. 26 And the terrible power of a censoring government, when
directed at repressing any group which, regardless of its proper aims
and innocuous effect on any war effort, is thought to require suppres-
sion, always includes spin-offs which prevent the exercise of consti-
tutional rights, e.g., press. s2 7  In lesser emergency situations the de-
gree of control is, of course, reduced, 323 but the threat always re-
mainsa 29
324. Near v. Minnesota, supra note 315, at 716, and see also Times Film Corp.
v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47-49 (1961); although see further discussion below. See
also, on misinformation, supra notes 93 et seq.
On Oct. 8, 1970, "President Nixon was asked to disclose the name of the nation's
chief censor, a private citizen now on standby duty who would assume office in a
national emergency." This "name has been a secret part of the Government's
contingency plan for keeping military secrets out of the press in wartime." N.Y.
Times, Oct. 9, 1970, at 8, col. 1. The name, of course, is classified information, as
is the censorship plan and other details. All nations, in one form or another, have
official censors, or, euphemistically, Ministers of Information, and even the Black
Panthers, Young Lords, and other militant groups in the United States have their
own such-titled functionary, e.g., Eldridge Cleaver. President Nixon has his own
"Director of Communications." See also supra note 100.
325. However, for a discussion of Presidential powers and limitations during
so-called "war" situations, e.g., Korea, Vietnam, see Forkosch, The Constitutionality
of the Vietnam Venture, and a Registrant's Right to Counsel Within the Selective
Service System, 22 S. CAR. L. REv. 287 (1970).
326. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944), and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
327. See, e.g., the 1917 conspiracy indictment against Haywood and others, the
"Wobblies," with introduction by FONER, 11 LABOR HISTORY 500 (1970).
328. E.g., as occurred in Endo, supra note 326.
329. See, e.g., discussion in the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium case, i.e., Blais-
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Domestic emergencies: It is the internal situation which gives rise
to problems really involving a variety of subjective evaluations and
policy determinations by the legislative and judicial branches, e.g.,
what is the kind, type, and degree of the emergency;1a0 to what ex-
tent does this situation so involve and affect (endanger?) the nation
that it must be circumscribed sufficiently (so as to render it innocu-
ous); how and in what degree is the person (involved in the flow of
information) so tied in (inextricably intertwined) 81 with the pre-
ceding required circumscription that he, too, necessarily becomes and
must be subjected to control lest the government's efforts be frus-
trated, and similarly for any information being transmitted; but, in de-
termining this last, consitiutional requirements which are still some-
what applicable in war s3 are now even more so applicable in lesser
emergencies and especially during peace; so the balancing evalua-
tions1 3a must take all these factors 3 4 into consideration in making
any policy determination.33
dell, supra note 318, where, at 437, the Court wrote that "[tihe economic interests
of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power
notwithstanding interference with contracts."
330. It is impossible to elaborate upon the thousands of situations which may
be labeled emergencies, e.g., economic ones (supra note 329), floods, pestilence,
etc. There has always been an emergency of one kind or another in the United
States (and the world), e.g., violence (see references in supra note 11). Or, ex-
tremist groups have always kept the nation in a turmoil, e.g., LIPSET and RAAB,
THE POLITICS OF UNREASON, RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM, 1790-1970 (1970).
331. See also use of other language by Frankfurter, e.g., "enmeshed," or "en-
tangled." Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287,
292, 294 (1941). However, these parenthesized and footnoted terms are too de-
manding, and the looser "tied in" is preferred.
332. See, e.g., supra note 320, and text keyed to supra note 323.
333. See text keyed to supra notes 208 et seq.
334. Justice Black, as already noted, is vehemently opposed to any balancing
procedure for first amendment rights. Assuming, however, its use, he still is dis-
turbed by the factors entering into both sides of the scale, for the addition of im-
proper or wrong factors tips the scales. See, e.g., his dissenting views in Barenblatt
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143-44 (1959).
335. In the fall of 1970 two officials were kidnapped by Canadian extremists
who desired to make the Province of Quebec a separate (French speaking) nation;
one of the hostages was wantonly murdered, which caused the Premier to invoke
emergency war powers to cope with the general terrorism. See supra note 217.
Under these powers searches and arrests were made without warrants. In one
instance a bookstore owner placed a hand-lettered sign in the store window, pro-
claiming sympathy with the freedom movement, and, defying a police order to re-
move it, became subject to arrest. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1970, at 2, col. 4. The
second hostage was later released, unharmed, as part of a "deal" whereby the kid-
nappers were given air passage to Cuba.
An extreme situation may be illustrated by the seven-year old military govern-
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Some aspects of the domestic emergencies encountered in the past
and even now in the present, may now be discussed. Sedition and
subversion: Censorship may be direct or indirect, governmental or
private, legal or nonlegal, so that it is, rather, the effect upon the cen-
sored which must also be considered rather than merely the means
employed. For example, any person in the educational, literary, or
publication and communication media is engaged in the flow of in-
formation; when his activities are diminished, or his creativity stifled,
by any kind of censorship, then the country also suffers directly
through the loss of his product, and indirectly by a lessening in the
first amendment freedoms. To illustrate, the passage in 1940 of
the Smith Act, 3 6 and in 1950 of the McCarran Act,3 37 came during
a period of hysteria, but they had numerous statutory forbears, e.g.,
the Alien & Sedition Acts of 1798, the Civil War and later statutes
aimed at preventing interruptions to the draft, etc.,338 the 1902 New
York "criminal anarchy" law 39 as well as those in other states 4 '
and, in addition, the efforts of the government during World War I
against the sabotage of vessels34' and in the post-World War I
ment in Brazil. It was allegedly a temporary suppression of civil and other rights
until normality returned. However, dissent was crushed, universities purged, and
public expression and the news media repressed. These temporary restrictions
have in part been made permanent in the new constitution and laws defining
political crimes and authorizing censorship of news, books, periodicals, etc.
336. Being §§ 2-3 of the Alien Registration Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 671, as
amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964).
337. The Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, as amended
in and to 1968, 50 U.S.C. § 781 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1968). On the McCarthy era
of this decade see supra note 168; and on the Alien & Sedition Acts see supra
notes 164 and 166. See also supra note 271 on the unconstitutionality of sections
of the McCarran Act.
338. See, for a description, history, and judicial decisions thereunder, CHAFEE,
FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES, 37-101 (1941).
339. Laws of 1902, ch. 371, enacted shortly after the assassination of President
McKinley and being the first state anti-sedition law, making it criminal to advocate
"the doctrine that organized government should be overthrown by force or violence"
or to join any organization teaching or advocating it. This statute was upheld in
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) against free speech and press conten-
tions, and also that the publication of the "Manifesto" did not have any such effect
as was denounced by the law. See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927) upholding that state's law, although in Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507,
511 (C.D. Calif. 1968), a three-judge statutory court held that Whitney had been
"by-passed and ignored" and now denounced that law as unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad; on direct appeal the Supreme Court reversed, on which see supra
note 195, for extended discussion.
340. See, e.g., CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH, supra note 338, at chs. 4, 7, 8, 10, and
app. III (1941).
341. The Magnuson Act, 40 Stat. 220, amended in 1950, 64 Stat. 427, and found
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years to deport (communist) aliens. 42 The history of the Smith and
McCarran Acts and their judicial34 and peripheral progeny is beyond
the complete reach of this paper;. 44 suffice it to say that recent
in 50 U.S.C. § 191 (1964), provided "against destruction . . . or injury from sabo-
tage or other subversive acts . . . [to] vessels, harbors, ports ....... In Schneider v.
Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968), a seaman who applied for validation of his license as a
second assistant engineer was denied further processing after admitting former
membership in the Communist Party and refusing to answer other questions. The
Commandant's refusal was based upon a Presidential regulation giving the former
such authority. However, while conceding "that keeping our merchant marine
free of saboteurs is within the purview of this Act," id. at 23, the Court held
that the statute "gives the President no express authority to set up a screening
program . . ." id. at 22; see also other like views id. at 27-28.
Current efforts at sabotage are, obviously, of relevance, on which see but these few
references: Forkosch, Is Violence An "American" Nightmare?, 4 GA. L. REV. 439
(1970); Collective Violence, THE ANNALS, Vol. 391 (Short & M. Eoltgang eds.
1970); Brofenbrenner, Radical Economics in America: A 1970 Survey, 8 J.
Eco. LIT. 747 (1970).
There is an intermixture of questionable repression or censorship of the constitu-
tional right of and to information with the justifiable repression of bombings and
mayhem which, as referred to in supra note 188, may drag the former down with the
latter. Regardless, constitutional rights must be respected, e.g., where the federal
government first seized, and then released, 6,000 copies of Scanlan's Monthly maga-
zine for January, 1970, devoted to "Guerrilla War in the U.S.A.," in which an arti-
cle informed one how to make bombs. This issue had been printed in Canada and
was held up at the border because of a possible violation of a law forbidding the
importation of materials advocating treason or forcible resistance to the laws. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 11, 1970, at 53, col. 2. See also id., Dec. 12, 1970, at 19, col. 1,
detailing the seizure of 102,000 copies of that same issue by Montreal police, the
inspector in charge declining to state the grounds for the seizure.
342. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), and Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), sustaining deportation because of past membership in
the Communist Party. But see supra notes 273-80, on travel aspects.
343. The most (in)famous on the Smith Act are: the two "action" cases, i.e.,
Dennis v. United States, supra note 314, the "first string" case, upholding the
convictions of all eleven of the top national leaders of the Communist Party, and
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), the "second string" case, overturning
the convictions of the fourteen defendants but distinguishing, and not overruling,
Dennis. The two "membership" cases, Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961),
sustaining a conviction, and Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961), simul-
taneously reversing a similar conviction because of a lack of evidence.
Those on the McCarran Act include: Communist Party v. S.A.C.B., 367 U.S. 1
(1961), upholding the registration requirement as against the Communist Party, but
as against an individual member declared invalid in Boorda v. S.A.C.B., 421 F.2d
1142 (D.C. Cir. 1969), although previously also sustaining a person's refusal
to register where he claimed the privilege against self-incrimination, Albertson v.
S.A.C.B., 382 U.S. 70 (1965), enhanced by Communist Party v. United States,
384 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also infra note 352.
344. See, e.g., CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH, supra note 338; Meiklejohn, What Does
the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 461 (1953); Mollan, Smith Act
Prosecutions, etc., 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 705 (1965); Mansfield, The Albertson
Case, etc., 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 103; Nathanson, Freedom of Association and the
Quest for Internal Security, etc., 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 153 (1970). On the "security"
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX:I
cases 46 have, in effect, squelched their direct legally intimidating ef-
fect 46 but, quaere, what of indirect, nonlegal, reputational, eco-
nomic and sociological effects? These latter can be illustrated by the
"listing" method next discussed.
Test and loyalty oaths: Censorship does not limit itself to efforts
to control subversive activities, associations deemed bad, disclo-
sures,34 7 disclaimers, test and loyalty 4' oaths, or similar required
aspect see, e.g., STERN, THE OPPENHEIMER CASE: SECURITY ON TRIAL (1969), where
J. Robert Oppenheimer was dismissed and disgraced and thus provided an object
lesson for anyone else speaking his mind against the horrors of the atomic bomb.
On peripheral progeny see, e.g., notes 450 et seq., 500 et seq., and 556, as well as
the contention by the government that the Attorney General has the power to
wiretap radical groups' telephones without a court order, infra note 360.
345. See, e.g., Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), holding unconstitu-
tional the state's Criminal Syndicalism Act as applied to one identified as a leader
and speaker at a Ku Klux Klan organizing rally.
346. E.g., in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), one section of the
McCarran Act was held unconstitutional as applied so as to make it unlawful for a
member of a Communist-action organization to engage in any employment in a de-
fense facility, the majority nevertheless saying, inter alia (see supra note 320), that
"Congress [has] the power under narrowly drawn legislation to keep from sensitive
positions in defense facilities those who would use their positions to disrupt the
Nation's production facilities. We have recognized that, while the Constitution pro-
tects against invasions of individual rights, it does not withdraw from the Govern-
ment the power to safeguard its vital interests." But see report that Attorney
General John H. Mitchell would ask the new Congress on January 4, 1971, "to pass
antisubversive legislation. . . ." N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1970, at 18, col. 1.
347. See, e.g., S. 782, proposed in 1970, and S. R. 91-873 accompanying it,
designed to prevent federal employees or applicants for jobs from being required
by any executive branch officer to disclose race, religion, or national origin; attend
meetings, etc. except as related to his work; report on outside activities unrelated to
work; submit to questioning about personal relationships or sexual matters through
interviews, psychological tests, or lie detectors; contribute money for political
campaigns, etc.; disclose personal or family assets. Other provisions would in effect,
permit some details of procedural due process in proceedings looking to any punish-
ment, etc.
But see the actions of J. Edgar Hoover, director of the F.B.I. (see also supra
notes .40 and infra notes 424, 499b and 502), in the following incident: on Oct. 31,
1970, a twenty-year old part-time motel employee was arrested and charged with as-
saulting a policeman; on coming before the General Sessions Court in Washington,
D.C., the prosecutor conceded the arrest was a mistake and dropped the charges;
counsel for defendant requested the arrest record be expunged so his client would not
be prejudiced in his efforts to get a job; this was ordered, i.e., the police department
in the D.C. was directed to destroy the arrest record, fingerprints, and mug shots.
However, copies had already been forwarded to the F.B.I. The judge therefore or-
dered that body not to communicate the information to anyone until a further hear-
ing could be held to determine whether to make the F.B.I. destroy the records.
Hoover went into the federal district court to remove the matter from the local
D.C. court. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
It should be further noted that such F.B.I. "rap sheets" may be circulated to
other than enforcement agencies, e.g., banks, insurance companies, hospitals, Civil
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methods; there are also registration statutes such as the Foreign
Service Commissions, railroads, as prospective employers, and even if there is a
follow-up note of no conviction, or even a withdrawal or dropping of the case,
many employers refuse to hire or even consider such a person. In July, 1970,
however, a Los Angeles federal district court judge ruled that Litton Systems, Inc.,
violated the Civil Rights Law in refusing to employ a black youth solely because
he had been arrested 14 times, without any conviction, the court feeling that blacks
are often arrested without good cause; the company was also required not to request
arrest, as distinguished from conviction, records, where non-sensitive jobs were
involved. N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1970, at E8, col. 1. Quare: why limit this to
non-sensitive jobs? Is it that, for example, an arrest for some type of sex item may
have been quashed for reasons other than judicial and therefore has some "mean-
ing"? If so, this should condemn the system, not those falsely accused and arrested
in this area.
The new F.B.I. building to be completed by 1973-74 at a cost of over $102 mil-
lion, will be able to house not only the fingerprints of the 85 million Americans al-
ready collected and (perhaps) to be computerized with those of the Department of
Justice (civil disturbance), I.R.S. (taxes, gun registration), Defense (politically
active civilian militants), and many other such agencies, but, eventually, the entire
nation of (by then) 210 million people. Fortunately, second thoughts prevailed in
this monolithic agency and they agreed to erase the case from their records. Id.,
Jan. 22, 1971, at 24, col. 1.
348. See generally, on these programs, BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECURITY (1958).
However, in accordance with Stewart v. Washington, 301 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C.
1969), the U.S. Civil Service Commission has removed the requirement that prospec-
tive employees sign a non-Communist or Fascist affidavit and also swear non-
advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government, etc. See also Haskett v.
Washington, 294 F. Supp. 912 (D.D.C. 1968).
The government's employee loyalty program begins with Pres. Truman's Exec.
Order 9835, 3 C.F.R. 627 (1947), as amended later on the evaluation of the
evidence, Exec. Order 10241, 3 C.F.R. 749 (1951), followed later by Pres. Eisen-
hower's Exec. Order 10450, 3 C.F.R. 936 (1953). These programs raise
questions of procedural due process, e.g., the right to a fair hearing, confrontation,
counsel, on which see, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
a! 'd (by equally divided Court), 341 U.S. 918 (1951); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474
(1959). There are numerous other aspects of these and other laws which cannot
be further discussed, although on a state's law requiring a teacher's oath, struck
down for vagueness, see Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967). See also supra
note 280.
Loyalty oaths, therefore, for federal and state employees, including teachers, ap-
pear to have been judicially proscribed except, perhaps, in one situation, i.e., the
affirmative oath. Ordinarily the individual's disclaimer of advocacy, etc., will be
that, or somewhat like that, found in Connell v. Higginbotham, 305 F. Supp. 445
(D.C. Fla. 1969), prob. juris. noted, - U.S. -, 90 S. Ct. 1865 (1970), case ar-
gued, 39 L.W. 3225, where the public employment oath attacked required the em-
ployee to swear "I do not believe in the overthrow" etc. Under the affirmative
oath the employee now swears to support the federal and state constitutions, etc.
Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd. per curiam,
390 U.S. 36 (1968), although in Rafferty v. MacKay, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 355
(1970), the California requirement that an applicant for a teacher's certificate
swear to "promote respect for the flag and respect for law and order and allegiance
to the government of the United States of America" was summarily denounced as
indistinguishable from Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
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Agent's Registration Act,349 the Corrupt Practices Act,5 0 and the
Regulation of Lobbying Act, 51 to mention but a few. 52  One early
and vicious method was the "Attorney-General's List of Subversive
Organizations," i.e., a listing of such associations as that government
official designated, albeit without any judicial-type fair hearing; al-
though this was rejected on the general constitutional ground that the
provisions invaded one's right of association,858 a recent listing of
"radical speakers" was made public by the Chairman of the House of
Representatives Committee on Internal Security, despite a tempo-
rary restraining court order prohibiting official government publica-
tion, because of the congressional immunity of the Committee from
suit.85 4
349. 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq. (1964).
350. 2 U.S.C. § 241 et seq. (1964).
351. 2 U.S.C. § 261 et seq. (1964).
352. See, e.g., others referred to by Frankfurter in Communist Party v.
S.A.C.B., supra note 343, at 97-101 (1961), the decision sustaining the registration
provisions of the McCarran Act as against the Communist Party, although in Boorda
v. S.A.C.B., supra note 343, the 1961 decision was distinguished and the registration
requirements held invalid as against individual members.
353. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), striking down a
state rule of evidence because of Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966), a state
case involving an oath, and thereafter followed by United States v. Robel, supra
note 346, refusing to bar a Communist Party member from employment in a defense
plant; also, United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), an analogous situation
involving a different type of (statutory) provision, and Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), rejecting efforts to deny passports to Communist Party
members.
354. Hantoff v. Ichord, - F. Supp. - (D.D.C. 1970), and see also Davis v.
Ichord, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1970), and Cole v. McClellan, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir.
1970). For the sequence of events in the Hentoff case see the N.Y. Times, Oct. 15,
1970, at 23, col. 3, listing sixty-five campus "radical" speakers, together with twelve
organizations, and tying the former with the latter by a cross-reference number; the
next day three listed persons denied any such affiliation or party membership, one
saying his only connection was as the attorney for some members of the Black
Panther party. Id. Oct. 16, 1970, at 11, col. 1. Thereafter the same judge issued a
permanent injunction barring official governmental publication at public expense,
the ground being that the subcommittee had overstepped its constitutional jurisdic-
tion and that free speech could not thus be inhibited. However, private publication
and distribution was not restrained, whether by Congressmen or others. Id. Oct. 29,
1970, at 1, col. 3. The aftermath included a dropping of seven names from the list
because the Committee had "'no hard evidence of card-carrying membership' and
that the 'other material was too flimsy' to keep" an eighth name thereon. Id., Dec.
10, 1970, at 37, col. 3. A formal House resolution (302-54) banning court or any
other action against a substitute new report was issued so as to avoid any confron-
tation with the judiciary. Id. Dec. 15, at 33, col. 1. Cf., for example, the caveat
appearing in the published hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Se-
curity, that it "attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the
name of an individual or an organization in this index" to the hearings. 91st
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In other words, the stream of information can be dried up at the
source by statutes, executive orders, and agency conduct such as those
given above, and, more importantly, there is a chilling effect upon
one's right to speech and press.355 The censorship thus need not be
direct and immediate, e.g., jail, for speaking or writing, but may be in-
direct, e.g., by a listing, or requiring disclaimers on license applica-
tions;356 it need not be legal but may be economic, e.g., when listed,
or if one seeks to exercise a constitutional right in (say) a legislative
investigation, 57 the public disapprobation or the industry's or in-
Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2, at 1 (1970). See further, suit against the State of Okla-
homa's blacklist seeking to have this destroyed, and its dossiers, as well as having
the state's Office of Interagency Coordination disbanded. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1,
1970, at 48, col. 1. See also infra note 424, for other quotations.
355. On the chilling effect, see text keyed to supra notes 194 et seq. One current
illustration is the Texas requirement that authors of all books used in schools
throughout that state sign a loyalty oath. Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stat. Art. 6252-7, § 3
(1953), although insofar as its § 1 required teacher disqualification for refusal to
sign the non-subversive disclaimer oath, solely and merely on grounds of present or
past membership in the organizations listed in the federal Attorney General's
listing, without any specific intent to further its illegal aims, that section is uncon-
stitutional. Gilmore v. James, 274 F. Supp. 75 (N.D. Tex. 1967), aff'd. 389 U.S.
572 (1968).
That book censorship of any sort is not limited to the United States, see the
decision handed down July 17, 1970, by the Tokyo District Court in a suit brought
by Professor Saburo Ienaga against the Minister of Education testing the constitu-
tionality of the latter's power to demand changes in textbooks; he was successful,
in a degree, but the government has appealed. See discussions in Japan Times,
July 24, 1970, at 14, col. 2, and July 25th, at 4, col. 6.
356. See, e.g., discussion in supra note 296 and text keyed to it.
357. E.g., a legislative committee seeks to compel answers to questions (Are you
now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party of the United
States, or of any organization seeking to overthrow the government of the United
States by force or violence?) which permit a prosecution or other type of punishment
to be inflicted; a person's right to refuse to answer because of self-incrimination is
obviously to be upheld, but what of a first amendment objection? This is the key
problem. The decisions utilize different rationales, e.g., Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178 (1957), striking down a conviction, but because the question was not
pertinent to the objectives of the legislative investigation, seemingly relying also on
due process grounds of Watkins not being accorded a fair hearing, and referring
passingly to the rights of free speech, e.g., "[tihe Bill of Rights is as applicable to
investigations as to all forms of governmental action. . . . Nor can the First
Amendment freedoms of speech, press, religion, or political belief and association
be abridged." id. at 188. See also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957),
simultaneously striking down a state conviction but on due process grounds. How-
ever, in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), the pertinency objection
was rejected and the conviction upheld, and see also Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963), where the Barenblatt decision was
qualified, although two of the majority of five preferred overruling it (even though
Barenblatt had been reaffirmed by the same majority, Braden v. United States,
365 U.S. 431 [1961], Wilhensen v. United States, 365 U.S. 400 [1961]).
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divdual employer's fears may result in a discharge from employment,
or a refusal to employ or purchase the person's products (e.g., writ-
ings) or services (e.g., radio, broadcasting), 8 s or one or one's family
may be snubbed or otherwise ostracized (e.g., children in school),
etc.-the point here is that censorship by extra-legal means is some-
times more effective and powerful than by legal ones.
"National security": The several non-emergency situations and
powers just discussed do not cover another facet of governmental au-
thority, namely, the criminal field. For example, "foreign subver-
sives" is a term which is ambiguous, for does it encompass only for-
eign spies, as with the German submarine infiltrators onto Long Is-
land during World War II; or does it also include citizens of this
country who, it is felt, may adhere to the enemy, as the President
thought in the infamous Japanese relocation directive after Pearl
Harbor; or does it embrace only residents or aliens who, during a
non-war period, spy for a foreign power, or even citizens who are
native-born or naturalized? So is peacetime "national security" an
ambiguous term, and who is or is not a "criminal" may occasion diffi-
culties. All of this is separate from the other questions concerning
the constitutional or statutory rights and privileges of citizens and
aliens, and whether, in their activities relating to information and its
flow, they are circumscribed by the exercise of any governmental
power.
Apart from overt and outright violations of valid criminal laws,
which now also condemn aspects of free speech and press inextri-
cably intertwined with them, the government also exercises within
this general area a different type of supervisory, or censorious, au-
thority. Here, while not exactly contending that a person is engag-
ing in illegal activities, it somehow feels insecure because such activi-
ties may conceivably relate to, open up, give a lead to, or include such
opprobrius behavior-in other words, while as yet still a virgin, the
person may conceivably be just a little bit pregnant, and it is the
self-appointed burden of these government agencies to determine
358. See, on this, COOLEY, REPORT ON BLACKLISTING: I. MoviEs; II. RADio-
TELEVIsION (1956), Horowitz, Loyalty Tests for Employment in the Motion Picture
Industry, 6 STAN. L. REV. 438 (1954), and also Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 19 A.D.2d 464,
244 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1963), aff'd. 14 N.Y.2d 899, 200 N.E.2d 778 (1964), cert.
den. 380 U.S. 916 (1965).
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this. Thus snooping, surveillance, and seizures abound. Numerous
departments and agencies assume this to be part of their responsi-
bility (and therefore authority?), but here the question relates to the
government's power to enter an unsettled area of the law, namely,
the third of the triple-s burdens just mentioned. When and under
what circumstances may the government search and seize; who has
this authority; how may it be exercised; what are its limitations; and,
in all this, how is the flow of information impeded or prevented?
Search and seizure authority is constitutionally limited, of course, but
the 1968 statutory permission to the government to bug or wiretap
when first obtaining a warrant was limited to criminal cases; sep-
arately, the Attorney General has always contended that an inde-
pendent right to eavesdrop without a warrant exists in cases involving
foreign subversives; 5 9 but domestic situations involving threats to
the "national security" are a middle ground in which no statutory or
other basis is found to permit such governmental power to be exer-
cised sans warrant or affidavit therefor. This unsettled area permits
a roving investigator to ferret out the trite and the innocuous, invade
privacy, create suspicion and fear of neighbors and others, make
people flinch at sight of uniform or badge, and all breeds a police
state of insecurity-with all of its horrendous implications for the ob-
taining, transmission, publication, and distribution of information.360
359. All of these subjects are further treated elsewhere, e.g., notes 81 et seq.,
and references; 188 and 341; 339-347; 549a-560. On the Omnibus Crime Control
& Safe Streets Act of 1968 see notes 78 and 558.
360. In 1969 Attorney General Mitchell claimed that the government had the
right to wiretap in such domestic "national security" cases (see also infra note
499c), and this argument was accepted by the trial judge in the Chicago 13 con-
spiracy trial, United States v. Dillinger et al., - F. Supp. - (N.D. Ill. 197-),
which is presently on appeal. The Sixth Circuit disagrees with the Attorney Gen-
eral (see infra note 499c). In a related matter eight individuals (who were de-
fendants in the Chicago trial) and nine organizations sued to obtain damages, a
declaratory judgment, injunctive and other relief; they claimed that Mitchell's sur-
veillance policies were invalid and sought to enjoin him; the government moved
that the action be stayed because it was initiated to circumvent the rulings limiting
the pre-trial discovery motions of the defendants (here plaintiffs) in the criminal
case, and that the issues in both proceedings were identical, and these plaintiffs
had their remedy on a criminal appeal; the Court of Appeals rejected such a stay
and permitted the suit to continue. Dellinger v. United States, - F.2d - (App.
D.C. 1971), 39 L.W. 2487.
In United States v. Smith, - F. Supp. - (D.C. Calif. 1971), 39 L.W. 2385,
however, a warrantless electronic surveillance of a purely domestic organization,
even though authorized by the President and in the interest of national security,
was held to require a full disclosure of the records so obtained. Inter alia the court
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Domestic non-emergencies-police and postal powers: Govern-
ments throughout the world dote on emergencies, whether real or
imaginary, actual or created. The reason is their accession to new
and greater powers or their untrammeled ability to enforce existing
ones. The distinction between a non-emergency and a true emer-
gency is thus often clouded by rhetoric, passion, and especially fear
of the unknown or possible, rather than probable. In this country,
the judiciary has the Solomon-like task of determining, for example,
did Harry Truman have power because of a "police" emergency,
did Minnesota have power because of an economic emergency,
did Congress have power because of a cold war emergency,3 61
and, today, is there any kind of an emergency justifying any degree
of censorship? By virtue of what authority or powers may the gov-
ernment act?
Governmental censorship may occur in non-war or domestic non-
emergency situations under, e.g., a plenary or a police power. For
example, even though the distribution of pamphlets, literature, etc.
on the streets cannot ordinarily be prevented without an overriding
reason, such a reason was found in the state's interest in protecting
the welfare of its children, and therefore enforcing a statute providing
that no boy under 12, or girl under 18, was to sell religious periodi-
cals in the streets. 62 And, using its implied police powers under its
plenary commerce powers,3 63 Congress may forbid monopolies and
restraints on competition so that newspapers become amenable to a
degree of indirect censorship, i.e., if they cannot group as they desire
for news-gathering purposes, they may find their collection abilities
impaired.
remarked that "The Government seems to approach dissident domestic organizations
in the same fashion that it deals with unfriendly foreign powers." In another case
in Detroit a like claim was also disallowed, and it is this decision which the govern-
ment apparently is appealing. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1971, at 18, col. 3.
The sum-total of all these governmental actions, as a threat to basic constitutional
rights in this area of speech and press, has been discussed in a series of four editorials
on "The Threat to Liberty" in the N.Y. Times, April 27-30, 1970. See also infra
note 366.
361. On the Truman police emergency, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) says no; on the economic one, Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) says yes; and on the cold war emergency
powers of Congress see, e.g., the sedition and loyalty cases, supra notes 338 et seq.
362. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
363. See supra notes 250 and 272 giving Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945); see also infra note 534.
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Or, under the postal power, there may be withheld, granted, or
withdrawn special or lower rates; 364 and efforts may be made to pre-
vent the receipt of information. For example, a 1962 statute36 5 re-
quired the postmaster general to detain incoming foreign material,
except sealed letters, which was determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury to be "communist political propaganda," then notify the ad-
dressee, and deliver it to the latter only at his request. This was struck
down "as a limitation on the unfettered exercise of the addressee's
First Amendment rights." '366 Nor can that functionary censor a mag-
azine's content by denying it second-class privileges. 367  However,
he may aid private householders in self-censoring their receipt of
mail,36 and he questionably still retains a degree of control in being
able to exclude from the mails items dealing with murder, assassina-
tion, arson, fraud, and libelous statements on envelopes.3 6  He can-
364. See, e.g., supra note 282, although in the granting of a privilege, the
state "may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitu-
tional rights," e.g., the First Amendment ones, Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271
U.S. 583, 594 (1926), and in Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 155-6 (1946)
the Court said: "We may assume that Congress . .. need not open second-class
mail to publications of all types. . . . But grave constitutional questions are imme-
diately raised once it is said that the use of the mails is a privilege which may
be extended or withheld on any grounds whatsoever. . . . Under that view the
second-class rate could be granted on condition that certain economic or political
ideas not be disseminated."
365. Postal Service & Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962, 39 U.S.C.
§ 4008(a) (1964), contains the applicable portion.
366. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965), continuing: "As
stated by Mr. Justice Holmes ...: 'The United States may give up the post-
office when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as
much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues. . . .'" See also Williams
v. Blount, 314 F. Supp. 1356 (D.D.C. 1970), denying seizure of newsletter sent
from China, and text accompanying infra note 581. Cf., however, the converse, i.e.,
seizing letters destined for foreign countries, as authorized by §§ 602-606 of the
Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375 (August 12, 1970).
The Army is in a class by itself, although now it may argue morale, war, etc.
Pursuant to an alleged 1970 regulation, and supposedly after the Secretary of the
Army has found thereunder that a danger to loyalty, etc. appears, it has issued a
confidential directive to Vietnam commanders to "intercept and confiscate personal,
first-class mail containing antiwar or other dissident publications sent to soldiers
here." N.Y. Times, March 31, 1971, at 4, col. 4.
367. Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 151 (1946), Manual Enterprises, Inc.
v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
368. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't., 396 U.S. 885 (1970), on which see supra
notes 212 and 268 decision furthered by § 3008(a-b) of the Postal Reorganization
Act of 1970, supra note 366, and see also the announcement by the Post Office
Department, on November 15, 1970, that it would effectuate § 3008 starting Febru-
ary 1, 1971.
369. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), although note qual-
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not, however, prevent the transmission and receipt through first-class
mail between consenting adults of pornographic material, 7 and
constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures
are still available to mailers.171
The constitutional rights of speech and press (or any other consti-
tutional right) may be asserted against these and all other types of
censorship, for "an untrammeled press [is] a vital source of public
information,"3 72 but the financial and other business costs involved
in law suits may loom to deter in some degree any proceedings
against these methods of control.37 This is an area well worth a con-
tinuing legislative investigation. 74
Libel: Freedom to speak, print, publish, and otherwise to distrib-
ute and inform, may, as has been seen, be made subject to legal re-
sponsibility at times and because of consequences, e.g., a libel dam-
age suit, and this is not a prior restraint. But libel and obscenity,
ifications discussed in infra note 388 and §§ 3005-3006, 3007 of the Postal Reor-
ganization Act of 1970, supra note 366. In Blount v. Rizzi, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct.
423 (1971), §§ 3006 and 7 were held violative of the First Amendment as lacking in
adequate judicial safeguards against the undue inhibition of protected expression,
where the PMG was authorized by the statute, after an administrative hearing to
determine if mail was obscene, and on a mere showing of probable cause, to obtain
a mail-block order against the sender. The burden of an appeal was, by the law,
placed on the individual to appeal a departmental obscenity decision, and no speedy
judicial review was provided for. The two cases now decided to end an obscenity
censorship scheme that began in 1950. However, Rowan, supra note 366, is still
the law. See also United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970), where first
class mail, ordinarily free from postal inspection, was permitted to be checked
under a search warrant after a 29-hour delay, where there were present circum-
stances arousing suspicion. See, further, infra note 382.
370. See infra note 403. The Mexican Constitution, in Art. 25, states: "Sealed
correspondence set through the mail shall be exempt from search and its violation
shall be punishable by law." The 1954 Constitution of China, in Art. 90, contains
the statement that "privacy of correspondence is protected by law" (a new Consti-
tution apparently exists but has not yet been made public).
371. See infra note 410 and FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 278, 465 et seq.
(2d ed. 1969).
372. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
373. See, e.g., Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490 (1947), where the Postmaster
General, after a hearing in Washington, D.C., issued a postal fraud order against a
Los Angeles weight-reducing mail enterprise, effectively cutting off all communica-
tions (and money) to it; suit to enjoin its enforcement was brought in California
against the local postmaster; the Postmaster General in Washington claimed he was
an indispensable party, but the Court held to the contrary. Thereafter 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391 (1964) was added in 1962, in effect adopting this rule. But cf. §§ 3005-3006
of the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, supra note 366.
374. E.g., by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate's Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, chaired by Sam J. Ervin, Jr. of North Carolina.
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classed in 1942 with "fighting words," and therefore not entitled to
free speech protections, 75 have since been removed from such gen-
eral classification and are now treated differently.
Libel is ordinarily involved in a personal attack, but a criminal
"group libel" statute may be upheld provided, of course, that no
other defect is present, e.g., vagueness.378 Private libel or criminal
libel suits by public officials or public figures,3 77 however,378 are
subjected to evidentiary requirements based on free press protections,
for example, a
rule that prohibits a public official3 7 9 from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was
375. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942), upholding
conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who got into a fight after calling a policeman a
"goddamned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist," the state law being based on the
common law "fighting words" doctrine. As dictum, Mr. Justice Murphy com-
mented that "[there are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Consti-
tutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well ob-
served that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
But see, discussion below concerning the obscene and libelous aspects as of today.
On the fighting words aspect, see also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969),
remanding because the conviction might have been for stating "[wie don't need no
damn flag."
376. Beaharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). Ordinarily, however, there
is no constitutional prohibition upon a court's granting a libel judgment in a purely
private controversy, nor, when a law made records in a divorce matter secret,
where a newspaper obtained a copy of the divorce papers from the wife and pub-
lished articles based upon allegations in them, certiorari being denied where the
state's judiciary had upheld the suit, News Syndicate Co., Inc. v. Shiles, -U.S. -,
91 S. Ct. 454 (1971), on which see further infra notes 377 et seq.
377. See, e.g., Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), involving two
cases, Greenbelt Cooperative Publ. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970), and
Minitor Patriot Co. v. Sullivan, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 621 (1971).
378. As well as the dismissal of a high school teacher for sending a letter to
a local paper attacking the school board's handling of a bond issue and the alloca-
tion of finances. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and see
supra note 59.
379. In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84, 85 (1966) the Court rejected the
suggestion that this term "should be answered by reference to state-law standards
. . . for the purposes of a national constitutional protection," and then held a re-
sponsible managerial employee of, and directly responsible to, three elected local
county commissioners to be such a public official, i.e., it "applies at the very least
to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the
public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of govern-
mental affairs."
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made with "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard3 8 0 of whether it was false or not.3 8 1
Obscenity: This is a queasy term3 2 and it definition,3 83 applica-
tion, and limitation have occasioned much difficulty.3 8 4  Its judi-
cial peregrinations are of interest as they bear on free speech and
press. The starting point is the historic Puritan strain in the United
380. See Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967), and St. Amant
v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). See also Indianapolis Newspapers Inc. v.
Fields, 400 U.S. 930 (1970), letting a $60,000 judgment stand where articles criti-
cized a sheriff, Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 628 (1971),
and Time, Inc. v. Pape, - U.S.-, 91 S. Ct. 633 (1971).
381. Times, Inc. v. Pape, supra note 380; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The Times
case involved an advertisement, but this was held not to be "commercial" as it was
informational, even though paid for. See also Greenbelt Co-op. Pub. Ass'n v.
Bresler, 396 U.S. 874 (1970), and discussion in Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565
(5th Cir. 1969), as well as: Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Curtis Publ.
Co. v. Butts, and Associated Press v. Walker, decided simultaneously, supra note
377; Arkin & Granquist, Presumption of General Damages in the Law of Constitu-
tional Libel, 1968 COLUM. L. REV. 1482, and Forkosch, Freedom of the Press:
Croswell's Cases, 33 FORD. L. REV. 415 (1965), as well as Kelly, Constitutional
Liberty and the Law of Libel: A Historian's View, 74 AM. HIST. REv. 429 (1968).
Apparently "invented dialogue, imaginary incidents," etc., do not protect a pub-
lisher of a biography of a public sports figure, though a factual portrayal would be.
Spahn v. Messner, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840 (1967), app. dism. 393 U.S.
1046 (1969).
382. For the historical background and development of the English and American
bases for laws and prosecutions see THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY
AND PORNOGRAPHY, notes 369 and 386, containing the Report of the Legal Panel as
Part Three (IV), at 293-369. The federal obscenity statutes are currently found in
18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1465 (1964). See also infra note 385. The first section declares
to be "nonmailable matter [e]very obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile"
item, as well as practically everything connected with abortions; § 1462 seeks to
prevent the importation or the common carrying in interstate or foreign commerce
of all such material, but adds phonograph and other recordings, and § 1465 adds
confiscation; § 1463 rejects for mailing all envelopes, postal cards, etc. having on
their outside covers, etc., any obscene, etc. characters, etc.; and § 1464 fines and/or
imprisons "[w]hoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means
of radio communication ....... See also infra notes 383 and 475.
383. In Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518 (1948) the Court felt that
statutory terms such as "obscene," "lewd," "lascivious," "filthy," "indecent," and
"disgusting," have a "permissible uncertainty;" in Roth v. United States, supra note
369, at 491 the federal statutory terms were "obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy...
or other publication of an indecent character," and the California terms were
"obscene and indecent." These terms were not denounced although both dis-
senting opinions felt otherwise.
384. See, e.g., the "fighting words" aspect as discussed in cases such as: Street
v. New York, supra note 375, at 590-91; Garrison v. Louisiana, supra note 381;
Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra note 376; Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951);
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra
note 375, banning "words likely to cause an average addressee to fight," e.g.,
"damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist" addressed to a city marshall "are likely
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States which has never been eliminated, although it has been limited.
One of its nineteenth century manifestations was the Comstock Act
of 1873.385 The judiciary has been ambivalent, hesitant, and even
inconsistent in this area. It accepts as quasi-politically necessary the
traditional view"s" and yet strives to emerge from this overpowering
chrysalis; the tool it uses for this latter purpose is the first amendment
(and others). Thus the Supreme Court, in 1942, incautiously er-
red as was noted above, 8 7 and in 1957 continued this error by pay-
ing lip service to the past and holding first and generally that ob-
scenity "is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press," and, secondly, attempting to define obscenity in a narrow
to provoke the average person to retaliation." In the light of these cases, a Toledo,
Ohio ordinance outlaws verbal abuse of policemen, e.g., calling them "pigs" or
saying "oink, oink." N.Y. Times, Sep. 20, 1970, at 18, col. 1. Quaere: is this
ordinance constitutionally bad, and, either way, how does it affect a reporter's right
to televise or write? On the difficulties in definition and litigation see, e.g.,
Kuh, A Rational Approach to Pornography Legislation, 37 BKLYN. L. REV. 354
(1971). Withal, one may question whether all this is not much of governmental
(including judicial) sound and fury, and that it is the public which ultimately de-
cides, e.g., in Sweden the complete lifting of all censorship resulted in an initial
splurge until, economically, it just did not pay when the public became surfeited
and revolted; apparently the American motion picture industry is turning from the
glorification of sex for the same reason. N.Y. Times, April 20, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
385. 17 Stat. 598, as now found in 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964) (see also supra
note 369). On the background of Anthony Comstock and his responsibility for the
federal law against obscenity, see dissents by Douglas in Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 650-51 (1968) (where the majority upheld the power of a state to
prohibit the sale of obscene magazines to minors under 17), and in Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 520, n.10 (1961) [see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
in effect rejecting Poe]. See also Slough & McAnany, Obscenity and Constitutional
Freedom, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 449 (1964), also giving descriptions of numerous
analogous groups involving private action and resulting in censorship, direct or
indirect.
The English Obscene Publications Act of 1959 still contains the old definition of
obscenity, i.e., that which has a tendency to deprave or corrupt. For a short dis-
cussion of the statute see Levin, From London, Int'l. Herald Tribune, Aug. 4, 1970,
at 6, col. 6.
386. The latest executive manifestation is President Nixon's further attack of
Oct. 24, 1970 on the report of the COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY
(1970), created by Pub. L. No. 90-100 (Oct. 3, 1967) as amended (which, inter
alia, had recommended the law not interfere with the freedom of adults to obtain
sexual materials), terming them "morally bankrupt conclusions," vowing "there
will be no relaxation in the national effort to control and eliminate smut from our
national life," and urging that "it should be outlawed in every state of the union."
See also infra note 400. The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws, in its final report to the President, also rejected the Commission on Ob-
scenity's recommendation. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
387. Supra note 362.
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manner as "material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to
prurient interest. '3 8
This continued judicial blunder had sought to resolve difficulties
and problems, bring a degree of legal order into a disordered area of
the law, and to resolve conflicting views, but it apparently still per-
mitted governmental control. Furthermore, the language does not
tell us the permissible kind or type of control, or its degree, or if any
particular procedure is required to exercise it. So these problems
are ultimately brought to the Supreme Court, whether or not a legis-
lature first acts.
The opinions shed some light as to the individual and collective
views of the Justices, but it is the decisions which count. Generally
speaking, all of the Justices subscribe to principles of free thought
and no governmental control over the minds of men; but when ex-
ternals are included in this picture a transformation occurs. One
group feels that critical thought cannot occur without the spur of
others' views, be these oral or written, and therefore the free com-
munication of information is vital to man and nation; another group
feels likewise but adds that the political majority opinion can also de-
termine what limits are to be placed upon the information and its
flow. In other words, the Supreme Court's internal disagreement,
regardless of principle, is as to application. The decisions not only
make all this clear but also disclose what has evolved in all the
media of information as permissible and non-permissible areas and
modes of communication, and disclose a continuing judicial cen-
388. Roth v. United States, supra note 369 at 485 and 487 (and see also infra
notes 391 and 392). Although see discussion and limitation of this general lan-
guage by Mr. Justice Marshall in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 560-64 (1969);
see also infra note 402. In Roth the majority opinion quoted from Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, supra note 375 and also from Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra note
376.
It must be further noted that a perversion of Mr. Justice Brennan's language
thereafter occurred. At 484-85 he wrote that "[a]ll ideas having even the slightest re-
deeming social importance" are constitutionally protected "unless excludable because
they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the
history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeem-
ing social importance." It is not that what is "utterly without redeeming social im-
portance" is "obscenity," which in effect is a definition (although itself vague), but
that obscenity, however defined by other criteria, and so labelled and now to be
acted upon, is utterly bereft of redemption, i.e., a conclusory and moralistic state-
ment which each individual may or may not subjectively make for himself. Yet
courts have reversed the language, as just illustrated, e.g. infra notes 377 and 387, us-
ing "utterly without redeeming social value" as one of the required findings.
[Vol. XX: I
1971] FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 109
soring of censorship, with a consequent narrowing of governmental
control.
To illustrate, and not to exhaust, these opinions and decisions,
there must be some degree of scienter proved by the prosecutor be-
fore a bookseller can be convicted of selling obscene literature,8 0
but obscenity should not be equated with sex. While "[a]U ideas
having even the slightest redeeming social importance" are protected,
still, that material which deals with sex in a manners"0 which ap-
peals to prurient interest is obscene, 9' and the initial 1957 test for
389. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 149, 153, 154 (1959). Since this deci-
sion, the Supreme Court has not closed the procedural gap in the proof required to
hold a defendant aware of what he is purveying, although in Mishkin v. New York,
383 U.S. 502 (1966) the Court upheld the conviction where Mishkin was "in some
manner aware of the character of the material" so that the statute struck only at the
"calculated purveyance of filth. . . ." See also infra note 384. Numerous lower
federal and state court decisions in this area are not discussed, although see the
views of Justices Harlan and Stewart in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S.
478 (1962).
390. Some lower courts have felt that the mere depicting of a nude female, and
even with a nude male, so long as no suggestive or erotic poses are assumed, is not
"obscene." In People v. Spicer, 33 A.D.2d 652, 305 N.Y.S.2d 122 (4th Dept. 1969),
an obscenity conviction was reversed in two aspects where several photographs each
showed a nude male, and a book was illustrated by photographs of scantily clothed
females, the court holding these not to be obscene; on the other counts defendant's
conviction was affirmed, and as to these certiorari was denied. Spicer v. New York,
397 U.S. 1042 (1970). See also Excellent Publications, Inc. v. United States, 309
F.2d 362 (1st Cir. 1962); United States v. Baranov, 293 F. Supp. 610 (S.D. Calif.
1968); United States v. 25,000 Magazines, Entitled "Revue," etc., 254 F. Supp.
1014 (D. Md. 1966); United States v. 1,000 Copies of Magazine Entitled "Solis,"
254 F. Supp. 595 (D. Md. 1966); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 128 F. Supp.
564 (D.D.C. 1955), afI'd en banc 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957), then Circuit
Judge Burger not participating. But see, California v. Pincus, 429 F.2d 416 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. granted 400 U.S. 922 (1970) and Keriakos v. Hunt, 400 U.S. 929
(1970), in the first of which the Court affirmed summarily a lower court's ruling
that a "stag" movie showing a woman masturbating was not obscene, and in the
second of which (4-4) let stand a ruling that magazines containing photographs of
women with breasts and pubic hair exposed were not obscene (Douglas not partici-
pating in both decisions). Regardless, in United States v. Unicorn Enterprises,
Inc., -U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 881 (1971), certiorari was granted to determine
whether the erotic Swedish movie, "Language of Love," can be denied entry into
this country, the Second Circuit having said no because, even though the film de-
picts sexual intercourse, masturbation, and the use of contraceptives, it nevertheless
supplies information of social value to married couples. See also notes 319 and
405.
391. Roth v. United States, supra note 369, at 487. In People v. Bloss, 18 Mich.
App. 410, 171 N.W.2d 455 (1969), the defendant was convicted of showing an al-
legedly obscene motion picture. The majority stated that "[flor us to find that
this movie is obscene, we must find that the dominant theme of the movie as a
whole appeals to prurient interest in sex, that it is patently offensive because it goes
beyond contemporary community standards [but see supra note 3791 . . . , and
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determining it was "whether to the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. '3 92  However, because
these terms or standards are vague and subjective, other problems
arise. To illustrate, is the quoted term "prurient interest" a good
standard, and is the "community" which is the touchstone a local or
national one? Seven years later, with the Supreme Court split asun-
der, 93 the first term was approved by two Justices, even though
"not perfect," because "any substitute would raise equally difficult
problems," and the second term was interpreted as national;39 4 the
dissenters now added, "We are told that only 'hard core pornog-
raphy' should be denied the protection of the First Amendment. But
who can define 'hard core pornography' with any greater clarity than
'obscenity'?" To which Justice Stewart responded that while he
couldn't "define the kinds of material. . . embraced within that short-
hand description," still, "I know it when I see it . .. ."
So whatever is judicially determined not to be within the mini-
mum of hard-core pornography is "as much entitled to the protec-
tion of free speech as the best of literature,395 which still leaves
open the application of this concept. 9 ' Thus by 1966 the Fanny
that it is utterly without redeeming social value [but see supra note 388]." Roth,
supra note 369 was cited. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and simultaneously
reversed in a per curiam decision, citing Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967);
Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U.S. 278 (1970).
Thereafter Bloss was again convicted on other charges, the Michigan court stating
it was proposing new standards for deciding whether a violation of the free speech
(and press) guarantees had occurred, as well as a new test to determine what the
distributor's intent was (e.g., to pander, etc.). The reason for these proposals was
"because of what it called the failure of the United States Supreme Court over the
last 13 years to reach agreement on doctrines. . . ." N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1970, at
9, col. 1.
392. Roth v. United States, supra note 369, at 489. Douglas's dissent (Black
concurring) castigated this new (third) standard of obscenity, i.e., the "prurient in-
terest" one. Of course the entire quoted language may be so vague as to violate
the "void for vagueness" rule, on which see FoRKoscH, supra note 371, at 349,
n.45, 419-20.
393. See also quotation in text keyed to infra note 401.
394. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 201 (1964), and see also infra
note 396. The opinion by Brennan (Goldberg) stated that whether a work is ob-
scene "necessarily implicates an issue of constitutional law" which "must ultimately
be decided by this Court." Id. at 188. And he concluded that "this Court cannot
avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the case as to
whether the material involved is constitutionally protected." Id. at 190.
395. Winters v. New York, supra note 383, at 510.
396. For example, Jacobellis, supra note 394, found Brennan writing, with Gold-
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Hill case permitted the open sale of this volume, 39 7 but simultane-
ously it was held that intent (for obscenity) could be proved by
taking into account the textual or graphic advertising material used
to sell the book so that the decision did not turn on the book itself.3 98
In 1967 three more reversals also occurred but seven Juseices wrote
that "[i]n none of these cases was there a claim that the statute in
question reflected a specific and limited state concern for juven-
iles," 39 a judicial hint which the next year was put into a hold-
ing;4"' then the following was written:
Two members of the Court have consistently adhered to the view that a State is
utterly without power to suppress, control, or punish the distribution of any writings
or pictures upon the ground of their 'obscenity.' A third has held to the opinion that
a State's power in this area is narrowly limited to a distinct and clearly identifiable
class of material. Others have subscribed to a not dissimilar standard, holding that a
State may not constitutionally inhibit the distribution of literary materials as obscene
unless '(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient
interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters;
and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value,' emphasizing that the
'three elements must coalesce,' and that no such material can 'be proscribed unless it
is found to be utterly without redeeming social value.' Another Justice has not
viewed the 'social value' element as an independent factor in the judgment of ob-
scenity.4 01
In that case the Justices also commented that in none of the cases
before them "was there any suggestion of an assault upon individual
privacy by publication in a manner so obtrusive as to make it im-
berg joining, but the latter also concurred in a separate opinion; Black (Douglas)
concurred separately, as did Stewart for himself; White concurred in the reversal
without opinion; this made six Justices. Warren (Clark) dissented in an opinion, as
separately did Harlan. The same day, in two other cases, White switched to the
dissenters in voting to deny certiorari, while the others, referring to their Jacobellis
views, voted to grant and simultaneously reversed. Tralins v. Gerstein, 378 U.S.
576 (1964), and Grove Press v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 577 (1924).
397. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
398. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), a 5-4 decision. See also
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966), also sustaining a New York conviction
under an obscenity statute.
399. Redrup v. New York, supra note 391, at 769.
400. Ginsberg v. New York, supra note 385, at 631, upholding statutory pro-
hibition of "sale to minors under 17 years of age of material defined to be obscene
on the basis of its appeal to them whether or not it would be obscene to adults."
In March, 1969, sixteen Senators sponsored federal legislation making it a crime to
sell and mail obscene books and other material to those under 18. See also supra
note 386.
401. Redrup v. New York, supra note 391, at 770-71, italics in original, citations
omitted, although compare this analysis with that of this writer in supra note 398
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX: 1
possible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it," and then
concluded, "And in none was there evidence of the sort of 'pandering'
which the Court found significant in" the 1966 Ginzburg case. In
other words, the Court set forth three areas in which, impliedly, gov-
ernmental control might be upheld; the "might" became "could" in
the first, namely, juveniles, so that the other two areas apparently
are the only (?) ones in which censorship may be upheld.
Since the preceding divisions and opinions occurred the Court has
decided several other cases, but the disagreements continue. How-
ever, there now also appears to be a consensus that private and public
obscenity should be constitutionally, and therefore governmentally,
distinguished, i.e., the former involves the right to privacy and is
therefore none of the government's business, so that it lacks power to
control in this nonpublic area. To illustrate, mere private possession
of obscene material in one's home cannot be made a crime,4 °2 nor,
if first class mail is likewise an extension of one's personality and
privacy, can there be governmental censorship by forbidding the use
of the mails to consenting adults to send and to receive obscene mat-
ter.40 However, where the public is involved, then a below-17 and
The text quotation next following is at 769. In the Ginsberg (and companion)
case, supra note 400, Harlan's separate opinion included n.1, that "Bin the following
13 obscenity cases from the date Roth was decided, in which signed opinions were
written for a decision or judgment of the Court, there has been a total of 55 sep-
arate opinions among the Justices." Id. at 704, giving the cases. Since 1967 there
have been two changes in the composition of the Court, with undoubtedly more to
come. Quaere: what now, brown cow?
402. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), although at 568, n.ll, Marshall
concedes governmental power "to make possession of other items, such as narcotics,
firearms, or stolen goods, a crime." However, is not "narcotics" required to be
defined? And may not the second amendment conceivably enter as to firearms?
The Justice then adds this significant paragraph: "Nor do we mean to express any
opinion on statutes making criminal possession of other types of printed, filmed, or
recorded materials. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 793(d), which makes criminal the other-
wise lawful possession of materials which 'the possessor has reason to believe could
be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign na-
tion'. . . . In such cases, compelling reasons may exist for overriding the right of
the individual to possess those materials."
403. This is a lower court decision which, in principle, follows on the assumption
so made, i.e., Dellapia v. United States, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1970), where porno-
graphic films were sent via the mail by one private person to another private
person for private use; a conviction under the century-old Comstock Act (see supra
note 371) was reversed; the court's opinion stated, inter alia: "The most fundamen-
tal premise of our constitutional scheme may be that every adult bears the freedom to
nurture or neglect his own moral and intellectual growth." And also, "We are
concerned with Dellapia's privacy, not merely for its own sake, but because this
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17-and-over classification apparently permits outright control of the
sale of obscene items to the former and some control over the latter.
In other words, of the three areas in which governmental control
may be exercised the minor one is permitted; as to adults, no pan-
dering is to be allowed, and, finally, the right of privacy is to be re-
spected. It is this last concept, constitutionally apotheosized in 1965,
which appears to be the new basis for and standard involved in de-
termining whether or not material is to be subjected to governmental
control, e.g., advertisements, movies, etc. should not do violence to, i.e.
overbalance, one's sense of privacy (although, of course, this, too,
involves a case-by-case analysis of the particular facts and situa-
tions just as before, with the only difference now being that the sub-
jective evaluation is fitted into a better objective framework of
[commercial] exploitation) .404
Thus governmental control is based upon judicial agreement (a)
on what is obscene, (b) that obscenity is subject to governmental
power, (c) that such power in turn must take into account and at
times be subordinated to constitutional rights (today the right to pri-
vacy?), and (d) that the exercise of the power through methods of
control requires these methods also to be reasonable, i.e., constitu-
tional in accordance with need, due process, etc. All of these aspects
of permissible censorship are relative variables, i.e., reversals occur
depending not only on the facts and circumstances but also on the
changing views and policies (values?) of sitting Justices or those of
incoming ones.405 For example, Justice Black's (and Douglas's)
kind of prosecution bristles with hazards to free speech." See also supra note 268,
and the commercial aspects of § 3006 of the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970.
404. The minor aspect is at supra note 400; the pandering one is at supra note
398; the privacy aspect is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (and see
also supra note 180); the balancing aspect is discussed in text and supra notes 208
et seq.; further on the privacy aspect see supra note 268, and references therein.
But cf. the two latest cases, supra note 390. Respectively, supra notes 400 and 398,
and on whether the court will hereafter tolerate the type of public movie adver-
tising (see, e.g., supra note 398) discussed in note 405, infra, is questionable in the
light of the analysis there given and the Burger court's jelling practice of dis-
tinguishing new cases from old, e.g., Wyman v. James, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 381
(1971), Harris v. New York, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 643 (1971), and also cases in
infra note 405. Analogically, the Ginzburg case, supra note 398, may be used here,
even though that involved books, with the supplemental advertising material now
being added and included in the determination whether this "book" was now to be
denounced.
405. As of this writing the Supreme Court should decide whether the erotic
Swedish film, "I Am Curious (Yellow)," can be banned in Boston from being
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views have changed from a somewhat grudging use of the clear and
present danger test to its rejection and the espousal of an absolute
right to publish, without any censorship, in this area,406 whereas Chief
Justice Burger's and Justice Blackmun's view is not only opposed to
such absolutism, but goes to the extent of permitting localities to de-
termine for themselves what is obscene and what to prevent. This
latter view is disclosed in the Chief Justice's language:
In my view we should not inflexibly deny to each of the States the power to adopt
and enforce its own standards as to obscenity and pornographic materials; States
ought to be free to deal with varying conditions and problems in this area. I am un-
willing to say that Kentucky is without power to bar public showing of this film.
• • 407
On procedures, other problems arise, e.g., scienter, as previously
mentioned. These problems involve the government's efforts to
evolve procedures consistent with the language and decisions of the
Court, and also procedures approved or suggested by that body.
For example,
shown in a movie house. (See supra note 390). The lower court felt that if Stanley
(supra note 402) could view pornographic films at home, then any adult had a
like right to see this one where it was not advertised in any pandering manner,
the theatre was policed so that no minor could enter, and no patron could be taken
unaware and his sensibilities offended. Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363
(D. Mass. 1969), prob. juris. noted, 397 U.S. 985 (1970), after argument restored to
calendar for reargument, 399 U.S. 922 (1970).
406. See, e.g., supra notes 209-14, 218, 390, and also Mr. Justice Harlan's lan-
guage in his Ginsberg dissent, supra note 400 at 705-06 that "[tiwo members of the
Court steadfastly maintain that the First and Fourteenth Amendments render society
powerless to protect itself against the dissemination of even the filthiest materials
[referring to cases which disclose these to be Black and Douglas]. No other mem-
ber of the Court, past or present, has ever stated his acceptance of that point of
view. But there is among the present members of the Court a sharp divergency
as to the proper application of the standards . . . for judging whether given material
is constitutionally protected or unprotected." Id. at 705-06. (See also the dissents by
Douglas and Black in Byrne v. Karalexis, 396 U.S. 976 (1969), where a stay was
granted by the majority, and on this case see supra note 405). As to this Harlan
comment, Douglas replied (Id. at 653, n.4) that it was only in Roth, supra note 369,
that the question "was only 'squarely presented' to this Court for the first time in
1957."
407. See the former's dissent in Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319 (1970), and
the latter's dissent in Hoyt v. Minnesota, 398 U.S. 524 (1970), concurred in by the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Harlan. See further the latter's dissenting remarks in
the Cain case. This local view may be contrasted to that in Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra
note 394. See also the Chief Justice's like views in his dissent in Walker v. Ohio,
398 U.S. 434 (1970). The text quotation is from Cain v. Kentucky at 319.
The social and psychological "case" against pornography and obscenity has been
made by Kristol, Pornography, Obscenity and the Case for Censorship, N.Y. Times
Mag., March 28, 1971, at 24, although subsequent "Letters to the Editor" disclosed
loopholes factually and logically.
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[olur decisions furnish examples of legal devices and doctrines in most applications
consistent with the Constitution, which cannot be applied in settings where they have
the collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of expression, by making the indi-
vidual the more reluctant to exercise it. The States generally may regulate the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof in their courts, and it is a common procedural device to
impose on a taxpayer the burden of proving his entitlement to exemptions from tax-
ation, but where we conceived that this device was being applied in a manner tending
to cause even a self-imposed restriction of free expression, we struck down its appli-
cation. 40
8
One instance of such a striking down of an unique method occurred
in 1963. The Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in
Youth compiled lists of objectionable publications and circulated
these to the publishers involved as well as to the local police, and in a
cover letter to the former reminded them of the Commission's statu-
tory duty to recommend to the State Attorney General the prosecu-
tion of the purveyors of these listed items. The publishers sued to
prevent this listing and the Commission now argued that "it does not
regulate or suppress obscenity but simply exhorts booksellers and
advises them of their legal rights." The Supreme Court rejected
this, its language being pertinent as to procedures:
But though the Commission is limited to informal sanctions-the threat of invok-
ing legal sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation-the
record amply demonstrates that the Commission deliberately set about to achieve the
suppression of publications deemed 'objectionable' and succeeded in its aim. We are
not the first court to look through forms to the substance and recognize that informal
censorship may sufficiently inhibit the circulation of publications to warrant in-
junctive relief. 4 0 9
Or, from a different aspect, in 1969 the entire Court concurred in
reversing a Georgia conviction, but three Justices disagreed on mak-
ing it a first amendment case; they felt the matter should be decided
as a straight fourth amendment unreasonable search and seizure one,
i.e., the warrant's particular description had been violated and so the
seized (obscene) items should have been suppressed.41 0 States may,
however, use a "limited injunctive remedy" to prevent the distribution
408. Smith v. California, supra note 389, at 150-51, per Brennan.
409. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963).
410. Stanley v. Georgia, supra note 402, at 369-70. See also reversals of
seizures of alleged obscene material under ex parte orders. Marcus v. Search War-
rant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205
(1964). The first and fourth amendments are interrelated, Stanford v. Texas,
379 U.S. 476 (1965), holding warrant for books alleged to violate state's anti-
subversion law invalid as not particularly descriptive of things to be seized.
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of items when, after due notice and trial, the material is first held to
be obscene.4"
Motion pictures: The judicial standards applied to motion pic-
tures differ slightly from the preceding but they also come under free
speech and press claims, e.g., standards such as "sacrilegious" and
"immoral" are rejected and denial of a license to permit showing of
a picture on the ground that it is "not suitable for young persons" is
impermissible.112 However, the statutory requirement that a film be
submitted for examination and licensing before showing, without
anything more, is not illegal4 18 although fear that personal biases or
prejudices, may be inserted into the examining and licensing proce-
dures caused the Supreme Court to caution that
a noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids
constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed
to obviate the dangers of a censorship system. First, the burden of proving that the
film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor. . . . Second, while the State
may require advance submission of all films . . . [this] requirement cannot be ad-
ministered in a manner which would lend an effect of finality to the censor's de-
termination . . . [so that] within a specified brief period, [the censor must] ei-
ther issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film. . . . [Tihe procedure
must also assure a prompt final judicial decision, to minimize the deterrent effect of
an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license. 414
Broadcasting: As will shortly be discussed, broadcasting is sub-
ject initially to licensing requirements but afterwards the broadcasters
are entitled to first amendment freedoms, subject, however, to cer-
tain requirements, such as fairness41 and equal time. Thus a degree
411. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
412. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); and also Inter-
state Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); and Kingsley Pictures
Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
413. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), where the distributor
refused to produce the film and claimed any and all licensing was bad, the Court
rejecting this claim of absolute right to show even though subject to later prosecu-
tion. See also supra note 292, concerning the use of a license for obvious and
admitted reasons of control.
414. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965). In Teitel Film Corp.
v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968), a modified Chicago licensing ordinance required
seven steps of up to 50-57 days before the Appeals Board was required to seek a
court injunction, and this was held to be far too long a period. In Interstate Circuit
v. Dallas, supra note 412, at n. 22, a nine-day hiatus between the Board's classifica-
tion and a judicial determination was upheld; the ordinance, however, was rejected
as too vague and not sufficiently narrow in scope.
415. See, e.g., on the "fairness doctrine," discussion in text keyed to infra
notes 486 et seq., referring to Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
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of control exists; in addition, when the medium's use is abused lia-
bility also attaches.416
Court proceedings-in general: All judicial proceedings are not
necessarily open to the public. For reporters or news gatherers, this
is a souce and form of censorship. To illustrate, the deliberations of
a jury, the discussions of judges in chambers, and even certain kinds of
trials are closed, e.g., when infants are involved in a variety of sex or
matrimonial types of proceedings. 416 a This is accepted by the public
although the press and others resent the strictness sometimes imposed
and seek to circumvent the restrictions. At times the publicity, in-
formation, and methods used are too much for the system to bear, and
prejudice results to a person (see next on contempts). There is,
however, another aspect or coin-face to all of this, namely, the use
of a trial to publicize, bring information to, and educate the people.
To illustrate this last aspect, thirteen Black Panthers were tried in
New York City during the fall of 1970, accused of plotting to kill
policemen and to bomb buildings; in their opening speeches to the
jury all argued that their party was on trial and, by bringing in proof
of this they sought to "use the trial for their own political purposes
* . .; they will use it to 'educate the people' about oppression by
whites and liberation by blacks." 4" To the degree that the judge
presiding at the trial rejects such evidence, quaere: is he censoring
not only the defendants but also information which otherwise might
not be available to the news gatherers and to the public?
Contempts and subpoenas-the right to a fair trial: Contempts
by persons may involve one or more of the three departments of gov-
416. In a libel suit the problem is whether a station is absolutely liable, or
whether it must also be at fault, where a speaker broadcasting libels another. See,
on this, Farmer's Educational v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959), in/ra note 484
and text keyed to it.
416a. Courts cannot, under most circumstances, "suppress, edit or censor from
the public" events occurring in open court proceedings. Chicago Tribune, April 9,
1971, at 3, col. 1.
417. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1970, at 53, col. 1, and Oct. 25, 1970, § E at 8, col. 3,
two news analyses by L. Oelsner. Insofar as deliberate disorder is present at a crim-
inal trial, interferes with it, and must be controlled, even the parties are not im-
mune to judicial methods such as removal from the courtroom, on which see
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). See also infra notes 438 et seq., especially
infra note 449. The Court has granted certiorari in Johnson v. Mississippi, - U.S.
-, 91 S. Ct. 464 (1971), where a black civil rights worker was sentenced to four
months in prison by a state judge two years after Johnson had exchanged words in
court with a bailiff. See, on this, infra note 447.
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ernment,418 and in all of these collisions the free speech and press
guarantees enter.41 At some point the judiciary ordinarily enters,
although if one refuses to obey a duly issued subpoena to appear be-
fore a congressional committee or subcommittee he may later be held
in contempt by the full body and summarily detained by that
body. 420 That recusant witness does not, of course, lose his consti-
tutional right to invoke the fifth amendment when he does eventually
so appear, i.e., he may refuse to answer on self-incrimination
grounds;421 nor does he lose any other right to object to the jurisdic-
tion of the committee,422 but he does subject himself to a proceeding
under the appropriate statute4 21 if he refuses to answer after a direc-
tion so to do; this results in an indictment by a grand jury and a trial.
Thus reporters, teachers, governmental and private employees, to
mention but these, are amenable to a variety of pressures by the gov-
ernment, whether through or under legislative investigations, loyalty
or security oats, or otherwise, and insofar as the flow of informa-
tion, from inception to distribution and receipt, is hindered, the na-
tion also suffers. Even the threat of such procedures may have a
418. See, e.g., discussion in FORKOSCH, supra note 371, at § 112 and also
§§ 151-159.
419. E.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
420. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927), and also supra note 37.
421. For a statutory grant of immunity, thereby permitting a recusant witness
to be punished for contempt, see FoRuoscH, supra note 371, at §§ 340 and 425, and
18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1964), as well as Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959). For one
recent such grant see the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention & Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513 (October 27, 1970), which, in § 514(a) permits the
"person presiding over the proceeding" to direct a witness claiming the privilege
against self-incrimination to answer, but "no testimony or other information
compelled under the order issued . . . may be used against the witness" etc. An-
other illustration is found in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, P.L. 91-452,
84 Stat. 922, which, in its Title II on "General Immunity," adds a new "Part V-
Immunity of Witnesses," to 18 U.S.C. as §§ 6001-05. The advance grant of im-
munity has been successfully challenged, In re Kinoy Testimony, - F. Supp. -
(S.D. N.Y. 1971), 39 L.W. 2427, where a federal grand jury sought to elicit in-
formation from petitioner as to her knowledge of the whereabouts of a fugitive, the
defect alleged to be a statutory failure to furnish the full Fifth Amendment pro-
tection from self-incrimination. The legislative history of the Act in U.S. Code &
Adm. News, 1970, adv. pamph. #12, 4705, at 4706, states that "Title II is a general
federal immunity statute that will afford 'use' immunity rather than 'transaction'
immunity ...... The court held "that transactional immunity is constitutionally
required as between the questioning sovereign and the witness . .. ."
422. See, on all this, FoRKOSCH, supra note 371, at 174-81, and also infra note
424.
423. The statute is given in FoRKosCH, supra note 371, at 180, and is found in
2 U.S.C. § 192 (1964).
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chilling effect upon the exercise of this constitutional right.424
Contempt by an individual collector, transporter, or disseminator
of information, e.g., a reporter, may also be tied in with the separate
institutional publication or dissemination of the material so collected
and edited. 25 The two aspects, however, that is, contempt by a re-
porter, and contempt by a paper, are not necessarily treated identi-
cally. Although this contempt power has been legislatively42 and ju-
dicially" 7 limited and circumscribed since the Judiciary Act of 1789
first granted it to the federal courts,42 it still exists, subject, how-
ever, to today's application of the clear and present danger test.42
For example, the causal connection and the deleterious effect would
have to be clear and grave to uphold a conviction; thus editorials pub-
lished on election day urging people to vote as suggested, cannot be
made into a threat to interfere, or be an actual interference, with elec-
tions.43° Thus the possible and proper exercise of a court's43' sum-
mary432 contempt 433 power is a psychological and extremely practi-
424. See text and supra notes 194 et seq., on the chilling effect aspect. See also
supra note 354, on one of the latest manifestations via a "list" which is publicized.
The district judge in the Hentoff case also commented that the committee report
"is without any proper legislative purpose and infringes on the rights of the in-
dividuals named therein." Also, that the report intended "to inhibit further speech
on college campuses by those listed individuals and others whose political persuasion
is not in accord with that of members of the committee." See further supra notes
40, 63, 81, 287, 323, 347, 455, 499, and 556.
425. See, e.g., the imposing of a fine in a labor matter upon not only the agent
but also the principal, that is, here not only upon the individual but, where the
publication is so involved, upon it, as in the three Lewis-UMW contempt cases, on
which see FoRKoSCH, LABOR LAW 401-03 (2d ed. 1965).
426. Beginning with the 1831 restriction on the contempt power where the
conduct did not obstruct the physical administration of justice. See Act of March 2,
1831, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1948).
427. See, e.g., Black's dissenting language in Green v. United States, 356 U.S.
165, 203 (1958), referring to the "baleful influence" of early English cases, and
see also supra notes 354 and 424.
428. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20 § 17, 1 Stat. 73.
429. See infra note 446, and supra notes 200-209 for discussions.
430. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966), denouncing such a state law and
therefore, pari passu, any court direction along the same lines.
431. The contempt power is found exercised in every federal and state court in
the United States.
432. As distinguished from a plenary proceeding, where a jury may ordinarily be
demanded, and the regular and usual court procedures are invoked. See Bloom v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 47-50 (1941); and
FoRKoSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 131-34 (2d ed. 1969). Insofar as this paper is
concerned, however, the difference is here immaterial. In a contempt proceeding
where a (trial) judge is contemned, he may summarily and instantly impose such a
finding and sentence (or, as in Sacher, infra note 439), but if he waits until the
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cal hindrance upon the flow of information. So, too, with respect to
the subsequent publication or other dissemination of the informa-
tion. 4' For example, in England "there is a definite relation be-
tween legal doctrines of contempt, and the status of the press' lib-
erty-a relationship which the cases will show severely subjects En-
glish journalistic freedom to the majesty of the court's control of the
administration of justice."4"' Fortunately, what is still true for Eng-
land has long since been rejected in the United States.
There are generally two substantive evils sought to be averted, and
concerning which arguments are made to sustain the use of the con-
tempt power, namely, "disrespect for the judiciary; and disorderly
and unfair administration of justice."43  The political and ideologi-
cal basis for this latter argument is that the very fabric of our de-
mocracy is permeated with the concept of procedural due process,
4 37
and that this principle rests upon and requires fair and full public4 38
conclusion (of the trial) he must let another judge preside over the contempt
proceeding. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 499 (1971).
433. Here the contempt discussed is civil; in a criminal contempt, and on the
question of a right to a jury trial, see Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391
U.S. 216 (1968), no right where such criminal contempt was a "petty offense"
under the state's law, and Bloom v. Illinois, supra note 432, right upheld where a
serious offense was involved, the imprisonment being for 24 months.
434. See the state judge's order prohibiting those involved in the grand jury's
investigation into the violence at Kent State University in May, 1970 (in which four
students were killed) from making public statements or from criticizing that
body's report; this report exonerated the National Guard for the killings and indicted
25 other persons, even though conflicting with the findings of the President's Com-
mission on Campus Unrest and those of the F.B.I. Thereafter one of the three spe-
cial prosecutors, and one witness, violated the injunction as to silence and both
were held in contempt (as of this writing appeals are pending). A federal district
judge, however, overruled this judicial direction of secrecy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4,
1970, at 53, col. 7, because the order was "overly broad" in that the report had
raised "social, political, and moral questions" meriting public debate and "now is
the time that it [a rebuttal] must be permitted."
It may be noted that while the information media gave Kent State super-duper
coverage, and a volume has just appeared on it, ESZTERHAs and ROBERTS, 13 SECONDS
(1970), two years earlier the media had either ignored or been propaganda-washed
in "The Orangeburg Massacre" at South Carolina State College in which three
young men were killed by the state police. See NELSON and BAss, THE ORANGEBtrRG
MASSACRE (1970).
435. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 79 (1963). This book gives an excel-
lent historic account of the contempt power and its various manifestations.
436. Bridges v. California, supra note 419, at 270.
437. See Forkosch, American Democracy and Procedural Due Process, 24
BROOKLYN L. REV. 173 (1958).
438. This term is still not completely understood or applied. It is found in the
sixth amendment's guarantee "to a speedy and public trial," but the details are still
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hearings in a court439 with all that is implied and required as a con-
comitant of an impartial trial. Thus, to illustrate and to give a flavor
of what is involved, a verdict based upon domination by a mob, with
a consequent actual interference with justice, is denounced,440 as is a
condition involving a biased judge,44' misrepresentations by a prose-
cutor to an accused who is without counsel,442 or when a prosecutor
knowingly uses perjured testimony or deliberately suppresses evidence
to impeach it.443 This due process concept of justice is therefore
brought into conflict with, e.g., a televising or broadcasting of the
proceedings, regardless of the absence of a showing by the defendant
of resulting prejudice, 444 or when there is so much and massive pub-
being forged in the judicial workshop. For example, in a federal prosecution under
the Mann Act (transporting a woman across state lines for immoral purposes) the
trial judge cleared the courtroom of every one except the accused, the lawyers, ju-
rors, witnesses, and the press; this was reversed. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d
919 (3d Cir. 1949). See also Estes v. Texas and Sheppard v. Maxwell, infra notes
444 and 445, which in effect held the trials to be too public.
439. The judicial power may be exercised when the contempt is committed in
the presence of the court, e.g., summary finding punishment, Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S.
155 (1949); or the punishment held to the end, Sacher v. United States, 343
U.S. 1 (1952); or in the immediate vicinity of the court or courthouse and so near
as to be causally connected; In re Independent Pub. Co., 228 F. 787, 789 (D.C. Mont.
1915) (probably not to be followed today in the light of Nye v. United States, infra
this note, and Bridges v. California, infra note 426), although a conviction for dis-
turbing the peace was overturned where a civil rights demonstrator picketed a court-
house and obstructed public passages, five Justices inveighing against such conduct in
front of the building. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965) (the first
of two Cox cases). For a discussion of the federal statutes, and the aspects of
proximity, see Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 48-50 (1941), and see also May-
berry v. Pennsylvania, supra note 432 on summary contempt limitations.
Since, in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-4 (1970), the Court expressly set
forth "at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an
obstreperous defendant [or others, e.g., counsel, but, of course, in a non-defendant
aspect] .. .," one of them being to "cite him for contempt," it thus, in the light
of the preceding cases, authorized a summary and immediate citing of a party or
his lawyer, holding either or both in contempt (as well as witnesses, spectators,
and others), and yet withholding punishment until the end of the trial, the degree
of such punishment to be subject to the future actions and conduct of the person-
is this a prior censorship of and a way of having a chilling effect upon the person's
free speech, effective counsel, and fair trial rights?
440. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915).
441. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v.
Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), setting aside an arbitration award.
442. Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
443. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28
(1957); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); United States v. Soblen, 203 F.
Supp. 542, 562-67 (S.D. N.Y. 1961), giving summary of cases in this area.
444. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), and see also Skinner, Constitutional
Aspects of Television in the Courtroom, 35 U. oF CiN. L. REv. 48 (1966); and
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licity through the press or other media that "inherently prejudicial
publicity . . . saturate[s] the community" and thereby deprives the
defendant of his constitutional rights.445 In so deciding, i.e., whether
the publication of information is detrimental to the administration of
justice, the courts have today rejected the likely tendency test and use
the clear and present danger one.4 4  And when spectators,440 a partici-
pants, parties, witnesses, or lawyers447 indulge in conduct deemed
Mishkin, The Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56, 146 (1965); and
Comment, The New Star Chamber-TV in the Courtroom, 32 S. CAL. L. REv. 281
(1959).
445. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); and Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717 (1961). See Attorney General's Statement of Policy, 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (1965).
See, for additional comments and views, Notes, 51 CORNELL L. QTLY. 306 (1966);
33 U. Cm. L. REv. 512 (1966); 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 281 (1965); 35 TEMPLE L.
QTLY. 412 (1962); 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 217 (1962); 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1278 (1959).
See, further, the situation in the federal district court in Brooklyn, N.Y., where a
mistrial was declared because five jurors admitted disobeying the court's instructions
not to read or listen to news accounts of the criminal trial, with two saying their
judgments might be affected by the news that the defendant's father had been pub-
licized, in connection with the instant trial, as a reputed Brooklyn boss of organized
crime, and as being a criminal himself. The judge noted he had urged newsmen not
to report the trial proceedings until after the verdict but acknowledged he had no
authority to compel them so to refrain. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1970, at 54, col. 4.
And, in this vein, how to evaluate the effect of President Nixon's pre-trial com-
ments, summed up by the following at his news conference, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11,
1970, at 32, col. 4: "Q. Mr. President, at a previous news conference you said that
what happened at Mylai was a massacre. On another occasion, you said that
Charles Manson is guilty. On another occasion you mentioned Angela Davis by
name and then said that those responsible for such acts of terror will be brought to
justice. My question concerns the problem of pretrial publicity and the fact that it
could jeopardize a defendant's rights at a trial. How do you reconcile your com-
ments with your status as a lawyer? A. I think that's a legitimate criticism.
I think sometimes we lawyers, even like doctors who try to prescribe for themselves,
may make mistakes. And I think that kind of comment probably is unjustified."
446. Respectively: Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907) (see also supra
note 245), Holmes writing for the Court with two Justices dissenting; Bridges v.
California, supra note 419.
446a. A news reporter is a spectator just as is every other non-participant in a
trial. Since "conduct" which is deemed harmful may include action other than
shouting, etc., a reporter can easily be caught in a web not of his own making, be
summarily proceeded against, and the suppression of news initiated at the source of
the medium's coverage. See, e.g., In re Katz v. Murtagh, - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.
2d - (1971); N.Y. Law Journal, April 13, 1971, at 1, col. 4; N.Y. Times, April 14,
1971, at 57, col. 4, upholding an immediate contempt sentence of 30 days in jail
when a spectator disregarded the trial judge's warning not to create a disturbance
during a pre-trial hearing in the case against the 13 Black Panthers accused of a
conspiracy to bomb public places (this was the third such spectator contempt cita-
tion during the pre-trial hearings, and the second jail sentence; since the trial be-
gan, one spectator and one defense lawyer have been so cited).
447. On lawyers, see, e.g., Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952), an out-
growth of the Dennis trials, supra note 314 as is the attempted disbarment in In re
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harmful and detrimental to these fair procedures, then they can be
proceeded against by means of not only contempt citations44 but also
by refusing them admittance, fining them, physically restraining a de-
fendant,44 9 or even imprisonment.
A reporter or news gatherer can thus be subjected to a variety of
limitations in his right to obtain information. One of the most oner-
ous inhibitions upon the information process involves the protection
of a reporter's sources of information where his refusal to divulge
them to the court or government leads to a contempt citation. The
reporter may, for example, be called before a grand jury, or be sub-
poenaed to appear as a witness in a court trial or before a legislative
committee during a hearing, and then, in response to a query as to
who told him what, or where and how he obtained the information,
refuses to answer on a claim of reporter's privilege, i.e., that found
in his occupational function under the freedoms of the first amend-
ment. In effect he urges that without such a privilege the sources of
information dry up and disappear, and not only he but society and the
nation suffer. These, and other, claims are sufficiently cogent to have
the privilege recognized by statute in fifteen states, e.g., California,
New York,45° but there is no such common law privilege, and nei-
Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953), upholding, and then denying in rehearing, 348
U.S. 1 (1954) (other cases not required here). See also Cooke v. United States,
267 U.S. 517 (1925); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
The latest publicized incidents of lawyers being so punished involve the trials of
the "Chicago Seven," wherein the defendants were found guilty by a jury of some of
the charges and, as of this writing, appeals are pending for these convictions and
also from the contempts and jail sentences and fines imposed upon all parties, in-
cluding the attorneys for the defendants. See, for transcript of contempt citations,
CONTEMPT (1970). See also notes 446a and 448 on trials.
448. See supra note 417, on the Johnson case, which raises the question
whether the same judge before whom a contempt is committed can later on decide
the matter in a proceeding other than one immediately instituted before him; if the
Court answers all the questions posed in this case it may, practically, decide the
Chicago 7's (see supra note 417) pending appeal in the (holdings and) punish-
ments imposed by the trial judge. See, e.g., separate contempt jailings for refusing
to answer questions after taking the stand, Yates v. United States, 227 F.2d 851
(9th Cir. 1955), continuing into 356 U.S. 363 (1958), upholding one contempt re-
duced to seven months already served.
449. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, supra note 417, a confrontation case, strongly
suggesting that shackling is to be avoided. See also supra note 417.
450. Application of Howard, 136 Cal. App. 2d 816, 289 P.2d 537 (1955), the
first such law, and see also the exceedingly broad New York Civil Rights Law,
§ 79-h, eff. May 12, 1970, preventing the news gatherer from being held in contempt
"for refusing or failing to disclose any news or the source. . . ." The other states
are: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michi-
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ther the federal government nor the vast majority of states recognize
it,451 nor has it yet been raised to a constitutional level-which, on
the basis of not only the individual's such right but also the public's
right to know, and for the public interest, may justify the Supreme
Court in so holding (with, perhaps, some slight limitation or condi-
tion precedent). Nevertheless, a reporter is today confronted by a
Hobson's Choice 411 which, unfortunately, is not one involving two
legally or judicially punitive alternatives; 453 he must choose between
a personally imposed and a legally imposed alternative, which so far
has prevented the other dilemma from arising. Thus many instances
of contempt are found, 454 and the chilling effect upon the constitu-
tional (exercise of the) freedom of the press is simple to see, e.g.,
during the election year of 1970 the government seemed to have
mounted a general and concerted attack upon all media by invoking
the subpoena process as a censoring device.4 5
The preceding may be illustrated by reference to one of the cases
cited. In 1957, Judy Garland, the actress, sued in libel because a re-
porter for the New York Herald Tribune had quoted defamatory
statements from an unidentified television broadcasting station execu-
gan, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington (on Kentucky see
infra note 457, last paragraph). See also notes 63a, 81, 287, 323, 424, 451-55, 471,
487, 499, 556.
451. Legislation has been proposed in many states and federally, e.g., S. 3552 and
H.R. 16328, companion bills introduced in 1970, granting newsmen a federal privi-
lege to refuse disclosure of confidential information acquired during their news
gathering, and of their courses. There are several exceptions, not here material.
Bills were also introduced in 1971.
The report of the Freedom of Information Committee of the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, presented at the Society's 1971 convention, included the state-
ment that "The weapon most used against freedom this year was the subpoena.
Its use has reached epidemic proportions." It castigated "Lazy law-enforcement
types [who] used the subpoena to try to force the press to do their investigating,"
and supported legislation to protect the media and others. See also notes 81 and 455.
452. See, for a discussion and case citations, FORKOSCH, supra note 432 at
424-25 (2d ed. 1969).
453. See, e.g., FoRKOSCH, supra note 432, at 288, n.18, and cases cited illustrating
this Hobson's choice.
454. E.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. den. 358 U.S.
910 (1958), Frankfurter and Stewart not participating, Douglas dissenting and de-
siring to grant certiorari; In re Goodfader, 45 H. 317 (1961); but see Taylor &
Selby Appeals, 412 Pa. 32 (1963). 8 WIGMORE § 2286 (3d ed. 1940) goes into the
subject at length, and see also Carter, The Journalist, His Information and Testi-
monial Privilege, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1111 (1969).
455. See, e.g., Caldwell, infra note 457 and also a few references in N.Y. Times
to some other subpoenas served on other media: Feb. 1, 1970, at 24, col. I (Time,
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tive. The reporter refused, under subpoena, to disclose the source
and was held in criminal contempt and sentenced to ten days in jail,
the judge stating, "I rule as a matter of law that [your claim of
privilege] is a position" that "has no legal support." The news-
paper's response, in an editorial, was that regardless of the fundamen-
tal question whether a reporter can be so jailed, "[tihe still bigger
question involved is whether the First Amendment guaranteeing the
freedom of the press to print all the news it can gather also protects
the right of reporters to gather the news." Unfortunately, the inter-
mediate appellate federal court upheld the reporter's conviction and in
its opinion (by then Circuit Judge Stewart, now elevated to the Su-
preme Court) accepted "the hypothesis that compulsory disclosures of
a journalist's confidential sources of information may entail an
abridgement of press freedom by imposing some limitation upon
the availability of news." In other words, the judge conceded
a first amendment impairment which, under the absolutistic in-
terpretation of Justice Black,4 " would have automatically reversed
the jail sentence. But, continued Judge Stewart, this "[f]reedom
Life, and Newsweek Magazines subpoenaed for unedited files and unused pictures
concerning Weathermen faction of SDS-Time and Life complied; Newsweek was
seeking an accommodation. See, Adelson, Have the News Media Become Too Big
to Fight?, SAT. REv., March 14, 1970, at 106); Feb. 10, 1970, at 24, col. 4
(Fortune Magazine subpoenaed to produce materials relating to interview with a
business tycoon); Feb. 22, 1970, at 74, col. 3 (Justice Department phones C.B.S.
news reporter to testify before grand jury on Black Panthers in Harlem); April 28,
1970, at 25, col. 2 (reporters subpoenaed in prosecution of 15 persons charged with
destroying Selective Service records); June 6, 1970, at 20, col. 3 (the Justice
Department and the F.B.I. requested from N.B.C. permission to interview a film
crew which had shot pictures of a draft record destroyed).
The president of N.B.C. termed these governmental "attacks on the news media
as the greatest threat to press freedom since the Sedition Act of 1798 [see supra
notes 164, 166, 168 and 186], 'when newsmen were jailed for statements displeasing
to the Government.'" March 11, 1970, at 95, col. 1.
Because of the outcry, the Attorney General eased the government's approach and
adopted a "policy of caution, negotiation and attempted compromise" Feb. 6, 1970,
at 40, col. 4, although a week later an F.C.C. Commissioner said "that the nation's
news media had an 'absolute right' to refuse the demands by Government prosecu-
tors for reporters' notes and unused television film." Feb. 13, 1970, at 18, col. 1,
and see supra note 81. As of May 17, 1970 (at 18, col. 1), the Times reported that
"Quite casually a few nights ago, Attorney General Mitchell told C.B.S. News that
he would accept a federal law guaranteeing the confidentiality of a reporter's notes
or television film." As of this writing a proposed federal law guaranteeing the confi-
dentiality of such material is not law, although see supra note 451, on federal bills
introduced, which still remain unacted on, and on data collecting and computeriza-
tion see notes 500 et seq., and on wiretapping, bugging, etc. see notes 556 et seq.
456. See supra note 174.
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of the press, precious and vital though it is to a free society
is not an absolute. What must be determined is whether the in-
terest to be served by compelling the testimony of the witness in
the present case justifies some impairment of this First Amendment
freedom." He felt that "a paramount public interest in the fair ad-
ministration of justice" required some diminution, as a contrary de-
cision "would poorly serve the cause of justice." The Supreme Court
refused to review the conviction for contempt but, instead of divulg-
ing the information, the reporter served the jail term. Whether or
not this 1958 case is still of present value is somewhat question-
able.1 7  Thus a statute granting a "reporter's privilege" or immun-
457. On Garland v. Torre, see supra note 454. On whether this case has been
violated or modified, see the recent decision in Caldwell v. - , - F.2d - (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. granted, - U.S. - (1971); see N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1970, at 25,
col. 3, and Dec. 17, 1970, at 26, col. 1, on the above. Caldwell must be carefully
analyzed to gather its full implications. There a subpoena required that reporter to
appear and testify before a grand jury, and also to produce tape recordings and notes
of his interviews with Black Panther leaders. Caldwell refused; the district court
directed him to appear and produce, promulgating what it considered to be a fair
compromise, i.e., swear only to what had already been published, but Caldwell felt
that even an appearance before the grand jury would compromise his sources of
news and rejected the compromise, whereupon he was next held in contempt. The
court of appeals now reversed and remanded so that the district court might recom-
mend new rules to accomplish the ends set forth in the appellate opinion.
At this point, side or peripheral reference is made to supra notes 37, 101, and
102. There the Supreme Court held that a legislative subpoena to appear had to be
obeyed. The reason is that a subpoena to appear and testify ordinarily does not
tell a person why or concerning what; for all he knows, at least at the outset, he is
to be questioned on matters relevant to the committee's jurisdiction and which will
not infringe on any of his constitutional rights (if a subpoena duces tecum is served
simultaneously or alone different questions may arise, as in the Caldwell case, for
now some inkling of what is sought may be gathered from the item's desire and, per-
haps, constitutional objections made). In McGrain v. Daugherty, supra note 420, the
first service was of both types of subpoenas, but the second service, and on which the
case was decided, was only of one, the duces tecum aspect being therefore absent, see
supra note 37. This service of a subpoena only is therefore one aspect of the sub-
poena-contempt power and process. Thereafter, on appearing, the witness may now
refuse to answer for various reasons, e.g., committee exceeding its jurisdiction, self-
incrimination, first amendment infringements. On the first, the witness could be
proceeded against for a contempt, following the statutory procedures in 2 U.S.C.
§ 192 (1964), although he could defend on a variety of jurisdictional grounds, i.e.,
the lack of committee authority, on which see FORKOSCH, supra note 432 at
§§ 154-57. On the second, there might be a proper statutory grant of im-
munity, see supra note 421, which ordinarily removes this claim. The last, of
course, in theory concedes the first, disregards the second, and asserts a personal (or
collective) constitutional right as against the body's authority and power. It is at
this point that a resolution of these conflicting claims is required, and various de-
vices, tests, or methods are utilizable, e.g., the balancing process, on which see text
and supra notes 197 et seq. Quaere: does the Caldwell decision, if upheld, permit
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ity, analogous to that conferred upon the physician-patient, or attor-
ney-client, relationship is presently required, such as the California and
New York statutes, but even so, a question arises whether such a stat-
utory immunity is in defiance of the constitutional and public rights
and interests just quoted.
a reporter, so haled before a legislative committee, to offer the same defense?
Here considerations of an overriding public policy enter which may conceivably
require a different answer if, e.g., only a secret hearing is involved or a public
one is held.
In effect we can now approach the Caldwell case from the preceding aspects.
Caldwell used the third contention but attacked the subpoena itself, i.e., he refused
to appear before the grand jury on first amendment grounds. The factual reason in
his case is that he was also directed, pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, to
produce tapes and notes, which thereby showed the subject-matter and nature of
his testimony, also involved the production as such sans testimony, and in either
case compromised his repertorial status. Separately, the mere appearance before a
grand jury would be a signal to his Black Panther sources that he might (or did)
compromise himself by giving information. So that even without the duces tecum
aspect Caldwell would refuse to appear-and this is the really important aspect of
this case.
What the Ninth Circuit did was, therefore, merely to rule on the subpoenas as
such. The opinion required that the reporter first show "that the public's First
Amendment right to be informed would be jeopardized ...... How would this pub-
lic right, not the reporter's but accruing to him, be jeopardized in this case?
"[B]y," continued the court, "requiring a journalist to submit [not testify, but
merely submit himself] to secret [not public] grand jury interrogation . . . ." But,
one may state, this is ridiculous. How do the two mesh? The opinion discloses
that here a particular and sensitive relationship had developed between Caldwell and
the Black Panthers so that he could obtain the information to which the public had
a constitutional right to have published for them. "It is not every news source that
is as sensitive as the Black Panther party has been shown to be respecting the per-
formance of the 'Establishment' press or the extent to which that performance is
open to view. It is not every reporter who so uniquely enjoys the trust and confi-
dence of his sensitive news source." And, continued the court, (separately and in
addition) "[t]he very concept of a free press requires that the news media be
accorded a measure of autonomy; that they should be free to pursue their own
investigation to their own ends without fear of governmental interference, and that
they should be able to protect their investigative processes." But if a grand jury or
the Department of Justice could appropriate a reporter's data then this would make
him change from a news gatherer into a governmental investigator, and "to accom-
plish this where it has not been shown to be essential to the grand jury inquiry sim-
ply cannot be justified in the public interest."
Thus when the reporter showed the public's right to be informed and how this right
to information was jeopardized it now devolved (the burden of disproving was) on
the government to "respond by demonstrating a compelling need for the witness's
presence before judicial process properly can issue to require attendance." The "rule
in this case," said the court, "is a narrow one." One other reason for this narrow
holding was the "tenuous and unstable nature of the militants with the reporters
disclosed by the affidavits, which could easily be ruptured if the former might fear
the latter's inability to withstand the pressures of the secret [grand jury] hearing."
And, concluded the court, "for the present we lack the omniscience to spell out the
details of the Governments' burden or of the type of proceeding that would accom-
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In the case of Congressmen, the Constitution confers immunity
from all criminal and civil liability for anything they say in any ses-
sion,4"' and the President and others in the executive branch, as well
as those in the judicial branch, have a like absolute immunity for
their official acts in the performance of their duties. 459
In many of the preceding illustrations the contempt involved con-
duct by an individual which was in some manner connected with, and
in turn brought in, a newspaper or other distributor of news, etc. The
inhibiting feedback upon this initial flow of information is not only
self-evident but is explicitly referred to by the courts; nevertheless,
they are willing to permit this debilitating consequence, in some de-
gree, because of a greater public interest. Separately, however, the
publisher and the publication itself may also be subject to legal sanc-
tions, although now somewhat greater care must be judicially exer-
modate efforts to meet that burden." The details were therefore left for the dis-
trict court to formulate initially.
Assuming the government could show such a "compelling need," then Caldwell
would have to attend, e.g., if the government alleged a crime, no direct admissible
information thereon in its possession linking certain persons and no way of get-
ting it, that these persons nevertheless were implicated through inadmissible and
extremely reasonable and good data, that the reporter had admissible such evidence in
his possssion consisting of tapes, etc., and admissions to him, linking such persons
with and to the crime, and that without the reporter's information the crime would
go unpunished, and all of these allegations were reasonably supported, they might
succeed.
Quaere: On now being forced to attend, and on a refusal to answer questions
because of the public's first amendment rights (assuming this could be raised),
would the government's plea of res judicata be honored? Or what of Caldwell's
personal, not the public's, rights--would these be honored? These are questions yet
to be determined. Cf. also, text and infra note 554. As of this writing, Garland v.
Torre, supra note 454, seems nevertheless still to be the current rule in the run-of-
the-mill press situation.
Compare the preceding with - v. -- Ky. - (1970), N.Y. Times,
Nov. 28, 1970, at 11, col. 1, where the reporter's article described the making of
hashish by two persons; the state's highest tribunal (one Judge dissenting) refused to
interpret its statute (supra note 450) so as to prevent the reporter from being
compelled to reveal the identities of the two so engaged "in the perpetration of a
crime ... "
458. Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, excepting from arrest while in session or traveling between
Congress and their homes cases of treason, felony, and breaches of the peace. On
the immunity see, e.g., Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948),
cert. den. 334 U.S. 843 (1948); Cochran v. Couzens, 42 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1930);
McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1960). If a congressman dis-
tributes a defamatory speech, otherwise clothed with immunity, to the public, he is
now subject to the libel laws. Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76 (1934).
459. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) and Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S.
593 (1959), with strong dissents in both, and Sauber v. Gliedman, 283 F.2d 941
(7th Cir. 1960).
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cised as the information may have already become "public" in some
degree. Against the dissent of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, the
Supreme Court, in 1918, upheld a summary contempt conviction
against a newspaper company because during the pendency of a
suit it published material which ". . . manifestly tendered to inter-
fere with and obstruct the court in the discharge of its duty . ... ""I
The dissenters could find no evidence of this as a fact in the record,
and there was no emergency warranting the summary proceeding, so
that a plenary trial should have been held; these views would un-
doubtedly be accepted today.46' Even so, however, it can be ar-
gued that the two Justices agreed, in theory, that a newspaper com-
pany could be so punished if evidence did exist in the record, there
was an emergency, etc., and that where proof and procedure war-
ranted they would uphold a contempt conviction. 462 Nevertheless, the
Court does go into the facts as such, and these include not only the in-
formation but also the consequences, e.g., where the paper initiated
the flow of information via its editorials published during a pending
court matter, the Supreme Court nevertheless examined not only these
facts but also the consequences so as to reject a lower court conclusion
that a negative ". . . substantial influence upon the course of jus-
tice . . ." had occurred, and held that any ". . . possible influence
on the course of justice can be dismissed as negligible ... ."468
The power to hold and punish in contempt is not omnipotent.4 64
The overall judicial philosophy applicable to and limiting such
power when applied to these various kinds and degrees of contempt
460. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 414 (1918).
461. See Nye v. United States, supra note 439, at 47-50, and also referring to
Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 COLUM. L.
REv. 401 (1928).
462. See supra note 446 and references.
463. Bridges v. California, supra note 419, at 273-74 (1941), the quotations
being respectively holdings as to the first of three editorials, and the second and
third ones.
464. See GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER Ch. IV (1963) entitled, "Limita-
tions On the Contempt Power" for a detailed listing and analysis of: limiting legisla-
tion (165-67); judicial limitations (167-68); constitutional aspects, e.g., jury trial
(168-84); first amendment aspects of religion (185-87); and speech and press (187-
95); congressional contempt cases (195-99); limits (199-200); and conflicts with
other rights (200-18); including the rights of privacy (218-20); and the public's
interest in first amendment freedoms (220-22); bills of attainder (222-24); fourth
amendment searches and seizures (224-30); fifth amendment's clauses (230-50), in-
cluding due process of law (250-57); sixth amendment (257-61); eighth amend-
ment (264-73); and the tenth amendment (273-79).
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may be expressed in language which is equally suitable to disclose the
judiciary's view of the freedom of the press:
No suggestion can be found in the Constitution that the freedom there guaran-
teed for speech and the press bears an inverse ratio to the timeliness and importance
of the ideas seeking expression. Yet, it would follow as a practical result of the de-
cisions below that anyone who might wish to give public expression to his views on a
pending case involving no matter what problem of public interest, just at the time
his audience would be most receptive, would be as effectively discouraged as if a de-
liberate statutory scheme of censorship had been adopted. Indeed, perhaps more so,
because under a legislative specification of the particular kinds of expressions pro-
hibited and the circumstances under which the prohibitions are to operate, the
speaker or publisher might at least have an authoritative guide to the permissible
scope of comment, instead of being compelled to act at the peril that judges might
find in the utterance a "reasonable tendency" to obstruct justice in a pending case.
This unfocused threat is, to be sure, limited in time, terminating as it does upon
final disposition of the case. But this does not change its censorial quality. An
endless series of moratoria on public discussion, even if each were very short, could
hardly be dismissed as an insignificant abridgment of freedom of expression. And
to assume that each would be short is to overlook the fact that the "pendency" of a
case is frequently a matter of months or even years rather than days or weeks. 4 6 5
In thereafter applying the clear and present danger test to facts in-
volving a publisher, an editorial writer, and a news reporter (all
three stages of the information stream), a state court felt that it had
satisfied the Supreme Court's admonitions; a majority of the High
Bench, however, re-examined the facts and felt otherwise; it also re-
fused to narrow the application of the test to non-private litigation
and, therefore, extended it to "all litigation, not merely select types
. . "466 So, in a different situation, the Court again reversed, ex-
amining the facts and upholding an elected sheriff's issuance of a
statement to the press in which he expressed personal views and
criticized the judge's action.4 67
Broadcasting: In the field of broadcasting there is censorship at
465. Bridges v. California, supra note 419, at 269, the quoted "reasonable
tendency" referring to the lower court's upholding of the contempt finding because
the publications had a "reasonable tendency" to interfere with the administration of
justice, so stated by Justice Black at 272.
466. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947). See also Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331 (1946), where a newspaper engaged in an anti-vice crusade, and im-
plied that the judges were using legal technicalities to hinder the prosecution of
several rape and gambling matters, but the Supreme Court reversed a contempt con-
viction and refused to define the meaning of a "clear and present danger to a fair
administration of justice."
467. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962). The facts, while more complex,
support even more the decision of the court.
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numerous points, e.g., hiring,46 song lyrics, 469 on several levels,4 70
and in the pre-editing, editing, and post-editing phases. Additionally,
there are negative471 and affirmative governmental controls, as well
468. For example, cigarette advertising on radio or television must cease, ac-
cording to the law, Pub. L. No. 91-222 (April 1, 1970) after Jan. 1, 1971 (See also
infra note 474), but quaere: will this not result in doubling or tripling such ex-
penditures in other media? On other censorship points see also text as to contempts,
supra notes 424 et seq., and also Skinner, Constitutional Aspects of Television in the
Courtroom, supra note 444, and Comment, The New Star Chamber-TV. in the
Courtroom, supra note 444. On the public interest in broadcasting, see text to
notes 61 and 72 on comparative hearings, supra note 287. For "A History of
Broadcasting In the United States" see BARNOUW, A TOWER IN BABEL (1966),
carrying the history to 1933; THE GOLDEN WEB (1968), between 1933 and 1953;
and THE IMAGE EMPIRE (1970), going to date. There are 270.5 million (broad-
casting) tv sets in 131 countries today, but what of their use by cable tv? This
latter is also within the present discussion and may do to broadcasting tv what
this latter did to radio, the latest illustration being the Muhammad Ali-Joe Frazier
heavy-weight fight with a "gate" of thirty millions and a future one of a hundred
projected! But cable tv is even more subject to regulation than is broadcast tv, e.g.,
cities control franchises and underground conduits. See also Smith, The Wired
Nation, THE NATION MAO., May 18, 1970. We do not enter the international field
of broadcasting communications via satellite, world, and other media, nor the es-
tablishment of domestic satellite services, concerning which the F.C.C. proceedings
are still continuing (Docket #16495) as to whom to franchise (or, perhaps, have a
TVA-like public body?).
While it may be urged that discrimination and bias, not censorship, enter
into the non-hiring of minority persons, e.g., blacks, still, insofar as they might be
able to influence (for better or otherwise) the content and timing of broadcasts,
there is an element of censorship involved.
469. See the public notice issued on "License Responsibility to Review Records
Before Their Broadcast," March 5, 1971-B, FCC 71-205, in which Commissioner
Johnson's lone dissent stressed the fact that "Simply by announcing its concern
with the content of song lyrics as they relate to drugs, the commission is effectively
censoring vagueness of the standard used-'tending to glorify.' . . ." For the in-
dustry's reaction see, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 11, 1971, at 50, col. 3. A federal
district court in Washington, D.C. dismissed a suit, because of lack of jurisdiction,
which attempted to strike down the commission's guidelines (earlier Commissioner
Lee had said these had been misinterpreted and would be clarified). Id., April 15,
1971, at 38, col. 4. See also infra note 476.
470. One important current question is whether television's crime and horror
programs, and depictions of violence and sadism, are so influencing the young and
others as to be a (major?) cause for the turbulence of today, thereby requiring
censorship. Presidential, private, and educational commissions and bodies have in-
vestigated and treated this subject, but we do not enter further into the field.
However, to the extent that even these types of broadcasts do give information of a
kind to the public, they are relevant to this discussion. See, e.g., the test suit
instituted in the federal district court in Washington, D.C. to prevent the showing of
"Wild, Wild West" in the 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. time slot, because geared to children,
and the violence depicted allegedly has an impact on the viewing audience. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 13, 1970, at 75, col. 1.
471. Negative controls may be illustrated by license refusals to grant on to
renew, and by a license revocation proceeding, e.g., charges of political favoritism by
radio stations whose owner sought to aid the election campaigns of two U.S. Sena-
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as private ones. The great mass of material prevents complete cover-
age, so that only illustrative items can be given here and elsewhere.47 2
For example, the difference between noncommercial and commercial
television, whether non-cable or cable, is plain enough without strain-
ing the point, that is, much that can be seen on the noncommercial
broadcasting cannot be televised or broadcast on the commercial be-
cause of the dependency of the latter on income, advertising, and
profits. This also brings up the indirect type of censorship exercised
by the corporate purchasers of time on sponsors of broadcasts on
types of programs, the scripts themselves, and what is to be shown
or heard. 473
There is, separately, the bias engendered by commercials, which is
a form of negative censorship. And there is also one consequence of
all broadcasts, i.e., the continuous and variegated stream of infor-
mation and opinion received by listeners and viewers results in an
imposed censorship whereby the recipients are influenced, affected,
or even conditioned in esthetic tastes, character, and conduct (this
last does not excuse what may be termed "good" biases so created,
tors in 1970 by charging them lower advertising rates, having an employee travel
with one Senator and submit "news promos" for broadcast on hourly news round-
ups, by permitting "only negative reports relating to" the opponent "to be aired," etc.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1970, at 9, col. 4. See also, e.g., infra note 475. On license
renewals see, e.g., notes 63, 81, 455 and 487.
472. On initial licensing and renewals, and as to the latter especially the
comparative hearing aspect, see discussion in supra notes 287 and 449.
473. This private censorship is rather obvious and need not be examined in de-
tail, but the consequences caused a former F.C.C. Chairman (Newton M. Minow) to
term the resulting air a "vast wasteland" (he also made Suggestions For Improvement
of the Administrative Process, 15 ADMIN. L. REV. 146 [1963]). The least common
denominator may be excellent for school children learning arithmetic, but for
humans to become such results in tagging them as no better than living caskets.
See also inIra note 572, the Foundation to Improve Television suit.
On the income dependency see infra notes 518 and 526.
Another aspect of corporate censorship (see also text and infra notes 518
et seq.) deals with the flight of capital to the place of greatest return, i.e., which
medium of information will give the greatest return for the least outlay, even
though this latter is greater in absolute terms. To illustrate, commercial advertising
used newspapers and magazines heavily, then went into radio and especially the
networks, and today has concentrated on television's three major networks. The
magazines have reduced their national head-count as an appeal to advertisers, and
selectivity and quality have appeared; radio has degenerated; with cable and
cartridge (cassette) television ready for a break-through, will network television
flounder in the morass of bland soporiferousness with which it offers voluptuous
blandishment to the mass of viewers? How will this affect their ability to report
news independently and objectively, program for the benefit of informing and not
clap-trap entertaining, etc.?
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e.g., anti-tobacco commercials as required by F.C.C. regulations,474
or its intervention to overcome the effect on children of certain types
of programs).
So, too, there is a "blip" censorship imposed by the broadcasting
stations themselves, e.g., when an actor or participant uses "unac-
ceptable" language, or actions or conduct occur, or there is anything
else deemed unsuitable, the station cuts out, i.e., blips, the offending
portion;475 separately, there is censorship because of libelous or de-
famatory language.4 76  To illustrate, some years ago a popular male
performer's hip motions during his singing were physically cut out of
the tape, and during October, 1970, a member of the regulatory
F.C.C. found his remarks likewise deleted.4 77  Congress, of course,
has power to prevent such blip censorship, and the only question is
whether it so desires.4 78  The broadcaster's contentions are that by
leaving in obscene material that same Commission may thereafter
refuse to renew its license and, more importantly, that the station
leaves itself open to libel suits by private persons.4 71 9  In some aspects
there is substance to these contentions, but in one there is not.
The area in which a broadcaster's apprehension concerning a suit
474. Unless declared unconstitutional, does not the new law (see supra note 468)
necessitate elimination of this requirement?
475. The U.S. Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1964), originally in the Fed-
eral Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 326, 506 (1964), forbids "any obscene,
indecent, or profane language" from being broadcast (see also supra note 382).
It enters license proceedings (infra note 479), and see also Robinson v. F.C.C.,
334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. den. 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
476. For example, the F.C.C. has ruled that broadcasters have a responsibility
to review song lyrics before airing them, and Commissioner Johnson's trenchant
dissent illustrates the silliness of this holding, on which see supra note 469.
See also infra note 479.
477. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 15 and 17, 1970, at 95 and 59, cols. 4 and 6, re-
spectively, detailing the blipping of some words of Commissioner Nicholas Johnson
who had used street slang in describing a commercial and in alluding to its sug-
gestiveness. The Commissioner charged that the incident raised the exercise by the
broadcasters of "the power of thought control over public officials trying to com-
municate with the people."
478. E.g., the equal time provision (infra note 482 et seq.) was suspended
for the 1960 federal presidential campaign so as to permit the Kennedy-Nixon
debates. 74 Stat. 554 (1960). Also, Congress has prohibited what it considers
bad broadcasting, e.g., of lotteries, gambling information, etc., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1304,
1084 (1964); and see further 47 U.S.C. § 509 (1964) (dishonest quiz programs),
although the F.T.C. also enters this area, e.g., F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
380 U.S. 374 (1965).
479. But see supra note 416, and also infra note 485.
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against it for libel is unwarranted involves the "public figure"48 and
"equal time" aspects, to which latter we add and here discuss also the
"fairness" doctrine.48 " The first concept is found in a positive form
of governmental control in section 315 of the Federal Communica-
tions Act of 1934; that section requires that all other legally qualified
candidates for public office be afforded equal opportunities to broad-
cast if one such is so permitted,482 and provides further that the sta-
tion "shall have no power of censorship over the material broad-
cast . . . -".8 But if obscenities or libels are now prevented from
being censoriously blipped by the station, must the broadcaster suffer
the consequences of another's conduct? The answer as to the libel
is no, that is, a federal immunity is granted to a station for libelous
statements so broadcast.45 4 Pari passu, the F.C.C. should not be
able to withhold a license renewal. Where section 315 does not ap-
ply, blip or other censorship is not prohibited as there is no other
grant of immunity available.485
Another form of positive governmental censorship involves the
fairness doctrine. Here the station, operating in the public interest,
must devote a reasonable amount of time for the presentation of news
and controversial issues of public importance. However, the pre-
sentation may, consciously or unconsciously, be biased or slanted, and
its editorials on the air obviously may be so; in all fairness to the pub-
lic, therefore, opposing views must be given air time so as to achieve
a balanced presentation, although the precise means for reaching this
480. See supra note 377.
481. See infra note 486.
482. During the 1970 New York campaigning the F.C.C. ruled, in one instance,
that a minor and relatively unknown party, the Socialist Workers Party, was entitled
to equal time from radio station WOR, even though its candidate was not on the offi-
cial ballots but was running a write-in campaign; the free time so required was
estimated to have ordinarily cost about $10,000. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1970, at
55, col. 8.
483. 48 Stat. 1088, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1964).
484. Farmers' Educational & Cooperative Union of America, North Dakota Divi-
sion v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959), and see Friedenthal & Medalie, The
Impact of Federal Regulation on Political Broadcasting: Section 315 of the Com-
munications Act, 72 HARV. L. REV. 445 (1959); Note, 48 GEORGETOWN L.J. 544
(1960).
485. E.g., Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950), cert.
den. 341 U.S. 909 (1951), and see, on federal preemption of broadcasting, con-
curring opinion by Brennan in Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424
(1963).
[Vol. XX:I1
1,971] FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 135
goal are left to the individual broadcaster.4 S  There is no requirement
of equal time for this purpose, so long as a reasonably balanced pres-
entation is achieved, 48 7 but as it is the government which thereafter
second-guesses the broadcasters, and holds them accountable for even
honest errors, it is simple to see the undisclosed pressures upon hu-
man beings who must initially decide these questions. As an off-
shoot, there is also a right to reply, as in the case where instead of at-
tacking or supporting issues, the program attacks a person, or where
the program is a political editorial. 488
There are two aspects of private broadcast censorship which are
connected with the commercial purchase of time. Both are financial
censorship, and they result in a species of monopoly or unfair com-
petition. The first is commercial, and the second is political. Both
stem from the ever-mounting costs of broadcasting, the limits of the
airwaves available, and the fact of life that where the supply is limited,
those bidding the highest win and, if they can now influence and
condition the consumer, they not only enjoy a financial-broadcasting
type of monopoly, but (unfairly) prevent the non-broadcaster from
486. See F.C.C., APPLICABILITY OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN THE HANDLING
OF CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES OF PUBLIC IMPORTANCE, passim and Appendices (1964),
and supra note 415.
See also, for the opening salvo against the F.C.C., its Feb. 19, 1959 controversial
ruling in the Lar Daly case (involving the Chicago mayoralty election) that § 315
of the 1934 Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315, did apply to television news broadcasts which
showed clips of the incumbent in connection with certain events, and thus rejected
the application to require equal time of the stations. Thereafter P.L. 86-274, 73
Stat. 557, approved Sept. 14, 1959, reversed this ruling where "bona-fide news"
coverage was involved. For background, see legislative history in 1959 U.S. Code
Congr. & Adm. News 2564.
487. Id., Part II, subd. C, 12. See also subd. D, giving the station a reason-
able discretion to choose the spokesman for the opposing views. Other aspects of
this doctrine are not further discussed, but see notes 63, 81, 287, and 471, on gov-
ernmental control where controversial items are broadcast. See initially, on the
fairness doctrine, United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (A.D.C. Cir.
1966), reversing, 38 F.C.C. 1143 (1965), and requiring a hearing on an application
for a license renewal where charges were made of a violation of the doctrine (see
also infra note 590).
488. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390-95 (1969),
decided with United States v. Radio Television News Directors Ass'n. This Red Lion
case is, at present, the authoritative judicial exposition of its views in this area.
One aspect of this doctrine is whether a President's broadcasts carry with them a
right in the other national party to reply. The F.C.C. promulgated a series of rules
on this in deciding various complaints. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, August 31,
1970, at 26. The personal-attack rule of the F.C.C. necessitates advice to the person
attacked within seven days of the broadcasting reflecting on his character or in-
tegrity plus an offer of an opportunity to reply.
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being able effectively to compete, so that a production or distribution
monopoly is furthered (any species of duopolistic or oligopolistic
competition is within this reasoning). The second or political as-
pect is, in reasoning, identical, for it is now the candidate(s) with
the most money who can "sell" an image, saturate the air waves, ob-
tain voter preference, and thereby succeed to or continue to remain
in office. 489
Secrecy-governmental-and data collecting, compiling, and in-
ter-computerizing: There are several fact situations which can be
mentioned, e.g., wartime or emergency secrecy, foreign affairs, do-
mestic security in peacetime, the ordinary internal affairs of a gov-
ernment, and some of these are here discussed. All of them en-
ter in some manner into the pre-editing aspect in preventing access to
information, limiting that available to the news gatherers, or otherwise
restricting the flow of news. A few illustrations are sufficient for an
understanding and appreciation of this common (among all nations)
type of censorship.490
Ordinary governmental secrecy: The affairs of any national gov-
ernment, in its proprietary or governmental aspects, ordinarily do not
489. On Oct. 12, 1970, President Nixon vetoed the proposed reform bill which
would have limited broadcasting expenditures by parties and candidates in federal
elections, repealed the equal-time provision, and otherwise remedied certain defects.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1970, § E, at 4, col. 2, and see also supra note 312. The
Senate thereafter sustained his veto. Nov. 24, 1970, at 1, col. 1. The logical con-
sequences of the unlimited (practically) expenditures in elections include a pluto-
cracy which, in one aspect, was rejected by the people by the ratification of the
seventeenth amendment (direct election of Senators) (and by the sixteenth amend-
ment, permitting taxation of incomes). See also supra note 473, and infra note 518
et seq.
490. For example, on the third day of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, a
rule of secrecy was adopted, i.e., "[t]hat nothing spoken in the House be printed,
or otherwise published, or communicated without leave." RECORDs I, 15 (FARRAND
iev. ed., 1937). But see infra note 527, concerning the use of the government's
powers to compel information for public use, and see also for additional items
supra notes 85 and 86. For the government's converse duty to inform (or make
information available) see text and infra notes 75 et seq.
There are many governmental projects which must be kept secret, such as the lo-
cation of projected improvements, which will raise real estate values, and the esti-
mate of the wheat crop, which will affect the price of futures.
See, on other nations' methods, England's Official Secrets Act, which supposedly
operates only in fields where the national security is involved, and that of Israel
(although this nation is in a de facto, if not de jure, war). In Russia "glasnost"
(i.e., public disclosure) is, of course, a chimera, and it is "tayna" (i.e., public
secrecy) which is found.
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require any secrecy. 49I However, there are aspects of unavoidable dif-
ficulty in the flow of information, e.g., budgeting. To illustrate this,
the federal government's budget of approximately two-hundred bil-
lion dollars is fantastically difficult to put together, draft in an under-
standable form, and present to the press, let alone the people, for their
comprehension. This is because of the nature of the beast, and yet
this does result in a form and degree of secrecy and censorship. Re-
gardless, in most other aspects of the functions performed by each of
the three departments of the federal government, a degree of secur-
ity49 2 or secrecy is important and necessary. For example, the Su-
491. Cf., however, Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951), upholding the
"Housekeeping Statute" then in 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1964) (now § 301), amended by
Pub. L. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547 (1958), which was at that time termed the "first free-
dom of information law," on which see text and supra note 85, and also its legisla-
tive history in U.S. CONG. & ADM. NEWS 3352-3412 (1958).
It would appear that the government's legislative proceedings would be open to
the people, particularly in view of the fact that the public is ordinarily admitted to
the galleries. And this seems especially so because on July 14, 1970 the House
voted to make public all roll call votes by its committees, even though it simultane-
ously rejected a proposal to open up more committee meetings to the public. There-
after, on July 27th, the House voted to end secret voting on amendments to bills, and
on July 29th refused to accept an amendment to the Reorganization Bill so as to for-
bid substantive changes, and print spoken and nonspoken words in different type.
Thus the supposed open-legislature practice in the House is not completely so, and the
Congressional Record is deficient in several respects. First, not all that is said on the
floor appears in print, as "editing," i.e., deletion, is still permitted; second, the con-
verse is still true through a so-called extension of remarks, permitting to be inserted
what was never said on the floor; third, much important business may be transacted
as a committee on the whole, which is now private; fourth, the real congressional
business is transacted in committees which may hold secret hearings or, even if
public, is rarely found in print or easily accessible; and, fifth, though not last, re-
ports and hearing records take months and even years to be published, losing their
current applicability.
Governmental units below the federal also are accused of violating their own
"open government" statutes, e.g., two New York City councilmen charged they could
not obtain access to public information and documents because a large number of
city officials were classifying them in a negative fashion. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6,
1970, at 96, col. 1. Thereafter that City's Council prepared a report concerning
the use of special consultants in which the following appeared: "The public's un-
qualified and unconditional right to have complete access to all aspects of the city's
operations excepting only those investigations and reports relating to the commission
of a crime, would seem to be a truism requiring no special emphasis. But such is
not the case with respect to the consultants and their work." Id. Nov. 16, 1970, at
25, col. 1.
492. To illustrate, in recent years (at least) it is necessary to have tight security
around presidential appearances in public; however, since mid-October of 1970, "any
news reporter with an appointment to visit a member of the White House staff must
be accompanied by an official escort between the White House press room and the
staff member's office." U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 26, 1970, at 8, col. 3.
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preme Court is a secret, deliberative body, and it is well known that
its decisions and opinions are prepared in secret and withheld from
all reporters and others until the day they are delivered in open
court.493 The Congress and the President likewise need secrecy
in many of their activities, e.g., international relations belong ex-
clusively to the latter in many stages "and their success frequently de-
pends on secrecy and dispatch."4 94
Thus all executive departments, whether under the doctrine of the
separation of powers495 or the necessity for secrecy in carrying on
their functions, and all Presidents beginning with George Washing-
ton, have insisted upon keeping confidential and secret those papers
and information they felt should not be made known;4 96 this has
been a bone of contention with Congress whenever it desires and sub-
poenas executive establishment personnel to provide information for
its proper functioning and is then met by such claim of executive
493. See, however, Vose, Book Review, 63 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1287, 1288 (1969),
who quotes Chief Justice Hughes's statement that "knowledge of how courts op-
erate would vindicate popular respect for the judiciary," and then queries what their
reaction would be to a series of illustrations showing the wheeling and dealing within
the court where secrecy was avoided or ignored. For the early practice in France
and England, see Rheinstein, Book Review, 18 AM. J. COM. L. 442, 444 (1970).
494. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
On Dec. 2, 1970, Senator Clifford P. Case introduced a bill to require the executive
branch to transmit all international agreements to Congress, whether these were oral
or written, tacit or expressed, etc. Another illustration may be the "off the record"
comments, or the private briefings, given by the President or other officials where
the source is anonymous and can be disavowed, i.e., a form and degree of censor-
ship. Press conferences, of course, whether or not televised or broadcast, are on the
record but, by not scheduling them regularly, or by having so few as to be a
travesty, even these may be so indirectly censored.
495. See, e.g., Forkosch, The Separation of Powers, 41 COLO. L. REV. 529 (1969).
496. See FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTONAL LAW § 128, at 152 (2d ed. 1969), where
an extended paragraph discusses, and gives reasons for, this executive policy: "The
Executive establishment cannot function in the spotlight of publicity; the best in-
terests of the nation require that a degree of privacy and immunity insure not only
the President's actions and communications, but also those of his departmental heads
and subordinates. The only problem is to what extent this degree of privacy and
immunity should extend. For example, confidential communications to and from
the President are inviolate to a judicial request, assuming confidentiality a fact, and
as to a congressional demand, the question is legally open but usually adjusted
politically. Where heads of departments are involved, and also inferiors connected
with policy, the mantle of the President's privilege is usually bestowed, although here
again a 'political question' or political adjustment will enter. Insofar as inferiors
and employees are concerned, and where policy is not involved, then obviously
there is no privacy or immunity." See also, for discussions of executive and agency
secrecy, United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), Appeal of the U.S. S.E.C.,
226 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955), and the 1968 study next referred to.
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privilege.4 97  This, of course, results in a lack of information being
made available to the gatherers, who must then seek other sources or
else remain frustrated, as does the public.
In addition to the preceding there are numerous peripherally con-
nected transactions, which seem to accept as their working premise
Machiavellian secrecy rather than the Wilsonian formula of "open
covenants openly arrived at," and so traditionally withhold news.498
For example, ten years after the Departments of State and Defense
entered into an unpublicized agreement to support a forty-thousand
man Ethiopian army, and to oppose any threats to the territorial
integrity of that nation, disclosure occurred only through the publica-
tion of testimony before a Senate subcommittee. 99 So, too, with
other executive agreements and agencies, e.g., the C.I.A. and the
F.B.I., which are notable for their undercover activities and secrecy.
497. A series of volumes could be written in this area, but there are two some-
what necessary and excellent references. The first is a study for the Senate's Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, prepared by the Legislative Reference Service at the
request of Senator Fulbright, entitled Congressional Inquiry Into Military Affairs,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (Wash. D.C., 1968). The second is a volume entitled With-
holding of Information From the Public and Press, printed in Washington, D.C. in
1960, which is a product of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate's Committee on the Judiciary. Although a decade old it is still useful.
Id. at 675 et seq., there is given a memorandum to President Eisenhower from his
Attorney General which is a legal justification for the existence of this executive
power and its exercise in numerous situations. On subpoenas and contempts see
also supra note 418 et seq.
498. But see, Craig and Gilbert, eds., THE DIPLOMATS 1919-1939 (1953), in
which the former's "The British Foreign Office" discloses how little respect Lloyd
George had for letter-diplomacy and desired personal meetings which, however, were
conspicuous failures. See Forkosch Administrative Conduct in Environmental Areas
-A Suggested Degree of Public Control, 12 S. TEx. L.J. 1 (1970). In which one
portion is entitled "Governmental Secrecy As An Exception in American Political
and Constitutional Theory," at 7-13, and another "Agency Secrecy As An Aberra-
tion in Administrative Proceedings," at 13-23. See, on other aspects, text keyed to
supra note 89 et seq.
499. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1970, at 1, col. 5. Senator Fulbright charged that
references in the Administration's annual presentation to Congress constituted "very
artful, in-depth concealment of what we are doing." See also his The Pentagon
Propaganda Machine (1970), giving details throughout of analogous situations, e.g.,
the 1953 Executive Agreement with Spain upgraded in 1963 by a joint declaration
between their Foreign Minister and our Secretary of State, pointing up the Presi-
dent's reliance for information upon the military, and even stating, at one point, that
"frequently the press has been the only source of accurate information about what is
going on in Southeast Asia and throughout the world." See further his attack and
the C.B.S. documentary on, the Pentagon's internal propaganda, supra note 83,
and also that by Senator Stuart Symington who gives numerous other such illustra-
tions. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1970, at 3, col. 4.
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Surveillance, information collecting, inter-computerization: To
this point governmental secrecy may be required and even justified
on grounds of necessity. Now another set of facts and factors inserts
its alleged needs. The first is the need of the government to obtain
and compile information. For example, the Constitution, in Article
I, section 2, clause 3 requires representatives (today) to be "ap-
portioned among the several States . . . according to their respec-
tive" populations, to be determined by a census mandated "within
every . . . ten Years . . . ." There are constitutionally-authorized
but statutorily-mandated compilations, such as those engaged in by
the Internal Revenue Service and the Selective Service Boards, and
there are statutorily-authorized ones such as where deemed necessary
to perform their functions or missions, for example, those compiled
by agencies in H.E.W., by the F.B.I. (e.g., criminal identification),
the C.I.A.49°a To illustrate, one reason for the great American suc-
cess in trade, manufacturing, and commerce is the plethora of statisti-
cal material available and obtainable concerning any and everything
breathing, moving, or stationary within this country. The Depart-
ments of Commerce and of Labor, the Federal Reserve Bank, and
all other governmental agencies, strive to maintain their ocean of
data spilling over.
But such required and "innocuous" gathering of data has been
superseded by its ineluctable political offspring of surveillance, spy-
ing, and secrecy, today verging on paranoia. Those who pursue
such underhanded machinations embrace not only the civil but also
the military branches of the government, and private civilian snoop-
ing is not too far behind. Furthermore, the methods of collecting
data are secret, as are the raw materials, evaluations, and their ac-
cessibility. Worse yet, the nation's governors may also be the object
of this clandestine supervision,499 b and a new "Mitchell Doctrine"
499a. On the statutory mission and limitations, and activities of, the C.I.A.,
see, for example, the speech of its Director Richard Helms, reported in N.Y. Times,
April 15, 1971, at 1, col. 2, and at 30, col. 1.
499b. E.g., Majority Leader Hale Boggs stated flatly on the House floor that his
phone had been tapped by the F.B.I. (although he gave no hard facts to substantiate
this), and called for the resignation of its Director; Senator Edmund S. Muskie, a
leading Democratic presidential contender charged that the F.B.I. had "con-
ducted widespread surveillance of last year's anti-pollution rallies on Earth Day
including his own appearance" at Washington, and said that "at least one [other]
Senator and probably others" had been so watched. N.Y. Times, April 15, 1971,
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has emerged, namely, that wiretapping (electronic and other snoop-
ing, searches and seizures) may be accomplished on the sole authori-
zation of the federal Attorney General, without any warrant or court
order or authorization, when, in his opinion, domestic subversives,
as with foreign spies, are involved. 99 c Eventually, as was bound to
happen, these huge masses of independently obtained information
became a veritable congeries of floating items which, insofar as it
has become public, is merely the tip of the iceberg. But the gov-
ernors' lack of knowledge and understanding of this information was
exceeded only by that of the public's unawareness. The informa-
tion amassed was assembled and computerized for each person or
project so covered; those authorized to do so could now obtain a. pro-
file of the subject, which included data the latter had forgotten, out-
lived, or never even knew.
Still worse yet, while the highest official in the land was susceptible
at I, col. 1. See also supra note 40 and 347. And "reliable sources" reported that
a House member's conversation was bugged by an informer with a hidden tape
recorder strapped to his back (see note 502). Id., April 16, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
Other governmental officials, in counter-statements, supported the F.B.I. in that no
"hard evidence" had been adduced to substantiate these various claims (except
for Muskie's, which was conceded). Id. at 1, col. 4, and see also U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., April 19, 1971, at 89. President Nixon felt that much of the criticism
was "unfair and malicious," Id., April 17, 1971, at 1, col. 5, and Senator Ervin
would not investigate the F.B.I.'s conduct "unless he saw some evidence of illegality
first. He said he had not found such evidence in nearly three years of search."
Id., April 19, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
499c. The Attorney General contends that federal agents may legally wiretap
in "domestic subversion" cases without court approval (see also supra note 360),
and so contended in the White Panther case, i.e., three members were accused of
conspiring to bomb a C.I.A. agency office in Ann Arbor, Mich., although the Sixth
Circuit felt (3-2) that there was not "one written phrase" in the Constitution or
statutes to support this view." United States v. Plamondon, - F.2d - (6th Cir.
1971). It may be also noted that Roosevelt permitted wiretapping in "grave mat-
ters involving the defense of the nation," "sabotage," "subversive activities," and
Truman did so for "domestic security," while Kennedy spoke of "national security"
but permitted tapping of Martin Luther King's phone, and documents indicating
governmental surveillance during the 1967-8 civil disturbances of political dissidents
by President Johnson and his officials and aides were disclosed. N.Y. Times,
April 17, 1971, at 1, col. 6. Of course today's 1968 Omnibus Crime Act authorizes
such conduct of the Attorney General but limits his power to "an emergency situa-
tion . .. threatening the national interest or . . . of organized crime . . . ." as
given in note 78, supra. One judicial method to deter such unauthorized and un-
constitutional action is to permit a defendant to have all material so illegally ob-
tained made available to him for examination, including cases of national security,
and another such method is the exclusionary rule, on both of which see White's
majority opinion in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), in which
several partial and full dissents were rendered.
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to a proposal for local and national offices and agencies to exchange
information on extremist groups engaging in assaults on policemen,
bombings, etc., what of the next step, namely, the use by these indi-
vidual computerized memory banks of "garbage" so collected to tie
in with each other on a national (eventually international?) level
and thereby to convey to and exchange with each other all sorts of
raw, that is, including false or poor, data, so as to check on unsuspect-
ing individuals, deny jobs or security clearances, or otherwise have
Big Brother now replace any individual constitutional privacy by an
all-seeing eye and alleged brain?500 The mind bogs under this weight
of possibilities, and yet raw information received is unevaluated in-
formation stored is incorrect information conveyed is misinformation
used; ' and at this point the question is, used by this dossier dictator-
ship how and for what end?
500. On the domestic spy corps by the Army, the F.B.I., and other organizations
(even the H.E.W.!), the use of informers, infiltrator-informers, and others by the
F.B.I. (and now local police) is the one most publicized. However, it is not only
when these infiltrators and their superiors violate constitutional rights, e.g., Colyer
v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17 (D.C. Mass. 1920) (holding Assistant Director Hoover's
raiders had ruthlessly violated the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments-Felix
Frankfurter and Zechariah Chafee filed a brief as amici), but the infiltrators also
write the party policy declarations on which the government builds its case and
teach, counsel, aid, and abet in the dissemination of "how-to-do-it" information and
materials (as the evidence in the N.Y. City Black Panther trial has disclosed, notes
427, 446a, supra), that the public's stomach is turned. See also the unpublished
master's thesis by N.Y.C. Police Inspector Anthony Bouza on that city's secret
police investigative work which, in his words, "creates a potential for abuse." N.Y.
Times, March 8, 1971, at 16, col. 1.
On the proposed plans for local and federal officials to exchange information,
see, e.g., Id., Oct. 31, 1970, at 1, col. 6, where Pres. Nixon, on recommendations
from his Attorney General and local chiefs of police, proposed to submit legisla-
tion for this purpose. See also infra notes 501 and 502.
On the national (international?) linkages, see, e.g., general references in infra
notes 501 and 502 and article by Congressmen Gallagher and Horton (former,
Chairman, and latter a member, of House Special Subcommittee on Invasion of Pri-
vacy) in National Enquirer, April 11, 1971, at 27, col. 1, stating that the executive
branch "has access to 10,000 computers. These separate computers are now
being taught a common language under an Executive Order, so that they will
shortly tie into each other.
"Once this process is completed, the computer system of any one agency will auto-
matically be accessible to the computers of all other agencies ...
"At that point, dictatorship in America will become an operational possibil-
ity. . . ." On the European fears of their own computer invasion of personal pri-
vacy, see N.Y. Times, April 17, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
501. The total picture concerning the collecting, etc. of information includes,
for example, unreasonable searches and seizures, wiretapping, electronic devices,
etc. used in surveillance, on which see infra notes 556 et seq.; on the subpoena
power see infra notes 450 et seq.
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Censorships of various kinds emerge from all this: The knowledge
of this information's availability and use must have a chilling effect
upon all persons writing, speaking, etc. insofar as any kind or type of
governmental work is concerned, and from here to private employ-
ment is a short hop; censorship also exists insofar as the media are
concerned, for what they publish is now so collected and collated and
used, with what effect upon the media's desire so to publish being im-
possible to gauge; and then the question of censoring the censors ap-
pears, which conversely means that the collecting of information is
to be stopped, or else its distribution and dissemination, which, to an
absolutist, is anathema. 502
Legislative secrecy: The legislative branch is like the executive in
this. Its internal procedures are not only conducive to secrecy
but sometimes adversely affect the other departments and even
the national interest. For example, a subcommittee of the House
Armed Services investigated the 1968 My Lai killings in Viet-
nam; in 1970 the first Army court martial of one of the participants
was begun; four prosecution witnesses were to be called, but be-
cause the subcommittee refused to release pertinent testimony of
theirs, the military judge barred them from testifying. This con-
For the present discussion on data collecting perhaps 1967 is as good a starting
point as any. Senator Sam J. Ervin first then learned that H.E.W. was storing in-
formation to blacklist scientists for certain panel positions within the Department
because of their political views. Two years later the Secret Service's data bank on
50,000 persons came to his attention. And in early 1970 a suit was begun to
prevent Army spying on civilians (N.Y. Times, April 23, 1970, at 12, col. 3). Then
came leaks of other agency's dossiers, e.g., the Passport Office acknowledged
that it kept a secret, computerized file of 243,135 Americans whose applications
for passports might be of interest to it or to governmental law enforcement agencies.
Id., Feb. 11, 1971, at 11, col. 1. Therefore, a linkage and interconnecting of vari-
ous and numerous governmental collecting agencies, with the Big Brother fantasy
now becoming actuality, loomed ahead (see also supra note 500). Apparently the
Census Bureau is the only agency refusing the F.B.I. information on suspects being
tracked, but only because of a special provision which either is lacking in all other
basic agency laws or else is ignored. See also infra note 502, on the hearings be-
fore Sen. Ervin's subcommittee, and also WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967),
and Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968), this first author also feeling that
computers may be programmed to protect privacy, not destroy it. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 15, 1971, at 24, col. 5; Rosenberg's THE DEATH OF PRIVACY (1969) is an
excellent compendium of illustrations, sources, and other items, and see especially
his chap. VIII on "Protecting Our Constitutional Rights."
502. As already seen, there are numerous reasons why data must be collected,
e.g., for tax and selective service, social security and small business administra-
tion purposes, and see Note, Privacy and Efficient Government, 82 HARV. L. REV.
400 (1968), so that no constitutional right not to be so pried into, or have data
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gressional lack of openness is compounded by the subcommittee's
own report that "competent testimony established conclusively that a
large number of unarmed Vietnamese . . .were deliberately killed.
collected for such purposes, appears to be a penumbral emanation from the First
Amendment or any other constitutional clause (see, however, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, May 4, 1970, at 22, disclosing government "snooping" into these tax re-
turns, regardless of confidentiality, by the President or his agents, the Department
of Justice, State Governors or their agents, Congressional bodies, etc.). This con-
clusion seems to be furthered by the White case, infra note 556, permitting the
use of a hidden transmitter on a government official's person so as to transmit and
record a conversation with a defendant involving drugs (see also notes 502 and
560). The continuing chief snooper throughout the years has been the F.B.I., on
which see supra notes 347, 500 et seq., and discussions therein. The best (albeit
condemned because of method) disclosure of its work occurred when some of its
files were stolen from a small office near Philadelphia on the evening of March 8,
1971, and copies were mailed to and published in some extent by a few news-
papers. Included in the information so collected was, e.g., the fact that a Boy
Scout leader had requested visas from the Soviet embassy for his troop to visit
Russia one summer! A somewhat detailed account of the documents is given in
THE NEw REPUBLIC of April 10, 1971, at 5-7. See also the Special Supplement of
the N.Y. REVIEW, April 22, 1971, "The Theory & Practice of American Political
Intelligence," by F. Donner, and the details and references in infra note 513.
Separately, in the summer of 1970 government agents visited libraries requesting
names of those who had read Che Guevara and books on bombs. The Administra-
tion also introduced and, in the 91st Congress guided along, a Defense Facilities Bill
which, in one provision, empowered the President to investigate any person or group
whether or not they seek access to classified information. Hentoff, The Secret Com-
panions, 14 EVERGREEN REV. 55, 56 (1970).
The Army (on the Air Force, for example, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1971, at 10,
col. 1) has long been notorious for its "Conus Intel," i.e., Continental U.S. Intelli-
gence, set up in the aftermath of the riotous mid-60's (in 1968 it so informed 319
government officials, including the adjutants general of all 50 states, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 18, 1971, at 16, col. 4), and its consequent dossiers (see, e.g., LIFE, March 26,
1971, at 21), but it seems now to have gone surveillance and data-bank happy. For
example, it secretly investigates and checks on all sorts and types of persons, even
having the power, if need be, to so act with respect to a Senator (on this claim see
N.Y. Times, March 18, 1971, p. 19, col. 1), and it amasses information and keeps
secret files on the (political) activities of civilians and organizations, e.g., between
1967 and 1969 it fed the names of about 18,000 civilians into its computers, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 18, 1971, at 1, col. 1. Even though evidence disclosed Army spying on a
U.S. Senator and Congressman, and a federal Judge, a federal district judge in Chi-
cago dismissed a suit brought by the A.C.L.U. to enjoin this surveillance, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 6, 1971, at 12, col. 1, the Army conceding, nevertheless, that it main-
tained numerous files (including two black Chicago Aldermen). On such Army
surveillance and data collection since 1965 see also Forkosch, Is Violence an "Ameri-
can" Nightmare?, 4 GA. L. REV. 439, 455, n.68 (1970).
Apparently the Army Intelligence detachment has been replaced by a Department
of Justice intelligence unit to collect data on dissidents. N.Y. Times, April 2, 1971,
at 25, col. 3. On Feb. 18, 1971, the Secretary of Defense announced the formation of
a high level, civilian-dominated board to assume direct control of all military investi-
gations. Id., Feb. 19, 1971, at 1, col. 2. Apparently the Army sought, albeit un-
successfully, to have the F.B.I. take over this onerous task, Id., Dec. 12, 1970, at 17,
col. 4, at least where student, Black Panther, and other riots and activities were in-
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This blocking of the hearing information, added to the
opinion of the subcommittee, hurts the nation and prevents the whole
truth from being known, as well as causes the trial to be impeded. °4
Credibility gaps: The preceding illustrations of governmental se-
volved, and Defense Secretary Laird even ordered a wide reorganization so as to
strengthen his powers over such Army domestic surveillance, Id., Dec. 24, 1970,
p.1, col. 1, but the early 1971 hearings before the Ervin Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Rights disclosed not only the Army's horrendous shortcomings in this area,
but also those of other departments and agencies. Legislation will be submitted to
the Congress as a result of the hearings and the report thereon, not yet available as
of this writing, although Senator Ervin has indicated he backs the creation of a gov-
ernmental agency having power, on a citizen's request, to demand access to and
erasure of erroneous or old or prejudicial information in data processing files, i.e.,
a data ombudsman.
It is not generally realized that computerization and national linkages of data
banks is exceedingly simple in the United States because of Social Security numbers.
Even the I.R.S., the Army, and others are following this system, and car drivers'
licenses should not be far behind, nor can a "total" numerical designation system
for all. Japan's envy of our system, and those used in Scandinavia and West
Germany, is being translated into action and its 104 million citizens will also be
numerically identified, but "in this event, the [Japanese] spokesman said, various
Government computers would be linked for exchange of information." N.Y. Times,
Jan. 31, 1971, at 5, col. 1.
503. Quoted in N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1970, at 44, col. 1. The legal reason for
excluding the testimony was the Jencks Rule, promulgated in Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) and then codified for the federal jurisdiction in 18
U.S.C. § 3500 (1964). "It may be that in some situations" the Rule may be ap-
plicable to the states as a sixth amendment violation. United States v. Augenblick,
393 U.S. 348 (1969). Is the statute applicable to court-martial proceedings where
Congress has interrogated a prospective witness and refuses to release the testi-
mony? Col. George B. Robinson now, in this first My Lai trial, said yes; however,
in a second trial of another soldier, Col. Reid W. Kennedy, the new judge, said no,
thereby permitting the congressional witnesses now to appear. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11,
1970, at 1, col. 6. On the Jencks background see, e.g., FoRKoscH, supra note 496, at
342, n.13.
It may be noted that on November 2, 1970, S.Sgt. David Mitchell was ac-
quitted. Quaere: in the second trial, will the admission of the testimony against
1st Lt. William L. Calley, Jr., provide the evidence to convict (of course the factual
situations are different, e.g., some degree of command is now involved)? See also
supra note 95. Since this was written Lt. Calley was convicted, and then sentenced
to life imprisonment on March 31, 1971, with a first automatic appeal provided and
thereafter others, including possibly the Supreme Court. President Nixon, however,
interceded immediately to: (1) order Calley released from the stockade and placed
under post arrest; and (2) make public his eventual personal review and decision of
the entire matter the moment the Army reviews were completed and Calley so re-
quested it (this creating a backlash of disapproval and calling forth a condemnatory
letter to the President by Captain Daniel, the Army officer who prosecuted the
matter).
504. Quaere: is there any contempt of any "judicial" type involved in that a
"judicial" court, even though in the Army, now has its "judicial" procedures im-
peded? See supra note 431 et seq.
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crecy are compounded by governmental lying. This is a strong
term. It is, however, justified to some degree. It is unnecessary to
go back farther than the Johnson administration, the 1964 Tonkin
Gulf Resolution and its 1970 repeal, and the credibility gap which
eventually compelled the President to withdraw from the 1968 elec-
tions. And the Nixon administration has continued this crude lack
of openness in many other ways, for example, its complete lack of
honesty in dealing with the Cambodian and then Laotian invasions;
the attempted justifications of victories, huge enemy and light Ameri-
can and South Vietnam casualities, and, in the face of reports by cor-
respondents to the contrary, claiming throughout that it desires com-
plete American withdrawals and no further invasions; or, lastly, its
Janus-like activities on the home front.5 0 4a
Administrative secrecy: Another area in which items and data are
504a. See also supra notes 94, 99, 499, and 502. On Tonkin Gulf see, e.g.,
Forkosch, The Constitutionality of the Vietnam Venture, and a Registrant's Right
to Counsel Within the Selective Service System, 22 So. CAR. L. REV. 287, 309-19
(1970), and on the Nixon administration's suppression and distortion of news see,
e.g., supra notes 323 and 324 and also, for example, the latest boo-boo by the mili-
tary when a Lt. General, at a press conference, displayed a three-foot length of pipe-
line allegedly cut from the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex during the incursion into
Laos, although a week later the Defense Secretary and also the Defense Department
conceded this was not so, and the pipe had been obtained before the invasion. N.Y.
Times, March 5, 1971, at 12, col. 5.
See also TIME MAO., April 5, 1971, at 13, as well as "Review of the Month" in 22
MONTHLY REV. 1, 8 (1971): "The lying only shows that the government knows its
policies are unacceptable to the mass of people and hence wishes to hide the truth.
The obverse is that a government can tell the truth, and has every reason to want to
tell the truth, only when its policies are really those which the mass of the people
accept and want."
While the American electorate does not openly condone political lying, it seems to
expect and condone some "puffing" (see, however, supra note 96), and even though
it is dismayed at too much of an official "stretching," it does not often punish. Com-
pare, however, the situation in Norway, where the Premier's admission of a lie, i.e.,
his original denial of leaking confidential information about the country's applica-
tion to join the Common Market was conceded by him to be false, resulted in an
emergency session of the Cabinet and the eventual resignation of the Premier. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
Perhaps the root evil is found in the contempt of power, that is, the contempt
which power holds for those who do not follow. In this instance it relates to what
early was expressed by those who had lived through the American Revolution,
namely, that "there is [in 1794] more levelling then ought to be, consistent with
good government. . . . [A] due subordination is essentially requisite in every gov-
ernment. At present there is too little regard and reverence paid to magistrates and
persons in public office .... ." And another conservative condemned the "ignobile
vulgus-a set of men without reading, experience, or principle to govern them."
Quoted in JAMESON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION CONSIDERED AS A SOCIAL MOVE-
MENT 19-20 (1926).
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withheld from the press and other avenues of information, and
even from the person against whom they are used to punish, oust
from or reject for a job, license, or other benefit, is that of the loyalty,
security, and now "violence" (internal security against bombings,
etc.) programs and happenings. For example, in one such pro-
gram not only was the press refused any information but the em-
ployee was also refused a quasi-judicial hearing so as to be able to
confront witnesses, cross-examine, or even know and be able to
prepare and meet specific charges, 05 and in another where an alien
sought admission there were also no such rights available. °6
Classification secrecy: Another abuse occurs in classification.
Numerous governmental departments, agencies, and officials have
this power, and when it is exercised it becomes a crime for
any unauthorized person to obtain or disseminate it.5" 7 The mod-
ern origin is Executive Order 10501, entitled "Safeguarding Of-
ficial Information in the Interests of the Defense of the United
States," promulgated by President Eisenhower in 1953. This Order
set up classification categories of top secret, secret, and confiden-
tial, limited the authority0 ' so to classify, and attempted to provide
safeguards against the indiscriminate exercise of the power, e.g., a
continuing review of the classified material so as to declassify or
downgrade (or upgrade). Such classification scheme is not limited
to the government as represented by the military; certain agencies
have this power, e.g., the Atomic Energy Commission, which may
have material marked "restricted data" and thereby likewise prevent
505. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), a 2-I decision, aff'd.
(by 4-4 vote), 341 U.S. 918 (1951), although later cases have cast sufficient doubt
as to this particular holding because of its facts and the changed climate to permit
the statement that it is probably no longer the law, and see Dotson, The Emerging
Doctrine of Privilege in Public Employment, 15 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REV. 77
(1955); McKay, The Right of Confrontation, 1959 WASH. U. QTLY. 122, as well as
supra notes 348 et seq.
506. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
507. In Exec. Order 10501, 3 C.F.R. 979 (Comp. 1953), next discussed, § 5(i)
requires the classified material to bear a notice, there given in detail, referring to the
espionage laws, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-4 (1964), so that "the transmission or revelation
of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."
508. An accompanying memorandum, likewise signed by the President, eliminated
the original classification authority of 28 governmental agencies but continued it
(though limited to the head) for 17 others (besides the military or those with par-
tial defense commitments) including, e.g., the Department of Agriculture, the De-
partment of Labor, the Small Business Administration!
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its dissemination or use. 09
Miscellaneous items: Even though one may sympathize with gov-
ernmental and agency efforts to restrict the flow of information, there
is another aspect of government control which deserves the severest
condemnation. First, acting in its proprietary capacity the United
States (and the local governments) obtains information con-
cerning products which are purchased by it; the government
uses this information to protect itself, e.g., refuses further de-
livery, seeks restitution, brings proceedings against the offender.
Where the identical item is also sold to the public generally and gets
onto their backs or into their bodies, or is used by them, with possi-
bly great harm resulting, the government, as the servant and protec-
tor of the people should, so one would assume, make known all this
information it has collected in its proprietary capacity and let the
people decide whether or not to purchase and consume. Secondly
and separately, and even though not so purchasing, the government
qua government must "police" industry and the nation for possibly
deleterious products harmful to the public, as does the Food & Drug
Administration of the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare. 510 It would appear that, while an argument of confidentiality
509. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 585 (August 1, 1946),
among other things, and in its § 10(a), stated it to be general policy that the
Commission have power "to control the dissemination of restricted data," defined
in subd. (b)(1), and in (2)(A) made it an offense punishable by up to $20,000
fine or 20 years in prison or both where one "communicates, transmits, or discloses
. . . or attempts or conspires" to disclose, information. See, for one historian's re-
cent anguished plea against such classification of World War II records, over 25
years old, Bums, The Historian's Right to See, N.Y. Times Book Rev., Nov. 8,
1970, at 2, stating, inter alia, "[t]he immediate issue is the scholar's right of access,
but the basic issue is the public's right to gain reliable information about what its
officials have been saying and doing in making the vital decisions of the postwar
years." This is but the latest such plea, as the American Historical Association, in
1969, had this as a topic brought up by 23 historians, and in March of that year
one professor charged government archivists with "deliberate concealment" of six
public papers in the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, N.Y. See N.Y. Times,
Dec. 28, 1969, at 46, col. 3. See also supra note 86.
510. The Administration, as such, was first created in 1901, 46 Stat. 1019 (see,
as well, 44 Stat. 1002), although its functions had been authorized in the Food &
Drug Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 768.
It is only in recent years that the Chief Executive has appointed an assistant for
Consumer Affairs (as has the City of New York for itself), and that a degree of
unfolding has occurred. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11566, 35 C.F.R. 16675 (1970),
establishing in the General Services Administration a consumer product information
coordinating center to collect and disseminate product information from all govern-
ment agencies, and also instructing the Defense Department to undertake a pilot
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might conceivably be upheld (though not necessarily accepted) for
governmental withholding of information when acting in its proprie-
tary capacity, this cannot, by any stretch of illogic, hold for the ad-
ministration now. But even here many departments have refused to
divulge their facts.
There is an interesting illustration which partakes of both govern-
mental and private secrecy. The Federal Reports Act of 1942 was
enacted in wartime to simplify burdensome questionnaires sent to
citizens and entrepreneurs. Under it "advisory committees" created
by the Office of Management and Budget have determined what data
the government would require and from whom. These committees
are composed of officials from the largest financial and business cor-
porations and trade associations, having no consumer, labor, or small
business representatives on them. Their expenses are paid for by five
major trade associations with offices nearby. Meeting minutes are
confidential. The chairman of the advisory committee on banking is
the executive vice-president of the Chase Manhattan Bank, and eleven
members are from the largest banks in the nation; the chairman of
the committee on petroleum and natural gas is from Gulf Oil, and
the other eleven members from comparable firms; and this is the pat-
tern in the other fourteen committees. "And since every government
agency must get a clearance from the OMB (and from these commit-
tees) before sending out questionnaires to ten or more firms, the
power to decide what information is solicited becomes the power to
shape policy." For example, these committees, since 1963, bottled up
project to determine how information obtained through governmental procurement
may be translated into a form useful to consumers. This is an offshoot of the Presi-
dent's Message of October, 1969, to Congress proposing "we help the consumer by
sharing with him some of the knowledge which the Government has accumulated in
the process of purchasing consumer items for its own use." However, despite a
Senate vote of 74-4 in favor of establishing an independent consumer protection
agency in the executive department, the House Rules Committee, by a 7-7 vote,
failed to clear such a bill for House consideration. N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1970, at 1,
col. 6. See also the activities of Ralph Nader and his unpaid legal student assistants
("Nader's Raiders") who delved and are continuing to delve into the activities and
inactivities of governmental agencies.
It may be ironic justice to find that the portion of the N.Y. City Consumer
Protection Law, which terms it "an unconscionable trade practice" for creditors to get
in touch with their debtors' employers before obtaining a final court judgment, has
been attacked by lawyers engaged in collecting bad debts on the ground that it
"interfered improperly" with their constitutional right of free speech. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 10, 1970, at 40, col. 1.
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efforts to get an inventory of industrial water waste, and only in Sep-
tember, 1970, was a compromise questionnaire, with assurances of
confidentiality, approved but, as of this writing, still not sent out.
Thus, section 3067 has been introduced to amend the statute to
broaden the representation on the estimated 1500 public comit-
tees attached to various government agencies. 511
Private and data collecting: Industrial trade secrets are, of
course, time-honored everywhere. 12  There is, however, a dis-
tinction which must be noted between such conduct and that in the
field of (say) copyright. In the former the person retains every
item of information and does not permit any outsider to learn it,
much less publicize it, and even within its organizational structure
the effort is to keep those having such information as few as possi-
ble. However, in the latter copyright field, there may still be a com-
mon law but especially a statutory copyright, and in either case the
information may be known and obtainable but it cannot be pub-
licized or commercially or publicly used without the consent of the
holder.
One of the least understood, and, potentially, perhaps the greatest
invasion of one's constitutional right to be let alone, involves the pri-
vate invasion of ones' self as illustrated by the ever-growing pri-
vate collection and dissemination of information concerning persons.
For example, there are insurance, credit card, and other dossiers on
more than half the population, each available to practically anyone
having the necessary five dollars and glib assurance of commercial
use. The nation has inched from general information desired for
general commercial needs, to personal information so required, to
snooping, innuendoes, and even falsifications, and a veritable in-
dustry has been built upon credulity not credibility. Errors abound
in uncounted dossiers; hard data (e.g., record facts) is replaced by
soft data (e.g., gossip); little, if any, opportunity is presented for the
individual to know all this or to correct; and even the Fair Credit Re-
511. See Green, Business in Government, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 14, 1970, at 14,
from which this paragraph has been drawn. The article also goes into other as-
pects, e.g., corporate lobbying. See also infra notes 518 et seq.
512. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(c)(5) (1964), "[in connection with any
hearings under this section [of the Air Pollution Prevention & Control Act) no
witness or any other person shall be required to divulge trade secrets or secret
processes."
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porting Act of 1970 is only of some, but not sufficient, aid. In all
this not only are the information media tied in with such private, as
contrasted with the governmental, dossier dictatorship, for items are
culled from all sources, but the press, for example, may itself be
suborned through its own "morgue." 13
513. See, on all this, details and references given in supra notes et seq., especially
502. However, there are (a) limitations on the collectibility and collection of such
data not only by private concerns but also in government, and (b) its secrecy, i.e.,
confined to authorized users and, governmentally, to the collecting agency, and (c)
its use. These limitations stem from not only the power, authority, or jurisdiction,
or lack of it, in the private body or governmental agency so to collect, etc., e.g., has
the Army power to collect information and keep secret files on the political
activities of civilians and organizations (see supra note 502), but also to cooperate
or exchange information with others, private or governmental, open its files to others,
authorized, permitted, or so able to see by law, or give opinions concerning such data,
and, a fear for the immediate future, to have a national data bank set up by private
dossier collectors amongst themselves, by governmental agencies amongst themselves,
and even by a combined tie-in to cover both these groupings. These limitations may
include not only First Amendment rights, e.g., to privacy, and common law rights not
to be harmed by others, e.g., a prima facie (or other) tort (see Forkosch, An Analysis
of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause of Action, 42 CORNELL L. QTLY. 465 [1957], and
supra note 360), but also, questionably, a statutory one.
One major reason to raise these limitations, especially on setting up and using a
data bank, to a constitutional right in the person so programmed is the indiscrimi-
nate use made of, e.g., arrests, not convictions, on records, Menard v. Mitchell, 430
F.2d 486 (App. D.C. 1970), which hurt, if not prevent, the obtaining of jobs, and
this last has long been a constitutional area, Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
Furthermore, confidential information voluntarily given is often abused, and one
illustration is in the field of consumer credit. For example, back in 1965 Jo Anne
Atwell went through a nightmare of cancellations in auto and other insurance, and
finally, through a friend, learned that Retail Credit Co. had given unfavorable in-
formation to these companies relating to her divorce and other personal matters.
She sued in 1967 for libel, obtained a $600,000 jury verdict, reversed by the federal
Court of Appeals because of the one-year statute of limitations, 431 F.2d 1008
(4th Cir. ), and was denied certiorari by the Supreme Court, - U.S. -, 91 S.Ct.
-(1971), the reason, perhaps, being the new Consumer Credit Reporting Act of 1970,
P.L. 91-508, under which consumers may, since April 25, 1971, demand and some-
what see the contents of their files (save for medical reports) held by credit agencies
although, unfortunately, no remedy is given (e.g., a suit for damages) against the
misuse of privately held intelligence data. (On the errors which occur, see, e.g., the
massive human-computer one of an erroneous emergency alert for a nuclear attack.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1971, at 1, col. 2.)
See further the Menard opinion, supra, at 492-5 for a discussion of a few specific
limitations and a pointing up of some of the injurious possibilities. See also the com-
prehensive analysis of this entire area by MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY:
COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS AND DOSSIERS (1971), who, in the opening testimony be-
fore Senator Ervin's subcommittee (see supra note 502), used the term "dossier
dictatorship;" the review by Clark, SAT. REV. MAG., April 17, 1971, at 29, of the
Miller volume; and also the excerpt from a report by Nader, The Dossier Invades
the Home, p. 18.
The right of privacy may also enter peripherally, and is discussed elsewhere, e.g.,
supra notes 147, 180, 268, 502. Other aspects of private secrecy may be mentioned,
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Elitist and financial censorship: This is an area of censorship
which has always existed in slight degree but has deepened and in-
tensified remarkably during the past few decades. What was found
during the formation of the nation,"14 that is, the penny paper or pam-
phlet, is not only an anachronism today but the individual's ability to
broadside or even be heard in almost any degree has also practically
disappeared. Today the media of information are included in the
classification of giant business;515 their corporate structure insures
permanence and continuity; their close-held stock assures family con-
trol;5'6 and for the individual, the collectivities and the nation the
consequences may be disastrous. 51 7 In a 1929 study by the Lynds of
but cannot be discussed, e.g., the refusal by schools to make their personnel records
available to federal investigators looking into job discrimination concerning, for
example, sex, although when confronted by a loss of federal contract funds many
such records were opened. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1970, p.l, col. 2. See also BAG-
DIKIAN, THE INFORMATION MACHNES (1970), and U.S. NEWS & W. REPT., Dec. 28,
1970, at 62, on "Instant Information: The Coming Battle For a 10-Billion Market"
in the booming data-transmission field in which A. T. & T. has almost a monopoly.
514. See MAIN, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 261-263
(1965). However, education, books, and culture patterns were for "the wealthy
merchant, lawyer, or landowner . . .[who] sought to imitate the way of life of the
upper-class Englishman .... [Ilt was wealth which gave him the choice." Id. at
240-241. Yet "Knowledge," wrote John Jay, is "the soul of a republic . . . and
nothing should be left undone to afford all ranks of people the means of obtaining
a proper degree of it at a cheap and easy rate." And, wrote Integritas in a letter
to a paper, "[tihe more democratick the state of government the more essential to
the interests of the body politick, that knowledge be generally diffused." Id. at 250.
515. The old-time muckrakers, who dealt in facts regardless of their political and
social convictions and parties, are still with us. See TARBELL, HISTORY OF THE
STANDARD OIL COMPANY (2 vols. 1906) and JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS
(1934), as well as ROCHESTER, RULERS OF AMERICA (1936), there are, today,
others following in their footsteps, e.g., PERLO, THE EMPIRE OF HIGH FINANCE
(1957); DoamoFF, WHO RULES AMERCA? (1967), Ferdinand Lundberg, whose
latest is the updated AMERICA'S SixT= FAMILIES (1937) and THE RICH AND THE
SUPER-RICH (1968).
516. In Domhoff's researches, supra note 515, he finds that "[mlembers of the
upper class secondarily control many of the mass media through ownership. As the
number of newspapers and magazines becomes fewer and fewer, the importance of
these large, upper-class-owned publications will increase. There is at least one
newspaper owned by a Social Register listee in every city with a Social Register
except for Pittsburgh. . . . Perhaps the most important newspaper of the Ameri-
can upper class is the New York Times. . . . Equally important ... are the
newspaper chains, the most famous of which is the Hearst chain ....... Supra
note 515, at 81. Professor Domhoff also gives information on other family group-
ings and, supra note 515, at 82-83, goes into the magazine and broadcasting areas
and concludes with the text quotation keyed to infra note 521.
517. See the Hoover Commission's RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS, supra note 29 at
204-05, where they point to "the decline in numbers of English language dailies,"
etc., and conclude that "[all of this raises significant problems of control of opinion,
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one supposedly typical American city, repeated in 1937, they dis-
closed that the sources of information which were open to the people
were largely in the hands of the small economic group or class in con-
trol of the community."' 8
The situation which so deepened between those years, and was
also reported by the Hoover Commission in 1933,"'" has further in-
tensified exponentially since then,520 and private, corporate, and busi-
especially when coupled with increased chain ownership and consolidation. Modem
newspapers are profit enterprises." And, id. at 214, they report that "[g]rowing
concentration in the control of [radio] broadcasting facilities is shown in the mem-
bership of the two major broadcasting 'chains.'"
The final view of the authors includes that "an interconnected web of com-
munication lines has been woven about the individual. It has transformed his be-
havior and his attitudes no less than it has transformed social organization itself."
518. R. and H. LYND, MIDDLETOWN Ch. XXVII (1929), stating at 476 that,
"[n]ot only advertising and editorial comment but the actual news presented is
not unaffected by Middletown's dominant interests," and MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSI-
TION Ch. X (1937), stating, at 381, that the press "has largely surrendered its
traditional role of leader; both [it and the pulpit] have bartered their peculiar rights
to proclaim sharply dissident truths for the right to be well supported by the reigning
economy. And as a result, in the central areas of business, national politics, and
civic pride they tend to reflect the point of view convenient to the purposes of this
dominant core of business interests .... ." See also supra notes 29, 473, 511.
To illustrate several facets of this type of censorship: many retired military
"brass" wind up in high positions with corporations transacting business with the
government; numerous federal agencies are under fire as being too favorable to
business; the Public Broadcasting Service informs 180 noncommercial broadcasting
stations that a documentary, "Banks and the Poor" (on how the banking industry
deals with the poor in the areas of personal loans, consumer credit, and slum hous-
ing), may result in protests and, because of the personal-attack rule (see supra note
488), require a reply. In reporting on the effect of this notice the N.Y. Times,
Nov. 9, 1970, at 82, col. 2, noted that "[in several sections of the country banks
are represented on the boards of noncommercial stations and also have made finan-
cial contributions to local public broadcasting outlets."
Another illustration would start with the poor image Mobil Oil received because
of the Santa Barbara oil spill in 1969, the suit by the government for its pollution
of Chicago waters, the attacks on its television ads as misleading, etc. Thereafter,
in 1970, it underwrote, for a little over one million dollars (the largest such grant
yet made by the business community), a 39-week series of one-hour dramas by the
B.B.C. and also a new "Sesame Street Magazine" (plus another item), thereby
gaining for its tax-deductible grant, institutional advertisements so as to create a
new and better public image (however, the theatrical unions were opposed to this
"runaway production" deal for the B.B.C. dramas, and other interests also were
somewhat opposed. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1970, at D19, col. 1).
519. See supra note 518, first paragraph.
520. For example, of the 1500 American cities with daily newspapers, only 45
had two or more separately owned and competing dailies (according to Vice Presi-
dent Agnew, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1970, at 17, col. 3). Or, in Canada, the testi-
mony of Paul Demarais, a multimillionaire industrialist, before a Senate Committee
studying the impact and control of the information media, was "that the four daily
and 16 weekly Quebec newspapers he controls were always free to criticize his
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ness censorship and distortion of information made available to the
public has resulted in a blow at one of the theoretical mainstays of our
democracy. 2 ' It is not invidious muckraking to point to the his-
toric and present facts. These disclose that with only two wire serv-
ices available for national and international information, plus three
major broadcasting chains, and the continuing agglomeration of all
other means for communicating, these information media are today
being accused of one-sidedness, distortion of the facts, and the exer-
cise of control to pervert the freedoms they enjoy and for which they
theoretically stand.5 2 So one observer concludes that "by controlling
every major opinion-molding institution in the country, members of
the upper class play a predominant role in determining the frame-
work within which decisions on important issues are reached." 2 '
other enterprises." However, if an editorial supported Quebec separatism, "I would
have to talk to the editor about it." His testimony also "demonstrated the fine
line between big-business ownership and freedom of the press. . . . The power of
chains, interlocking companies and combinations of largely 'outside' interests has
grown until they own or control two-thirds of Canada's 107 daily newspapers ... "
N.Y. Times, March 10, 1970, at 12, col. 3. See, for additional items, supra notes
62 (for United States) and 61 (for Italy).
521. See, e.g., text and supra notes 4-8, 12, 126 et seq.
522. See, e.g., MILLS, THE POWER ELITE Ch. 13 (1956), in which trenchant
chapter he gives excellent cause for alarm at the inherent imbalances in our com-
munications-political society and, in one aspect, leading to totalitarianism.
523. DOMHOFF, WHO RULES, supra note 515, at 83, citing SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE
SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 35 (1960). See also Tobin, The Coming Age of News
Monopoly, SAT. REV., Oct. 10, 1970, at 51, stating two facts combine "almost
chemically" to cause great concern about the future of communications. The
first is the geographical-political fact that ninety percent of the world's industry lies
within a comparatively narrow strip of land between 330 and 530 north latitude.
"The other fact is the coming age of news monopoly, an era in which more than
95 percent of all the daily newspapers in the United States will have no local print
competition, where only two national news-gathering organizations will supply
virtually everything broadcast over the average radio or TV station, and where a
tiny handful of executives and news operators in but three networks will pretty
much determine what the American electronic audience is allowed to know about
the world in which it is trying to exist. When one combines [this] . . . with a trend
toward monopoly in communication, one begins to shudder and wonder if 1984 is
not nearer than George Orwell predicted .... "
Another recent occurrence poses another and different problem, namely, the
intertwining of commercial agglomerations with the information media, whether
newspapers, magazines, motion pictures, television, or others. For example, the
General Electric Company, which is the world's largest manufacturer of electrical
and electronics equipment, is entering the entertainment production business and
plans, initially, to engage in closed-circuit t.v. distribution, produce t.v. programs,
invest in feature-length motion pictures. N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
This permits the question of interconnected purchases of equipment and advertising,
of biases resulting in "pushing" their interconnected products of capital funding, to the
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The American myth of required free competition in business" 4
foundered because of the cupidity of those entrepreneurs and their
cohorts who utilized various legal methods until these loopholes were
closed;" " one result has been a contention that giant corporations
such as General Motors, whose financial stake, sales, and income rival
that of many countries and our states, become subject to public con-
trol in a greater degree than they are today, e.g., they be made quasi-
governmental agencies and act in the public interest. 26  So with the
numerous media in the information field-they not only are monopo-
listic or oligopolistic, but also are controlled and directed as private
corporations for private profit and yet are able in some degree to con-
trol and direct the minds and votes of men. This is a perversion of the
market-place concept of a free exchange of ideas and opinions, and
therefore warrants at least a corresponding degree of public control
not to discolor but to remove any discoloration of and from the in-
formation purveyed. This is a delicate task in a sensitive area, with
much of control required over the controllers-but unless the infor-
mation media remove their own internal pressures and censorships, a
possible consummation cannot devoutly be wished.
Miscellaneous: Governmental censorship may be exercised to ob-
tain a "good" result through the use of regulatory powers, e.g., the
F.C.C. so as to prevent the use of the telephone to collect debts in
ways that violate criminal statutes.527  Or a congressional investiga-
tion may be held of, for example, a motor car company so as to bring
to light internal memoranda and reports which would allegedly dis-
close that corporate officials had given false testimony in court dam-
age suits involving their products' safety and stability. 2 '
ultimate and horrendous possibility (probability?) of a monolithic octupus-at
least in the information field.
524. See, e.g., FORKOSCH, ANTITRUST AND THE CONSUMER (1956).
525. See, e.g., discussions in SCHWARTZ, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC OR-
GANIZATION (1952); ANSHEN and WORMUTH, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1954); and SEAGER AND GULICK, TRUST AND CORPORATION PROBLEMS (1929).
526. See, e.g., the line of decisions beginning with Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934), discussed in FORKOSCH, supra note 496, at 412-14.
527. See, e.g., infra note 510 and also N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1970, at 61, col. 2,
where the Commission listed violations such as, e.g., calls at odd hours of the day or
night, making a variety of threats, falsely asserting credit ratings will be hurt or that
legal process is about to be served.
528. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1970, at 43, col. 1, where Ralph Nader requested a
reopening of the Senate 1966 investigation and public hearings. See also, federal
suit against General Motors Corp. for the maximum of $400,000 in civil penalties
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Censorship may also, as has been seen, be private and not govern-
mental, e.g., a refusal by a film writer to answer questions before a
legislative committee has been held to constitute a violation of the
"good conduct" clause of a contract of employment, although a suit
by six screen directors to enjoin a merged association, of one of
which they had been members, from imposing an expurgatory (loy-
alty) oath as a condition of the new membership, was upheld.52 9
Associations and Organizations
There are numerous and varied types of associations and organiza-
tions, formal and informal, profit and nonprofit. The United States
has been called a nation of joiners. The range of associations in-
cludes not only business and professional ones but also social, literary,
religious, political, etc. Many of these, in one way or another, en-
ter into directly or peripherally, and even sometimes affect, the stream
of information. To the extent that limitations imposed upon or re-
jected for such groups, even though they are not connected with or
involved in the flow of information, may nevertheless reach over and
be held to apply to the information media, they are of relevance here.
Separately, and within such media, there are associations and organi-
zations also to be considered.
Organizations generally: The right of association is subsumed
under free speech and liberty.53° However, the first case definitively
so holding involved the N.A.A.C.P.; and the court particularly called
attention to the fact that "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and
private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably
enhanced by group association. . . . Of course, it is immaterial
for violation of the National Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15
U.S.C. § 1398(a) (1966), by failing to obey an order of the Department of Trans-
portation to notify truck owners of a wheel defect; General Motors next brought
suit in the Wilmington, Del. federal district court to restrain the demand it notify
the purchasers, id., Nov. 7, 1970, at 1, col. 6, but was denied a temporary injunc-
tion, Nov. 10, 1970, at 1, col. 6.
529. On the "good conduct" clause see: Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 240
F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. den. 353 U.S. 939 (1957); Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. den. 348 U.S. 944
(1955). See also Horowitz, Legal Aspects of "Political Black Listing" in the En-
tertainment Industry, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 270-78 (1956). On the loyalty oath
rejection see Hurwitz v. Directors Guild of America, Inc., 364 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.
1966).
530. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, supra note 530 at 460, 466.
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whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain
to political, economic, religious, or cultural matters . . . ." In that
case the state's insistence upon obtaining the association's member-
ship lists was denied because of the lack of a "showing [of] a con-
trolling justification for the deterrent effect . . . which [such] dis-
closure . . . is likely to have."' 31 If groups such as these are free of
governmental harrassment in these respects, then analogically so are
likewise free those engaging in the information process, e.g., pam-
phleteering. And while the ordinary newspaper is a business or-
ganization seeking to make a profit, and therefore subject to those
restrictions and requirements generally imposed upon all businesses,
still, nonprofit groups do enter the information field.
To illustrate, many papers, magazines, and other media, including
broadcasting, are devoted to special interests, e.g., religious propa-
ganda. They may be and generally are supported by contributions
from members and non-members. For example, in television, there
are nonprofit stations which broadcast appeals for and obtain money
from viewers; the lists of contributors is a valuable item. Because of
the federal licensing of broadcasters it is highly doubtful whether a
state could obtain such lists; what of a request by the F.C.C., with
a threat to refuse a license renewal or an implication of bias against
a station in any license proceeding? To date no such situation has
arisen, but on the strength of the cases discussed there should be no
question as to the judicial view (quaere: Can the judiciary sweep
away all bias and prejudice?).
In other types of situations, however, governmental power has been
upheld despite constitutional arguments based on free speech and
press. For example, employers are prohibited from interfering with
union activity by their employees when coming within the federal
jurisdiction and coverage, and the employer may not claim a right
to free speech and press to the extent that "coercion" flows there-
from.532 While basically a rule of evidence, and not applicable in
531. See also N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (upholding the as-
sociation's use of lawyers against the state's contention these improperly solicited
business), followed by N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Bates v.
City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960) (rejecting listings in teachers' organizations).
532. See N.L.R.B. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941), and
§ 8(c), i.e., the "free speech" section of the 1935 Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449, as
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cases involving the determination of the representation rights of the
employees, section 8(c) of the amended Wagner Act does protect
both parties in their exercise of their rights to inform and to com-
municate as they choose, so long as they do not go outside the limits
imposed by the law.5"'
Employers' organizations: There are huge associations, serving
many of the nation's papers and other media, such as the Associated
Press and the United Press;, 3 4 there are also small groupings involv-
ing but a few employers. There are also organizations which must
separately be here considered, even though they embrace one so-called
owner, e.g., General Motors, for these agglomerations are really
groupings and associations just as these others of which we speak.
For example, when one of the largest book publishing houses in the
country purchases, for over eighty millions of dollars, from one of
the largest magazine publising houses in the country, thirteen tele-
vision and radio stations, then, regardless of the legal methods used
there is no factual doubt that a huge new association or organiza-
tion has come into existence in the information field. s53
These combinations or organizations enter into the news gathering
process and some are practically indispensable. Without these latter
it would be economically impossible for the average communications
medium to obtain all the desired information, domestic and interna-
tional. There could be little practical effect given to freedom of in-
formation if only those media having ample financial means could
have access to and obtain what later they cared to publish. Never-
amended in 1947 (and 1959), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1965). See also, on free
speech, N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969). Newspapers and
all other interstate media are also subject to all other general labor legislation, e.g.,
the Fair Labor Standards Act, Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186,
192-93 (1946).
533. See, for a discussion, FoRKoscH, LABOR LAW 781-84 (2d ed. 1965).
534. In Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1945), their activities
were described generally. See also, on application of antitrust laws to newspapers,
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), although in Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), the rail-
roads were held not liable under the antitrust laws for combining with others to
obtain the passage and enforcement of laws detrimental to motor carriers, one
reason being the first amendment freedoms. On the newspaper's success in enact-
ing legislation, see supra note 8.
535. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1970, at 1, col. 8, giving details on sale by Time,
Inc. to McGraw-Hill, Inc., subject, of course, to F.C.C. approval (a formality ordi-
narily).
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theless, if membership is refused to others, one consequence is to
narrow the market for and of information and thereby stifle all that
the first amendment freedom is supposed to enhance.5 86 Free speech
and press therefore cannot be used to permit a violation of, e.g., the
antitrust laws, for while "Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the
Constitution, . . . freedom to combine to keep others from publish-
ing is not. Freedom of the press . . . does not sanction repression
of that freedom by private interests. '5 T
However, there are indirect methods of repression by private in-
terests, illustrated by the Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970.538
The legislative background of this Act shows that many joint produc-
tion and business newspaper operation agreements were entered into
by numerous papers which claimed that otherwise bankruptcies would
occur; furthermore, it was urged, this arrangement also permitted edi-
torial independence. The Department of Justice nevertheless insti-
tuted a general investigation which thereafter culminated in the filing
of an antitrust suit against one such arrangement, charging the partici-
pants with a combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade."3 9 The
government's success in winning this suit5 40 prompted Congressional
action which culminated in the 1970 statute exempting such joint ar-
rangements from these laws. In practical effect this law gives a vir-
tual monopoly position to newspapers in numerous cities, and the
opposition of the Justice Department, as well as of the Federal Trade
536. In the Associated Press case, supra note 534, at 4, "[t]he heart of the gov-
ernment's charge was that appellants had by concerted action set up a system of by-
laws which prohibited all AP members from selling news to non-members, and
which granted each member powers to block its non-member competitors from
membership ....
537. The Associated Press case, supra note 534, at 20, the full paragraph being
of interest and containing this: "That [First]Amendment rests on the assumption
that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of
a free society."
538. Pub. L. No. 91-353 (July 24, 1970) and see also supra note 8.
539. United States v. Citizen Publishing Co., 280 F. Supp. 978 (D. Ariz. 1968),
these charges being brought under § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, but separate
charges alleging a monopolization in violation of § 2, as well as an unlawful
merger prohibited by § 7 of the Celler-Kefauver Act. During the pendency of
the suit a number of bills was introduced to exempt from such antitrust laws the
various joint newspaper operating arrangements then in existence. The first group
was generally termed the Failing Newspaper Act, but the later substitute bills gave
it its present name.
540. See id., judgment affirmed in Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394
U.S. 131 (1969).
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Commission, to the bill while in Congress points up this conclusion;
they felt that while the printing and distribution operations could be
merged so as to save money, permitting the papers to fix advertising
rates and split profits (denied to every other industry) was an affront
to the basic principles of free enterprise. This is one of the arguments
advanced in a suit brought in San Francisco by the "Guardian" against
the "Chronicle" and the "Examiner": The first paper alleged that the
other two entered into such a joint arrangement, that the 1970 Act
is unconstitutional, and that therefore no immunity is given to the
Chronicle-Examiner agreement.
Unconstitutionality, it is claimed, stems from the Act's violation of
the first amendment freedom of the press: (1) by allowing a monop-
oly the Act permits inflation and manipulation of advertising rates,
making it practically impossible for the "Guardian" or other com-
peting papers to publish, and thus infringes the constitutional guar-
antees; (2) a free press must be an independent one, but, as the Act
confers a special favor of a substantial economic value it renders the
recipients indebted to those responsible for this, and thereby deprives
the public of its right to a press which is completely free to criticize all
aspects of government. 4'
Employees' organizations: The major employees' organizations
which sometimes affect the flow of information at its various stages
are the labor unions. Here, in the news-gathering phase, it is the
541. On a strict constitutional approach, regardless of one's sympathies, it
would appear that such a suit would be dismissed. Congress has plenary power over
interstate commerce, and all of these antitrust statutes are hitched to the Commerce
Clause; legislative exemptions have been given in several economic fields, e.g.,
for trade, agricultural cooperatives, and the judiciary has given baseball its blessing;
thus the first contention is inaccurate. As for the second argument, the reasoning
shows that it is indirect and secondary injuries which are alleged, and that con-
jectures and possibilities abound, a rather poor way in which to seek relief in the
courts.
See also the 1964 purchase by the Los Angeles Times-Mirror (published by a
corporation of that name) and three others of the Sun Company, which published
and still publishes the morning Sun and evening Telegram; the federal government
instituted an antitrust suit and finally compelled divestiture; the sale of the Sun
Company to the Gannett Company of Rochester brought $17.7 million; the former
Sun owners now sued the original purchasers claiming unjust enrichment. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 11, 1970, at 43, col. 2. See also, on the question whether the News-
paper Preservation Act of 1970 really is meant to save failing newspapers or gives
larger ones and chains antitrust immunity at the eventual expense of smaller ones
and the independence of the press in general, Tebbel, Failing Newspapers and Anti-
Trust Laws, SAT. REV. LIT., Dec. 12, 1970, at 58.
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reporters' guilds which come to the fore. A preliminary caveat,
however, is necessary. In the United States the national approach
to private labor-management disputes is initially and generally a
laissez-faire one, i.e., let the participants fight it out on economic
terms. Thus private business and industrial strikes and lockouts are
permissible as the ultimate resort to economic force. There is no
question but that others, i.e., here the reading or listening public,
will suffer when these tactics are employed. However, so long as a
national emergency,"' does not result as a consequence of (say) a
strike, the incidental damage to the public must be borne by them.54
Strikes by, e.g., the news-gathering reporters, or picketing by, e.g.,
broadcasting employees, have occurred and have resulted in shut-
downs of the plant and distribution or broadcasting processes;144 to
date no national emergency has been declared as a result of such a
diminution or cessation in the flow of information, and no first
amendment freedom of the press has been seriously advanced as a
justification for curbing the freedom of the worker to strike.5 45  What
542. In 1947 Congress passed several labor relations bills, among them being
§§ 206-210 of Title II of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 206-210 (1964), which permit an injunction to be granted by the
courts for a total period of 80 days when the President (or his agent) so requests
and offers proof that a strike or lockout will harm the "national health or safety,"
constitutionality upheld in United Steel Workers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39
(1959). There are various procedures to be followed, on all of which see FonKOscH,
supra note 533, at 398-403.
543. For all of these principles, statutes, judicial decisions, and national emer-
gency legislation and its application, see FORKOSCH, supra note 533, especially § 147,
p. 287, n.10, referring to DeMille v. American Fed'n. of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d
139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 ( ), upholding the union's
suspension of this motion picture producer and radio celebrity because of his oppo-
sition to the use of an assessment for political purposes to which he objected. A
more serious challenge has been mounted to the "union shop" clause by conserva-
tive and leftist broadcasting artists against the same union alleging a compelled
joining of the union because of that type of clause and paying dues to such un-
wanted union, as a condition to getting and staying on the air, all as an infringement
of their constitutional rights of free speech under the First, Fifth, and Ninth Amend-
ments. N.Y. Times, April 12, 1971, at 37, col. 1.
544. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1970, at 29, col. 1, concerning the strike by
the Newspaper Guild (representing reporters and others working directly on the lan-
guage of the news) against the afternoon New York Post (one of the three papers
published in the city, the two others being morning papers), and relating other
actual or projected conferences between the other papers and the Lithographers &
Photo-engravers Union and the Machinists Union; numerous other unions may be
involved, e.g., the Teamsters, in the post-editing distribution aspect, e.g., N.Y.
Times, Oct. 18, 1970, at 51, col. 1, detailing a shut-down of a broadcasting station
when picketed by employees.
545. All this has to do with peace-time situations; in a war it might be argued
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is true in the news-gathering stage is true of all other stages in the
flow of information, i.e., that labor unions and employers have the
like opportunity to stop such flow.
The rights of others
Freedom of speech and press is not rendered greater in scope or
in degree when exercised by a publisher, broadcaster, etc., who is an
entrepreneur rather than by a private person; for, as between them,
it is the same freedom with the same rights attaching. In any colli-
sion between (say) a newspaper's and a private person's exercise of
their respective same freedoms and rights, a balancing process,54
with a degree of limitation, must occur, i.e., if the entrepreneur's
right is upheld then the private person's is either denied or diminished.
And, where in addition to a private person's rights the public interest
is also involved, e.g., a fair trial for an accused, the balance may be
heavily weighted in favor of the person-public combination.5 47
The illustrations here discussed involve not only transgressions by
the government's actions against private persons and their rights to
privacy, etc., but also the (entrepreneur's) right to obtain informa-
tion as against the (private person's) right to privacy, although a
private-versus-private situation is also included, e.g., a picketer who
desires to inform others of facts concerning the person picketed.5 48
that other national considerations and requirements necessitate the public be kept in-
formed, and the public interest and the national welfare might well be used to stop
(say) a lockout (or even a strike). Such an effort was made by President Truman
during the Korean peacetime "war" when he ordered Secretary Sawyer to seize the
steel mills (steel being absolutely necessary for the war effort in shells, etc.) which
were being shut down because of the labor strike, and to operate them as government
business, thereby preventing a worker from striking against the government (also,
being threatened with the draft). Because of various reasons, importantly the Con-
gressional national emergency provisions available to him (supra note 542), the
Supreme Court refused the President power so to act in time of peace independently
under his own constitutional powers. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952), discussed in FORKOSCH, supra note 496, at 145-46.
546. See supra note 197 et seq. on freedoms and rights see, e.g., supra notes
23, 47-50.
547. See supra note 416, et seq.
548. Not necessarily in a labor dispute, and see generally FORKOSCH, supra note
496, at 436-38, referring to the picketing of a supermarket (and shopping center) in
which the court stated that consumers might picket "protesting shoddy or overpriced
merchandise ...... Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 324 (1968), and see also Forkosch, Picketing in Shopping
Centers, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REy. 250 (1969). The private rights here would be the
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Privacy versus governmental intrusion: The right to information,
i.e., under free speech and press, is no greater in constitutional theory
than is the right to privacy, i.e., under free speech. Privacy is a
penumbral right emanating from free speech and is to be protected
in the same manner and degree as is any other constitutional right.549
Even the government is not exempt. In addition, the fourth amend-
ment's proscriptions apply, that is, there is a constitutional right to be
secure "against unreasonable searches and seizures;" whenever possi-
ble warrants must be obtained, but these will not issue unless "upon
probable cause," and they must "particularly" describe the search,
etc. 5 49a The fifth amendment prevents a person from being "a witness
against himself," or from being "deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . ...
These latter two amendments are ordinarily a source of protection
against governmental search and seizure of persons, e.g., the arrest
of a reporter, and things, e.g., a reporter's personal notes, write-ups,
papers, but, as these protections are personal,550 neither a corpora-
tion nor a labor union may object (except under the Due Process
Clause)551 save to question a subpoena duces tecum.552 Stop-and-
picketing free speech and press (placards, pamphlets) versus the property rights of
the person picketed. See also supra note 58 and 187.
549. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965), that "the First Amend-
ment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion." See
also discussion in supra note 180.
549a. Whiteley v. Warden, - U.S. -, 91 S.Ct. 1031 (1971), rejecting a sher-
iff's complaint before a magistrate as insufficient where the former acted on a
tip that Whiteley and another had committed a crime but did not so state and merely
gave general conclusions, so that a broadcast resulting in an arrest by an officer
hearing it, with a search of the car and the use of incriminating items found to convict
the two, was also bereft of probable cause for the arrest and seizure. See also supra
notes 78 and 499c, the former detailing pertinent aspects of the 1968 statute here
applicable, and the latter giving slight background.
Certiorari has been granted to determine whether the suspicion of an experi-
enced customs inspector, without more, is a sufficient basis to require a person seek-
ing to enter the country to disrobe in private so as to be searched for narcotics, the
Ninth Circuit holding no. United States v. Johnson, - U.S. -, 91 S.Ct. 451
(1971), 425 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1970) (a 2-1 decision, the majority opinion citing
cases in this area). See also supra note 280.
550. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906).
551. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946), and United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
552. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, supra note 551. There are numerous
other aspects concerning this Fourth and Fifth Amendments combination, on which
see FoRKoscH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 424 et seq. (2d ed., 1969), and also, e.g.,
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397
U.S. 249 (1970).
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frisk laws, which provide that under rather suspicious circumstances a
person may be stopped and patted down for dangerous weapons, do
not infringe one's constitutional rights,5 53 which in effect may some-
times permit a reporter, in the field, and after his notes have been
made, so to be frisked so that otherwise personal and secret informa-
tion may be made available to the government.554 The Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970555 likewise authorizes such frisking but
places a statutory imprimatur upon broader exercises of the power of
stopping and frisking than that judicially permitted in the described
situation, and whether this portion of the law is constitutional is there-
fore open to question.
Governmental wiretapping and bugging are akin to a peeping-Tom
situation. Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934556
struck at wire tapping. In this practice a physical act or intrusion oc-
553. In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), a New York statute so per-
mitted. This had been declared constitutional by the New York highest court,
People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y. 2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964), cert. den. 379 U.S. 978
(1965), but in Sibron the Supreme Court refused to go into constitutionality be-
cause the conduct, regardless of the authorizing statute, was here proper under the
federal law.
554. See, e.g., People v. Horman, 22 N.Y. 2d 378, 239 N.E.2d 625 (1968), and
the use of material obtained by a private frisk, and see also infra note 565. Thus,
what of the guarantees in supra note 457.
See, however, nullifying a so-termed "stop-and-frisk" situation by the Second
Circuit, sitting en banc, Williams v Adams, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1971), N.Y.L.J.,
April 15, 1971, at 20, col. 7.
555. Pub. L. No. 91-452 (Oct. 15, 1970).
556. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1965). Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)
held (5-4) that a telephone wiretap was not an unconstitutional act because noth-
ing tangible had been seized and no private house searched or physically invaded.
The 1934 statute makes this conduct bad. However, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1969) reversed Olmstead where an electronic "bug" or listening device was
planted on the outside of a telephone booth, as this was an invasion of privacy (on
non-retroactivity see Epps v. United States, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. - [1971], 39 L.W.
3433). The latest case in the continuing saga of electronic warfare is United States
v. White, - U.S. -, 91 S.Ct. - (1971), upholding the bugging of an informer who
purchased heroin from White at various times, their conversations being transmitted
to a narcotics agent sitting in a nearby car, the majority (5-4) upholding the intro-
duction of the evidence. The implications of this holding for the rights of privacy,
free communication of thoughts, ideas, and criticisms, and, eventually, for its impact
upon the type of society in which we desire to live, were somewhat plumbed by
Harlan and Douglas in their dissents.
On the use of the subpoena power see notes 81, 450, 455, and references, and on
data collecting, computerization, a dossier dictatorship, etc., see notes 500 et seq.
For a reverse situation, in which the civilian wiretappee by the government becomes
the wiretapper of the government, see the statement by lawyers for a reputed un-
derworld chieftan, in open court, to that effect. TIME MAG., April 12, 1971, at 12.
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curs so as to intercept communications by actually tapping a wire or
analogously obtaining the electrical impulses therefrom. The Supreme
Court rejected bugging, i.e., electronic eavesdropping which can even
use a light beam from a distance. In connection with wiretapping,
however, a series of decisions evolved to a judicial rule, today also
applicable in bugging, which by 1968 rejected any evidence in fed-
eral or state court trials obtained by violations of these laws and prin-
ciples, i.e., a judicial exclusionary rule of evidence.55 However,
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968558
authorizes a limited and qualified governmental wiretapping and
eavesdropping under court order, with the information so obtained
receivable as evidence in court proceedings.559 The Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 cuts at the exclusionary rule by imposing a five-
year statute of limitations on the time within which a defendant can
object to the use of any such electronic evidence, and is otherwise a
smorgasbord of other legalistic oddities; whether the limiting provi-
sion, or the other aspects, are constitutional is, of course, as yet un-
determined.560
Privacy versus private intrusions: Section 605 of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, and the 1968 and 1970 Crime Control Acts, ap-
ply to the governments directly and immediately, whether to permit
or denounce their conduct. What of private persons? Do these
statutes, as judicially interpreted, permit or denounce private con-
duct? That is, must private persons, against whom others commit
557. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968); Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
On the lower court rejection of the power of the Attorney General to direct wiretap-
ping of telephones of domestic radical groups without a warrant, see note 360.
558. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1970). See also supra note 78. See also notes 78,
359-60.
559. See FOKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 479-82 (2d ed. 1969) for pro-
cedures, etc. on this law, whose interpretation, application, or constitutionality has
not yet been finally tested.
560. However, as the Supreme Court's composition changes there undoubtedly
will be changes in approaches and decisions. The public and governmental-official
outcry against these snooping Toms has not been the equal of that directed against
the computerization of the individual, supra note 500 et seq., but, as UN Doc.
E/CN. 4/1028 and adds. 1-4 disclose, the technology, methods, and devices avail-
able in this area of surveillance are, practically, unlimited. For example, even the
Supreme Court's decision in Katz, supra note 556, denouncing the evidence (see also
supra notes 146-47), can probably be circumscribed by the use of a laser beam. And
on the judicial permission given to governmental undercover agents to hide trans-
mitters on their persons when questioning people, and the subsequent use of this evi-
dence, see supra note 556 (and also notes 499c, 502, and 549a).
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wiretapping or bugging intrusions upon privacy, stand by impotent
against these acts, whether in or out of court, or do they have any
remedies?
To bring the problem into sharper focus, assume that a reporter
seeking facts requests a person to answer questions. Ordinarily there
is no problem. Assume next, however, that: (a) the questioned
person refuses to answer and the reporter persists; or (b) the ques-
tioned person is in deep (immediate) mourning (at the scene of an
accident, crime, etc.) and the reporter nevertheless puts his ques-
tions; or (c) the person to be questioned is at home or in an office
into which, without invitation or even after refusal, the reporter
forces his way; or (d), as in (c) above, but without forcing his way
in, the reporter instead wiretaps or bugs so as to obtain information.5 16
These illustrations do not exhaust the situations possible, but they
do give a flavor of what is involved here, namely, the question: At
what point does the exercise of a constitutional right to obtain infor-
mation strike against the constitutional rights of another? Obviously
the first two situations disclose reprehensible, and even morally dis-
gusting, conduct by a reporter, but it is with the third that the in-
vasion of another's rights begins. Where these latter rights are legally
protected" 2 then a cause of action for relief, e.g., an injunction, or
money damages, arises which, either as a threat or as an actuality,
561. This illustration might also be of a motion picture operator who seeks to
photograph persons at various events or in various situations, and uses regular or
telephoto lenses. While there is a factual difference the basic principles are similar,
if not identical in every respect, e.g., a live television broadcast is generally unable
immediately and without reflection to screen out material not desired to be shown,
whereas a motion picture can be subjected to a private (censorial) showing before a
public release. Obviously a slightly different aspect of constitutional right and legal
liability may here enter. See also Epps case, supra note 556 (see also notes 502
and 560).
562. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91, 93 (1931) where
the intermediate appellate court refused to recognize and support a legal right of
privacy but, because of the reprehensible conduct of defendant in filming and ex-
hibiting a motion picture which defamed plaintiff, reached into the state's constitu-
tion which gave all persons "certain inalienable rights, among which are . . . pursu-
ing and obtaining safety and happiness," and now held that "[t]he right to pursue
and obtain happiness is guaranteed to all by the fundamental law of our state.
This right by its very nature includes the right to live free from the unwarranted
attack of others upon one's liberty, property, and reputation. Any person living a
life of rectitude has that right to happiness which includes a freedom from unneces-
sary attacks on his character, social standing, or reputation."
The Melvin opinion does not disclose whether the defendant pleaded a first
amendment right of free speech as against the state-created right to safety and
happiness here upheld, but the subsuming of motion pictures under free speech was
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results in a limitation of the reporter's ability to obtain informa-
tion, i.e., his own constitutional right is not available to him or, in
another sense, is diminished.5 6 3 For example, a reporter, as with any
other person, has no "right" to force his way into another's home or
office merely because he desires to interview someone, and neither
does he have a right to wiretap or bug. If, however, the reporter so
acts then, because of any physical violence involved and the damages
thereby resulting, he is liable criminally and civilly; for a wiretap or
bug he likewise should be liable to be proceeded against.564
There is some authority which rejects this conclusion. For ex-
ample, state courts were split on whether to permit into evidence
illegally obtained information," 5 and the recent cases5 66 rejecting for
federally articulated only in 1952 (see supra note 412), and the later aspects of news-
paper (and other media) responsibility (for libel) several reduced to practically the
vanishing point. Speculation on the court's determination today is an interesting
task but here unnecessary.
563. See, e.g., Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y. 2d 560, 565-66, 567, 570,
255 N.E.2d 765, 768, 769, 770, 771 (1970), stating that while ". . . some intru-
sions into one's private sphere are inevitable concomitants of life in an industrial and
densely populated society, . . . the law [nevertheless] should and does protect
against certain [other] types of intrusive conduct . . . ." "It should be empha-
sized," continued the opinion, "that the mere gathering of information about a par-
ticular individual does not give rise to a cause of action under this theory. Privacy
is invaded only if the information sought is of a confidential nature and the de-
fendant's conduct was unreasonably intrusive." In this case the facts disclosed
nothing private or confidential, but ". . . unauthorized wiretapping and eavesdrop-
ping by mechanical and electronic means . . ." sufficed, especially when ". . . ap-
pellant [G.M.C.] hired people to shadow the plaintiff and keep him under surveil-
lance .... " so as to be actionable (i.e., "intrusive conduct"?). Since the case was
a conflict of laws one, and the District of Columbia law had to be ascertained and
followed, quaere: is this New York law?
564. Where there is a physical entry upon another's property in order to wiretap
or bug then obviously a trespass has occurred; however, in Guido v. City of
Schnectady, 404 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1968), a suit for damages against a city for a
violation because of the prohibitions in § 605 of the 1934 Act, supra note 556, was
denied where the government tap was pursuant to a court order, but thereafter the
Supreme Court decided two cases which may compel a different conclusion. See
supra note 557.
565. Excluded in a divorce case in Del Presto v. Del Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 305
(1966), but permitted in Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y. 2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481 (1964),
although the latter court thereafter refused to accept such evidence in a civil con-
tempt case for violation of an injunction as the punishment was penal in nature,
where the evidence was obtained in the same way as that in a prior criminal action.
Incorporated Village of Laurel Hollow v. Laverne Originals, Inc., 17 N.Y. 2d 900,
218 N.E.2d 703 (1966), although in People v. Horman, supra note 554, where a
private security manager, acting, however, as a private citizen (also as could a
reporter?), frisked an accused shoplifter, found a concealed and loaded semi-auto-
matic pistol, which was admitted into evidence.
566. Supra note 564.
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all jurisdictions any evidence so obtained involved governments; how-
ever, the concepts and legal principles cannot apply to one and not
to the other, as Chief Justice Warren said with respect to school de-
segregation in a different aspect,5 67 and while not yet definitively so
decided, such is the conclusion of this writer.
Some procedural limitations
A free press must pay the price of eternal vigilance, that is, it must
fight to stay free. In the United States this fight is not only in the
form of public opinion but also before the President, Congress and
the Supreme Court. The first two of these latter three are political,
and the procedues to be heard need not be discussed. One reason
is that fifty other separate jurisdictions should also be included, for
every state has powers which can be exercised vis-4-vis the press and
all other sources, media, and persons engaged in the flow of informa-
tion. For example, the state's right of "visitation" may be applied
to every authorized corporation; under this power a body, e.g., a com-
mission, visitors appointed by the legislature, state officers, or even
the judiciary via a writ, can examine into and thus superintend the
exercise by a corporation of its powers and functions.5 6
What may be here touched upon only slightly and particularly are
a few judicial procedural requirements confronting a person seeking
to protect his freedoms, whether on behalf of or even against a me-
dium in the flow of information. The overall procedure in the courts
contains numerous roadblocks or limitations utilizable to inhibit, if
not prevent, the exercise of any freedom. Some of these are statu-
tory, some are judicial, and some combine both sources.569
567. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
568. See, e.g., 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 986, (1940).
569. For a general analysis see, e.g., FORuOSCH, supra note 559, at §§ 53-55,
especially the "political question" aspect id. at 73-74, on which see also Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), and FoRUoSCH, supra note 559, at 74-75 re-
ferring to several other court doctrines, e.g., the abstention doctrine, Spector Motor
Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944), a favorite of the late Justice Frankfurter
which, under the Warren Court, did not flourish much, on which see Harrison v.
N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167, 178-80 (1959), per Douglas dissenting, and Dombrowski
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), but which under the new Burger Court may be
revived, on which see supra note 195. See also Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103,
109 (1969), rejecting a declaratory judgment suit because there was no "sufficient
immediacy and reality" present, and supra note 316. Another indirect method of pro-
ceeding to vindicate a public interest is the so-called qui tam or informer's suit,
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For example, the judicial doctrine of "indispensable party" has al-
ready been mentioned;570 another is the requirement of standing to
sue, which may stem from non-economic values as well as from eco-
nomic injuries. 571 Here the question is whether the litigant has "such
whereby persons first present facts to the government which may seek dollar re-
coveries giving the informer a share in the proceeds, and if no governmental suit is
brought the informer ordinarily (but not always) may bring one on behalf of the
government and so collect his share, e.g., the Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 411
(1964), although the Department of Justice, required by § 413 "to vigorously prose-
cute all offenders" has not done so. See also infra note 590.
A person may also seek to intervene, judicially or before an agency, e.g. In re
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., F.T.C. Docket # 8818, Oct. 26, 1970, where a group
of law students obtained such discretionary permission in a deceptive advertising
proceeding so as to argue the need for affirmative disclosure for consumer protec-
tion. A federal district court, in another case, rejected the City of New York's
effort to intervene, on behalf of consumers, in the utility's price-fixing suit against
construction firms, Consolidated Edison Co. v. DiNapoli, - F. Supp. - (S.D. N.Y.
1970), the court citing Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
386 U.S. 129 (1967) for support, although that court permitted intervention
(against a strong dissent). And see further the Georgia success in suing the
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., as pater familias, on behalf of its citizens, 324 U.S. 439, 450
(1945) (see also infra note 591), which should indicate a more sympathetic pro-
cedural outlook on behalf of litigants seeking to protect interests not specifically and
immediately their own, and see also infra note 590. On the abstention doctrine see,
e.g., discussions and cases in supra notes 195 and 403 as well as Askew v. Har-
grave, - U.S. -, 91 S.Ct. - (1971).
570. See supra note 373.
571. Data Processing v. Camp,. 397 U.S. 150 (1970), and see Barlow v. Collins,
397 U.S. 159 (1970), utilizing Data Processing to uphold standing for tenant farmers
eligible for payments under a 1965 statute to challenge an amended regulation is-
sued by the Secretary of Agriculture (and see also infra note 582). See also Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d 608, 614, 615 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. den. 384 U.S. 941 (1966), setting aside agency order and remanding because,
inter alia, the statutory "recreational purposes" had to be considered, and held that
the Conference had standing even though no claim of personal economic injury was
made, and stating (354 F.2d at 619) that "[a] party acting as a 'private attorney
general' can raise issues that are not personal to it." See further Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1970), including the
"zone of interests" statutorily protected "not only the economic interest of the regis-
trant but also the interest of the public in safety . . . . The injury alleged by peti-
tioners is the biological harm to man and to other living things resulting from the
Secretary's [of Agriculture] failure to take action" restricting the use of D.D.T. Con-
sumers were also held to have standing.
Parker (Volpe) v. Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley, 400 U.S. 949
(1970), upholding both lower courts, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), and 302 F. Supp.
1083 (S.D. N.Y. 1969), which had prohibited the construction of a proposed Hudson
River Expressway under an 1899 law requiring the Army Corps of Engineers to
obtain Congressional consent before approving construction of a "dike" on a naviga-
ble river. Although the lower decisions upheld the right of the Citizens group, the
Village of Tarrytown, and the Sierra Club to maintain the suit, this issue was not
passed upon by the Supreme Court.
See also Parker v. Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley, et al., - U.S. -,
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a personal stake57 2 in the outcome. . as to assure. . . concrete ad-
verseness," 578 and therefore "focuses on the party . . . and not on
the issues . . . . 7 However, this rule "is only a rule of practice"
and so will not be applied when "the reasons which underlie [it] . . .
are outweighed by the need to protect. . fundamental rights which
would [otherwise] be denied. ' '57  Since this is a judicially-made
limitation, the judiciary ordinarily controls its interpretation and ap-
91 S.Ct. 237 (1970), upholding both lower courts, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), 302
F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), which had prohibited the construction of a pro-
posed Hudson River Expressway under an 1899 law requiring the Army Corps of
Engineers to obtain Congressional consent before approving construction of a "dike"
on a navigable river. Although the lower decisions upheld the right of the Citizens
group, the Village of Tarrytown, and the Sierra Club to maintain the suit, this issue
was not directly passed upon by the Court. However, see Sierra Club v. Morton,
- U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 870 (1971), granting certiorari to determine, among other
things, whether the Club had standing to challenge the issuance of permits by the
Agriculture and Interior Departments to the Walt Disney Organization to construct a
ski and recreation area in the Sequoia National Forest, although on the basis of Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, - U.S. -, 91 S.Ct. 814 (1971), this
procedural permission should be granted.
572. See Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118 (1939), where
plaintiffs showed actual economic damage, i.e., financial loss (which some term
"injury in fact," as alleged in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 [1970]) by the
defendant's actions, but the Court held that no "legal injury" had been shown, i.e.,
plaintiffs had no legal right to be free from otherwise lawful competition. See,
on this latter concept, Forkosch, An Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause of
Action, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 465 (1957), and see further suit by Foundation to im-
prove Television against C.B.S. and its Washington affiliate to restrain them from
showing re-runs of "Wild, Wild West" during the late afternoon because it "con-
tains fictionalized violence and horror harmful to the mental health and well-being
of minor children." N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1970, at 75, col. 1. The Foundation's
brief sought to "protect the rights of viewers" in this first such suit filed in a federal
district (or other) court.
573. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
574. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968). At 99, n.20, the Court also dis-
closed non-adherence to the rule in standing that one could not assert the rights of
absent third persons, citing Dombrowski, supra notes 195 and 569, and Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). In United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., 318 F. Supp.
1293 (S.D. N.Y. 1970) the government was held to have standing to seek an in-
junction against a retail seller's practice of obtaining sewer service default judgments,
i.e., "to end widespread deprivations . . . of property through 'state action' without
due process of law." See also supra note 86, and, for a recent discussion and analysis
of cases, seeking to apply them in a specialized field, see Maloney, The New Stand-
ing Applied to Eminent Domain, 25 THE REcord 669 (1970).
575. Barrows v. Jackson, supra note 574, at 257, and see also supra note 85, as
well as illustrations such as: Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970), per-
mitting a group of travel agents to challenge performance of travel services by
national banks; D.D.C. Federation of Civic Ass'ns. v. Volpe, 308 F. Supp. 423
(D.D.C. 1970); Ad Hoc Committee on Consumer Protection v. United States, 313
F. Supp. 119 (D.C.D. 1970).
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plication in particular situations,5 70 even permitting standing to raise
the claim that a statutory limitation denied equal protection;5 77 how-
ever, Congress has also entered this area, e.g., by permitting "[a]ny
competitor, customer, or competitor of a customer of any person"
violating a 1906 statute to seek injunctive or other relief,5 78 and by
permitting judicial review by a competitor where a new broadcasting
license was granted, as "[i]t is within the power of Congress to con-
fer such standing to prosecute an appeal. '579  Thus where no statute
is found the Supreme Court may reject standing,5"" but where an
unambiguous statute grants this right to sue no question of standing
arises; 581 and even where the statute is clearly against a person the
576. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923), rejecting a fed-
eral taxpayer's suit to enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from making payments
under the Maternity Act of 1921 because his interest was "shared with millions of
others [and] is comparatively minute and indeterminable .... ." However, in the
light of Flast, supra note 574, and other decisions, Frothingham is suspect, as
Douglas argues in his dissent in Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970). See
further Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943), rejecting attack by a physician on a
state statute which allegedly deprived his patients', not his own, right to life, and
also see supra note 86, cf., however, cases where suit was permitted: Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
(1947); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (and see earlier Tileston case, supra, and also Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497 [1961], although in Griswold there had been a defiance of the law
which certainly conferred standing).
577. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970), although the Court's footnoted
(n.23) analysis does not go this far. But see, Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction,
368 U.S. 278, 282 (1961), that whether one "has standing to attack a state statute in
this Court is, however, a separate issue, to which we must bring our independent
judgment."
578. Pub. L. 91-366 (July 31, 1970), the legislative history disclosing that
while the National Gold & Silver Stamping Act of 1906 contains civil sections to
ensure that articles made of those metals be properly marked, still, "despite in-
dications of repeated and substantial violations of the act, the Department of Jus-
tice has never brought a suit to enforce this statute." Therefore, "it is essential
that a method be devised to insure adequate enforcement ...... H.R. Rep. No. 91-
928, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). This statute, of course, first creates a cause of
action, and then gives such persons the ability to sue. See also Mulvey v. Samuel
Goldwyn Prods., - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1970), holding a former owner of a feature
film has standing to sue a purchasing distributor for block-booking it, citing Clayton
Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964), and thus disagreeing with Billy Baxter, Inc. v.
Coca-Cola, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1970).
579. F.C.C. v. Sanders Bros. Radio, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). See also language
in Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C., 316 U.S. 4 (1942); see further infra note
590.
580. E.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 470
(1951), with Frankfurter's concurring opinion also discussing other requirements.
581. F.C.C. v. Sanders Bros. and Scripps-Howard v. F.C.C., supra note 579
Where a statute is ambiguous a question of construction arises but, in ecological
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court may still interpret it to permit the suit. 5 2  So, despite the Su-
preme Court's rejection of an action by iron and steel producers to
prevent the application of minimum wages to them,58s the Congress
enacted a statute to permit the suit,584 Senator Fulbright stating, "It
is our purpose by this Amendment, to overturn that decision."' ' 5
A class suit is one where a person sues on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, with like problems arising: that is, the
Court has refused 58 6 and has also permitted 587 suits to be maintained,
although "[w]here statutes are concerned, the trend is toward en-
largement of the class of people who may protest administrative ac-
tion. '58 8  For example, one or a few persons receiving newsletters
from China may sue on behalf of themselves and all others who reg-
and related matters, it seems as if the courts are supporting the standing of numer-
ous organizations, e.g., Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425
F.2d 97, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1970); see also supra note 575.
582. E.g., Associated Industries of N.Y. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943);
and see vacatur of certiorari, 320 U.S. 707 (1943), although see also the Data Proc-
essing and Barlow cases, supra note 571, where Brennan's dissent on standing
(White joined him), at 168 of 397 U.S. urged that a plaintiff need only allege "that
the challenged has caused him injury in fact," and that "By requiring a second, non-
constitutional step, the Court comes very close to perpetuating the discredited require-
ment that conditioned standing on a showing by the plaintiff that the challenged gov-
ernmental action invaded one of his legally protected interests," citing, and quoting
from, in n.1, the Associated Industries case.
583. Under the Walsh-Healey Act of 1936, Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310
U.S. 113 (1940).
584. Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2061-2166
(1952).
585. 98 Cong. Rec. 6531 (1952), although see language in Mitchell v. Coving-
ton Mills, 229 F.2d 506, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. den. 350 U.S. 1002 (1956).
586. See, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman, supra note 576. See also supra note 572, the
Foundation case, as a questionable illustration here.
587. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra note 576 and also Hardin v.
Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968); Data Processing Service v. Camp,
supra note 571, and companion case of Barlow v. Collins, supra note 572. See,
in the Data Processing case, concurrence of Brennan (White) who objects to one
element of the majority's two ingredients for standing.
588. Data Processing Service v. Camp, supra note 571, at 154, and see Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as discussed in Rosado v. Wyman, - F.
Supp. - (E.D. N.Y. 1970). See also Forkosch, Administrative Conduct in Environ-
mental Areas-a Suggested Degree of Public Control, 12 S. TEx. L.J. 1 (1970).
In Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1970), plain-
tiff's own complaint under the 1964 Civil Rights Act was rejected because of a fail-
ure to prove damages, but as plaintiff also brought the suit as a class action the
Circuit Court held that the firm's hiring policies should be kept under observation
by the district court which was to "retain jurisdiction over the matter for a reason-
able period of time to insure the continued implementation" of the defendant's hir-
ing policies. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 16, 1970, at 65, col. 1. See also
Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc., 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1970).
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ularly receive them, and wish them to continue being sent and re-
ceived, to enjoin their seizure and impounding by the Postmaster Gen-
eral; and in October 1969 the President requested legislation author-
izing a class action by consumers victimized by a common fraud, al-
though no action has yet been taken on this.58 9
However, even where no statutory support exists, the courts may
reject a past theory "when it is no longer a valid assumption which
stands up under the realities of actual experience," and so permit,
e.g., the public interest to be represented in the licensing of a broad-
casting station, or "individual litigants, acting as private attorneys-
general, . . . [to] have standing 'as representatives of the public in-
terest.' "590 The judicial key seems to be not only the public in-
terest but also the financial burdens which bear onerously upon one
plaintiff where his claim is minimal and his success will redound to
the advantage of others, i.e., all these others are piggy-backing him, or
the need to have some other method available whereby the public in-
terest is to be protected and vindicated. For example, in 1945
Georgia was permitted to bring an original proceeding against the
Pennsylvania Railroad Company to contest the railroad rates charged
its citizens, even though in reality it was the Interstate Commerce
Commission which was involved;591 and the 1970 furor over the
ability of tax-exempt organizations to bring suits concerning pollu-
tion and other ecological and environmental aspects has greatly
589. The mail case is Williams v. Blount, 314 F. Supp. 1356 (D.D.C. 1970) (see
also supra note 366). For the legislation requested see supra note 510. For other
legislation giving individual consumers a cause of action see, e.g., the Truth in
Lending Act, being Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-321 (May 29, 1968), § 130. In Title II an amendment to 18 U.S.C. adds a
new chapter, including §§ 891-896, striking against loan-sharking, and the consti-
tutionality of these provisions may be tested in Perez v. United States, cert. granted,
400 U.S. 915 (1970). For a detailed analysis of "Consumer Proposals for Class
Actions and Other Remedies," see that Analysis No. 20, Nov. 20, 1970, by
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (1970).
590. For the license case see Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ v. F.C.C., 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969), decision by now Chief Justice
Burger. The quotation is from Flast v. Cohen, supra note 574, at (citing also
the United Church case, on which see also supra note 569).
591. Georgia v. Penn. R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945), and see also supra notes
487 and 569. To what extent does this fly in the face of Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1923)? Although there the Court used the disjunctive in holding
no justiciable controversy was presented "either in its own behalf or as the repre-
sentative of its citizens," i.e., if a justiciable controversy had been presented then the
question of the state suing on behalf of its citizens might have arisen. See also the
Douglas dissent in Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970).
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broadened not only the doctrines of standing and class availability,
but also the Court's willingness at least to listen to such plaintiffs.59 u
CONCLUSIONS
The conclusion which flows irresistibly from all of the preceding is
simply expressed-that the almost-absolute freedom of information
is a necessity for nation and individual and, it may be added, for
the family of nations. It is not only a right of all persons themselves
to seek out and obtain, edit, publish, and distribute all forms and
types of information, but also a duty of all governments to make avail-
able and cooperate in all of this, and a coin-face right of all persons to
receive, discuss, dissent, reply, and otherwise engage in a free and
untrammeled debate concerning the substance and merits of such in-
formation, i.e., other and additional information to substantiate, ex-
plain, reject, or otherwise defend or attack the first (there are also
obligations attached to the exercise of these several rights); and in
this ebb and flow of the information tide the governments have no
business or power creating locks or dikes (save, unfortunately, in the
direst of emergencies and then only as needed for a temporary pe-
riod). And, it may be added, neither do private classes, monopolies,
or oligopolies have any business, much less a constitutional right, to
exercise any degree of control or censorship593 over the content or
592. See, e.g., the Internal Revenue Services' announcement on Oct. 9, 1970, to
stop granting any new tax exemptions to such litigating organizations, and to review
the status of those having such exemptions, where the legal actions involved
"citizens suits" or other types of proceedings against industrialists to reinforce weak
anti-pollution legislation; wide pressure was brought, e.g., editorial, NEW REPUBLIc,
Oct. 31, 1970, at 5, quoting objections by Senators Gaylord Nelson and Clifford Case,
and quoting the latter that "it is specious to contend that 'the tax exempt status of
these groups gives them an unfair advantage. Corporate legal expenses, as well as a
large share of lobbying expenses, are incorporated in the regular operating costs of
business which are passed along to the consumer to the degree to which they
are not written off as tax deductions.'"
Thereafter other vociferous and influential opposition caused the I.R.S., on Nov.
12, 1970, to back down, and eight guidelines or criteria were issued to determine
such status. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1970, at 1, col. 6. If this concern by citizens
resulted in this reversal (somewhat), why not apply it to the Refuse Act of 1899,
supra note 569, so as to compel the federal attorneys to enforce this anti-dumping
section and save the waters.
593. In 1969 President Nixon introduced a State of the World report to Congress
and the nation, and it is not amiss to suggest that in future such reports he include an
analysis of the global state of freedoms and liberties with, perhaps, special emphasis
upon those of speech, press, religion, petition, and assembly, i.e., the first amend-
ment rights.
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means of transmission of information.5 94
The United States is committed, in theory, to these concepts. In
practice, however, it and many of its people and private bodies have
wavered in the economic and political continuation and enforcement
of these rights and duties. The three branches of the federal govern-
ment have not been uniform in their interpretation and application of
the constitutional principles, and, at times, one or more have re-
verted to the discredited views embodied in the infamous Alien & Se-
dition Acts of 1798. Nevertheless, the fundamental principles of
our democracy have continued' 9" upon the foundation erected in the
eighteenth century and so cogently expressed in the Virginia and Ken-
tucky Resolutions of 1799 as a second response to the obnoxious
1798 Acts:
In every State, probably, in the Union, the press has exerted a freedom in can-
vassing the merits and measures of public men, of every description, which has not
been confined to the strict limits of the common law. . . . Some degree of abuse is
inseparable from the proper use of every thing; and in no instance is this more true,
than in that of the press. It has accordingly been decided by the practice of the States,
that it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches, to their luxuriant growth, than
by pruning them away, to injure the vigor of those yielding the proper fruits. And
can the wisdom of this policy be doubted by any who reflect, that to the press alone,
chequered as it is with abuses, the world is indebted for all the triumphs which have
been gained by reason and humanity, over error and oppression; who reflect, that to
the same beneficent source, the United States owe much of the lights which con-
ducted them to the rank of a free and independent nation; and which have improved
their political system into a shape so auspicious to their happiness. Had "Sedition
Acts," forbidding every publication that might bring the constituted agents into con-
tempt or disrepute, or that might excite the hatred of the people against the authors
of unjust or pernicious measures, been uniformly enforced gainst the press; might not
the United States have been languishing at this day, under the infirmities of a sickly
confederation; might they not possibly be miserable colonies, groaning under a for-
eign yoke? 59 6
594. See supra notes 514 et seq., and SIEBERT et al., Four Theories of the Press
1-2 (1956): "The thesis of this volume is that the press always takes on the form
and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates. Espe-
cially, it reflects the system of social control whereby the relations of individuals and
institutions are adjusted...." The authors feel that only two theories of the press
are discoverable, i.e., an authoritarian and a libertarian one.
595. To what extent and degree they are still found in practice, and are threat-
ened in the future, is, of course, an opinion which each person determines for
himself. See, e.g., supra notes 62 and 518 et seq.
596. THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY 144-145 (Padover ed. 1939) (see also
supra note 145), the Resolutions being the product of Jefferson and partly of
Madison.
